The Destiny of Technology.docx

1、The Destiny of TechnologyThe Destiny of Technology: Modern Science and Human Freedom in the Later HeideggerRex Gilliland, Birmingham-Southern CollegeWhen we read Heideggers lectures Insight into That Which Is (1949) and The Thing (1950) once again, the underlying theme is still striking: According t

2、o Heidegger, the invention of the airplane and the radio may bring the distant corners of the world within reach in far less time than was formerly possible, but this does not mean that we have brought things into nearness. Modern technology may remove distances (Entfernungen, Abstnde), but it does

3、not grasp the essence of the nearness (Nhe) and remoteness (Ferne) of things because the latter never arises as a question for it (see GA 79:3-4; GA 7:167-168/Th 165-166).1 By elucidating the difference between these two ways of relating to the thing, Heidegger raises not only the issue of the essen

4、ce of the thing, but also the issue of the essence of technology.2 However, some may wonder whether Heideggers discussion of technology is still relevant today, given the many scientific and technological advancements that have occurred in recent decades. His references to the radio, the airplane, m

5、achine technology, and the hydrogen bomb seem somewhat facile in an age of space exploration, cell phones, and the internet. Technological innovations such as the particle accelerator and gene sequencing have enabled science to penetrate into the microstructure of the organic and inorganic, opening

6、up new vistas for the representation and manipulation of beings. Has the essence of technology and science changed in the last fifty years? The datedness of Heideggers examples and the tireless pace of scientific advancement appear to confirm Heideggers claims about the essence of technology instead

7、 of undermining them. The novelty of such examples is wearing off even faster today, which suggests that our ability to be enchanted by technological innovation is decreasing: Current discoveries make much less of an impact today than did the invention of the radio, airplane transportation, and the

8、nuclear bomb. We are less surprised by new innovations because we have grown to expect them, and are so impatiently focused on how science promises to improve our lives in the future that the current cutting edge of technology is experienced as little more than a stopgap measure whose limitations ar

9、e painfully apparent. Does our decreasing ability to experience wonder in the face of technology not confirm Heideggers claim that the human being is “continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering (Bestellen), and of der

10、iving all of its standards on this basis” (GA 7:26-27/QCT 26)? This danger is what Heidegger earlier calls machination (Machenschaft). According to Heidegger, machination is the total disappearance of enchantment and questioning. In machination, beings are reduced to that which is re-presentable and

11、 makeable (machbar), what can be calculated and manipulated (see GA 65:108-109, 123-127/CP 76, 86-88).3 The extinction of wonder is, for Heidegger, the culmination of the type of technological thinking so prevalent today in the sciences. The danger of machination can be seen in the contemporary scie

12、ntific inquiry into the nature of human being, an issue that has long generated some of the greatest difficulties for scientists. Cognitive science attempts to explain human behavior by studying such things as the architecture of the brain, the nature of language, memory, perceptions and motor funct

13、ion, as well as the possibility of simulating human intelligence with computers. What is common to the various forms of research conducted under the rubric of cognitive science is the general assumption that human cognition, at least in principle, is representable in much the same way as other natur

14、al beings. Though not all cognitive scientists espouse material eliminativism or epiphenomenalism, the attempt to uncover the basic elements that determine human activity threatens to reduce human being into something that we no longer experience as wonderous. What does Heidegger have to say about t

15、he way that science and technology conceal the mysterious and unique presencing of beings, especially that of the human being? What response to science and technology does he develop in his thought? In this paper, we will explore these questions by considering how Heidegger raises the issue of human

16、 freedom in his discussion of technology. This may sound strange, because is it not the case that, in his later thought, Heidegger critiques the notion of the will and subsumes human agency to the granting of being? Does Heideggers thinking not turn from Dasein to the history of being? The claim tha

17、t Heidegger jettisons the notion of human freedom in his later thought may be the prevailing view, but Heideggers discussion of technology suggests otherwise. This is seen especially in the 1953 lecture The Question Concerning Technology, where Heidegger examines the difference between destiny (Gesc

18、hick) and fate (Schicksal). At the beginning of the lecture, Heidegger states that his purpose here is to prepare a free relationship to technology. What this relationship reveals about the essence of technology and the possibility of human freedom is something we will consider in detail. Does the h

19、istorical transformation of the essence of technology in another beginning have anything to do with human decision? Is the destiny of technology intrinsically connected to the human being?In addition, the question arises as to whether Heideggers response to modern science and technology is merely cr

20、itical. Richard Rorty stated recently that “Heidegger had considerable contempt for the natural sciences.”4 Is this an overstatement of Heideggers critique of modern science, or does science, for Heidegger, lack a destiny? Does Heideggers critique of science leave a space open for scientific and tec

21、hnological innovation and for the possibility of a scientific respect for the question of being? We will consider these questions surrounding Heideggers philosophy of science briefly by way of conclusion.As we have seen, Heidegger begins the lecture The Question Concerning Technology by introducing

22、the issue of freedom. At the outset, he states that his purpose in the lecture is to prepare a free relationship to technology, a relationship that “opens our Dasein to the essence of technology” (GA 7:7/QCT 3). What is free about this relationship to technology and how is it distinguished from othe

23、r ways of relating to technology? Heidegger provides a hint of the direction in which he will develop this issue when he states that “the essence of technology,” in contrast to the way it is prevalently understood, “is by no means anything technical.” According to Heidegger, when we relate to techno

24、logy as something technical, our relationship to it is not free. “Everywhere we remain unfree, chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny technology” or “regard it as something neutral” (GA 7:7/QCT 4). As this suggests, the openness to the essence of technology that characterizes

25、a free relationship to technology is significantly different from the usual ways of relating to technology. The latter treat technology as something technical and, as a result, the essence of technology is not experienced. But what is this openness to the essence of technology, and why does it const

26、itute a free relationship to technology? What is the essence of technology if it is not something technical? These questions reemerge later in the lecture after a discussion of modern physics and the current conception of technology, which we must trace by way of preparation. According to Heidegger,

27、 technology is presently defined in a way that is “instrumental and anthropological.” Technology is defined as something produced by human beings to serve the ends that they posit for themselves (GA 7:7-8/QCT 4-5). It is on this basis that it is often asked whether we are properly mastering technolo

28、gy or whether technology is slipping out of our control (GA 7:8/QCT 5). However, as Heidegger points out, this definition of technology is severely limited because it fails to distinguish between the hand crafts and modern machine-powered technology. If it is only the latter that threatens to overwh

29、elm us and become our master, what specifically is it about modern technology that makes this possible? As Heidegger notes, it is said that the relationship of modern technology to modern physics is what sets modern technology apart from earlier forms of technology. According to this view, modern te

30、chnology is based on modern physics (GA 7:14-15/QCT 13-14). The conceptual and mathematical foundation of the latter provides a degree of precision that allows modern technology to manipulate nature to an extent previously unforeseen. Heidegger does not agree, however, that the essence of modern tec

31、hnology is found in modern science. Instead, he maintains that the reverse is the case: Although “modern technology must employ exact physical science,” the claim that “modern technology is applied physical science” is a deceptive illusion (GA 7:24/QCT 23). Heideggers claim may appear strange to us

32、because, as he notes, modern physics arose almost two centuries prior to the development of machine-powered technology (GA 7:22-23/QCT 21-22). In his discussion of the essence of modern technology, however, Hediegger is not only challenging the priority of modern science, but also the claim that tec

33、hnology is a human creation. According to Heidegger, what distinguishes modern technology from earlier forms of technology is that the former is a challenging (Herausfordern), “which puts to nature the unreasonable demand Forderung that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such” (GA 7:15/QCT 14).5 Although earlier forms of technology