lethalandleaking听力材料原文.docx

1、lethalandleaking听力材料原文Albert Einstein once defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Well, thats what critics accuse the U.S. Department of Energy of: making the same mistakes over and over in a project that has already squandered billions of dolla

2、rs in taxpayers money. But the risk here is far greater than financial, since it involves highly toxic nuclear waste. At stake are millions of gallons of radioactive liquid waste left over from the making of nuclear bombs, including the one that was dropped on Nagasaki. This waste has been sitting i

3、n underground tanks in Hanford, Wash., ever since, while the government tries to figure out how to clean it up. As correspondent Lesley Stahl reports, the waste is so lethal that a small cup of it would kill everyone in a crowded restaurant, in minutes. 60 Minutes recently visited Hanford, where the

4、 witches brew is being stored. Hanford, located along the Columbia River, is home to the most contaminated piece of real estate in the world outside of Russia. It is contaminated by waste left over from the production of nuclear weapons. There are 53 million gallons of highly radioactive liquid wast

5、e stored in underground tanks that are now so old they have leaked one million gallons of the stuff.Some of it leaked into the groundwater, and its heading right for the river. With a million people downstream, theres a sense of urgency about cleaning up the site, which is huge. It takes up 586 squa

6、re miles in southeastern Washington. But for the Energy Department, which runs the project, its been a case of easier said than done. In the nearly 16 years 60 Minutes has been covering this story, its been one foul up after the next. Charles Anderson, the Energy Departments official overseeing nucl

7、ear clean up, gave Stahl a tour of what has been built so far at Hanford, starting with a replica of the underground tanks. This is a model of tanks that are already built that have waste in them. Be careful with your head here as we go in, Anderson told Stahl during the tour.The tank can hold 750,0

8、00 gallons of waste. Many of the tanks, built for the Manhattan Project to develop the first nuclear weapons, are more than 60 years old. Anderson explains there are a total of 177 tanks holding high-level waste at this site. The plan is to pump the waste out of the tanks and route it through miles

9、of pipes to a yet-to-be-completed pre-treatment facility. The idea is to convert the radioactive waste into glass logs. This is where the radioactive waste will come from the tank farms, will come from those tanks and will come in here and be treated in different chemical processes and be turned int

10、o glass logs for final disposition to be disposed of in a landfill, Anderson explains.Stahl last visited the area in 2001, when the site was just a field. Anderson says significant progress has been made. The plants 35 percent complete in regard to construction, he says.But the place is a total ghos

11、t town. What happened?What happened here is that after three years of welding, pouring cement and laying miles of pipes and tons of steel, construction came to a screeching halt in 2005 because the Energy Department underestimated by 40 percent how strong the building must be to withstand an earthqu

12、ake. Were talking about a building that would be full of radioactive liquid. In a building like this, you need to build it to ensure that it withstands whatever an earthquake may pose - if there is one - because we absolutely do not want a breech of this radioactive material in the atmosphere, says

13、Gene Aloise of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress investigative arm.But heres what 60 Minutes has learned: that the Energy Department and the contractor, Bechtel, went ahead with the plant knowing their seismic standard might be off. Just as construction was about to begin in July

14、2002, an independent safety board sent a letter, warning the department. Energy debated with the safety board for almost two years over the standards, says Aloise.Ok, let me understand this. This is brought up as an issue in 2002. Instead of going back right then, they debate until 2005, during whic

15、h time theyre building the building? Stahl asked Aloise.Theyre building the building, he replied.They were building it using the wrong seismic standard. Because they did factor in some margin of safety, the contractor, Bechtel, has told the Energy Department there is no restructuring required on the

16、 foundation or the walls. But Aloise says what they do have to fix are the internal components of the building. Hangers, piping, vessel supports, all of this interior of the building, where the technologys going to rest. That all has to be re-engineered, he explains. They have to re-do tens of thous

17、ands of designs.The seismic miscalculation is costing at least $800 million and a two- to four-year delay in completing the building. This practice of pushing ahead with construction before the engineering is complete is known as fast track.The people in the state of Washington who are living with t

18、his thing, they dont want it to slow down, they want it to speed up, Stahl remarked.But it doesnt work in our view on complex, technical nuclear facilities like the ones in Hanford, Aloise replied.Asked what he would tell the people of Washington, Aloise said, That we need to do it right.Fast track

19、was singled out as a major problem five years ago when 60 Minutes last reported on the cleanup. Gary Jones, a GAO investigator in 2001, told 60 Minutes that they had rushed ahead with construction of this building at a similar site in Idaho before the designs were finished. We asked about it back th

20、en. Youre saying they went ahead and built the building and then when they were finished making all the changes, the equipment wouldnt fit in the building? Stahl asked Jones in the report five years ago.The equipment for this particular process would not fit into the building as designed, Jones repl

21、ied.Five years ago, 60 Minutes was assured the government had learned from its mistakes and things were finally under control. And yet, since then, costs have gone through the roof, up more than 150 percent, and the start date for making those glass logs has slipped seven years, to 2018. The seismic

22、 error was only one of several snafus. Tom Carpenter of the watchdog group called Government Accountability Project got hold of internal Energy Department and Bechtel documents which reveal a series of problems with a special tank for processing or scrubbing the nuclear waste. The problems began whe

23、n Bechtel hired an outside vendor to build it. They gave the wrong design specs to the manufacturer, says Carpenter. They gave them a less strict nuclear design.According to the documents, when the tank arrived at Hanford it had cracked stay welds. They were fixed. But then different types of weld d

24、efects were discovered. And yet Bechtel went ahead and installed the scrubber tank anyway.They still said, We can fix those when the tanks installed. So they went ahead and installed it with defects, all right? Carpenter says. Knowing it, okay. So at this point they, Bechtel, demanded and then recei

25、ved a $15 million bonus for meeting a milestone.Bechtel wouldnt give 60 Minutes an on-camera interview, but did say that the $15 million wasnt a bonus, it was a fee. In any event, after they got the money, a new deficiency was discovered by independent inspectors for Washington state.This new defici

26、ency, says Carpenter, was discovered after the tank was installed.Carpenter says, The red flag goes up and a full inspection is then ordered on the tank. Well, the full inspection shouldve been done at the factory where they built the tank.Asked whether this inspection was part of the contract, Carp

27、enter says, Sure.The full inspection finally led Bechtel to realize the tank was not up to specification. But Carpenter says thats not all. The design flaws缺点 that led to this tank being deficient applied to 66 other vessels, Carpenter explains. Seven of which had already been built. And they had to

28、 go and redesign the ones that had not been built, and fix the ones that had been built. It really raises a big question about, well, what have they not caught out there? What other equipment or tools, or machine, is installed maybe under feet of concrete that these programs failed to catch? Because

29、 their programs failed. The contractor failed. The Department of Energy failed. It took an independent inspector to find new deficiencies. Where is the adult supervision here? Were talking a nuclear facility handling some of the worst waste in the world, and theyre fast tracking it? Excuse me.60 Min

30、utes asked Charles Anderson of the Department of Energy about this. When you hear they gave the wrong design specifications you almost cant believe it on one piece of equipment, and then when you hear its been repeated over and over, I mean, that doesnt sound like the Department of Energy is managin

31、g the situation very well, Stahl said.Theres a number of those issues that have occurred. Those issues have been identified and corrected but theres also a large, large percentage of equipment where the specs have been correctly given, the equipments been purchased correctly, Anderson replied.But th

32、ere shouldnt be mistakes like that in a plant like this, should there? Stahl asked.Well, Lesley, in a large complex facility, a project like this, you do have mistakes, he replied.Anderson acknowledged they are big mistakes. I would agree that there are big mistakes here that we are taking control of and were correcting, he says.You know, Im getting a little deja vu here because when we were here in 2001 it was the same thing. We figured it out. Its better now. No problem any more.