责任的社会工作者道德理论与实践的含义外文翻译.docx

1、责任的社会工作者道德理论与实践的含义外文翻译本科毕业设计（论文）外 文 翻 译原文：The responsibility of the social worker: ethical implications of theory and practiceHeinz J. KerstingProtestant University of Applied Sciences, Freiburg, and Institute of Consultation and Supervision, Aachen, GermanyAbstract：Purpose To focus on the topic of

2、ethics and responsibility, specifically on the ethical action of the social worker.Design/methodology/approach Considers that while ethical questions are discussed in social discourse everywhere, social work in Germany seems to avoid a reformulation of deeply ethical premises. This is perhaps so, be

3、cause ethics already are implicit in the actions of social work.Findings The author believes that the implicit dealing with ethics on the part of the social worker is similar to the “implicit ethics” of Heinz von Foester, which “cannot be articulated”, but are immanent in every action.Originality/va

4、lue A consideration of the ethical responsibilities of the social worker.Keywords Cybernetics；Ethics,；Social welfare Nowadays, there are no more conferences, where there is not at least one lecture dedicated to the topic of ethics. Almost every professional group concerns itself with this topic, and

5、 many professional associations establish committees on ethics. The German government recently established an ethics committee, with very distinguished members, focussed on the problems of stem cell research. When one looks at the literature, we see a blossoming landscape of ethics, which is semanti

6、cally innovative, used economically, and politically arguable. Presented linguistically and sometimes already established as morality in technology, business ethics, bio-ethics and until now appearing only in the form of neologisms such as theor-ethics, CybernEthics (von Foerster, 1993b), aesthethic

7、s and gene-ethics. Economically rewarding, one finds morality as something for consultants to investin. Politically speaking, morality is often assiduously taxed, as most recently in the discussion for and against the Iraqi war. Ethical imperatives are very current for business, and increasingly eth

8、ical questions, concerns and limitations are also being discussed in relation to scientific research, especially in the fields of gene technology and brain research.Here I will focus on the topic of ethics of responsibility, i.e. on the ethical acting of the social worker. However, the professional

9、group of social workers in Germany seems to be immune regarding the topic of its own professional ethics, at least when one looks at the professional literature, browses through the respective magazines and attentively listens to conversations among colleagues. It seems to me that, aside from some e

10、xceptions, German social work is little touched by questions regarding ethics.By comparison, social workers in the US and the Netherlands have succeeded in coming up with a “code of ethics”, recognized by its professional group. Perhaps social workers in Germany are mentally too inflexible to pick u

11、p on the important developments of the times. Perhaps for them ethical questions are a matter of course in their acting, not warranting big discussions. Perhaps, however, something already shows in their implicit handling of ethics that makes for the standing of ethics in the last years of the secon

12、d and the first years of the third millennium, thereby pointing to a new and rather useful approach to ethics. Well, I do not think that German social workers are mentally less flexible than the social workers of other countries and the members of the other professional groups. Possibly they perceiv

13、e the world more pragmatically, need to improvise more, and overload themselves with work so that while they are acting they do not have much time left for explicit ethical reflecting. On the other hand, in many areas, especially those concerning the marginal zones and the vital questions of society

14、, the German social workers have their fingers on the pulse of the times, while seismographically perceiving the problems of the people more clearly than many other professional groups. In addition, social work is the first professional group that invented supervision for its own reflection, which t

15、oday has been adopted by many other professional groups throughout Europe as a useful consulting tool for its own practice.In the process of supervision, social workers let themselves to be observed by supervisors. They allow a total stranger to look at their cards, which initiates a very effective

16、process of reflection. With supervision, social work has introduced second-order observation into their practice, and institutionalized the supervisor as the observer of the observers long before “cybernetics of cybernetics” or “second-order cybernetics” (von Foerster, 1993b, pp. 91-4; Bradmann, 199

17、6; Kersting, 1997, 2002, pp. 25-31) was thought about theoretically. Second-order cybernetics delivered a posteriori the theroretical foundation for the effectiveness of supervision as a reflective tool thus far “only” experienced in practice.For social workers this was nothing new, because they had

18、 always thought in terms of social interdependencies, which already on early charts had come out as circles. (It would be interesting to reread the classics of social work, for example, Jane Addams, Alice Salomon, Bertha Reynolds, Felix Biesteck, Louis Lowy, Jim Garland, Alex Gitterman for this aspe

19、ct). Cybernetic thinking clearly contravenes the “fundamental principles of scientific discourse , which commands the separation of observer and the observed. That is the principle of objectivity: The characteristics of the observer shall not enter the description of the observed . . . ” (von Foerst

20、er, 1993b, p. 64; translated by Monika Broecker). Objective description acts as if the observer did not exist. However, when I observe the observer and when I observe myself as observer while observing something that seems to be outside of me, then the observer is part of the observation itself, the

21、n I as the observer am always the observed as well. This strange process, which in my opinion occurs with any scientific research, as “objective”as it may seem, is called cybernetics of cybernetics, or second-order cybernetics. “When the characteristics of the observer, i.e. the characteristics of o

22、bserving and describing are excluded, there is nothing left, neither the observation nor the description” (vonFoerster, 1993b, p. 64; translated by Monika Broecker).It makes sense to me that science wants to hold on to this principle of excluding the observer with his characteristics, because it is

23、afraid of paradoxes, for example, such paradoxes, in which we just got caught up. And here we are again, unwittingly, in the land of morality. Out of fear of self-reference, out of fear of the observer including himself in the observation, that he would become the implication of research, out of fea

24、r of having to talk about himself, this paradox was forbidden in science. At least since we concerned ourselves with cybernetics, we know that all our scientific theories are based on a belief and are only possible because an angel with a burning sword keeps away the paradoxes that occur through cir

25、cular, self-referential thinking.Scientific theories usually assert their claim to truth. They operate according to the Aristotelian logic with the distinctions “true/false” and “right/wrong”. They cannot deal with paradoxes. The statement “All Cretans are liars”, spoken by the Cretan Epimenides, cr

26、eates a problem that can not be solved with Aristotelian logics. In the middle ages one told the following little story to the beginners in philosophy, in which Epimenides enters the scene; only in the form of a barber: A barber can shave all inhabitants in his little village who cannot shave themse

27、lves. But what does the barber do with himself? If he wants to shave himself he cant shave himself. For if he agrees to the statement that says that he can only shave those who cant shave themselves, hecant shave himself even though on the other hand he can shave himself as he is abarber.Western sci

28、ence was indeed unable to logically deal with paradoxes. And what does one do when one cant logically deal with a thing or a person? One tries to ridicule him or her and imposes a ban. And both did in fact happen. Throughout the entire Middle Ages one made fun of the lying Cretan and of the constant

29、ly growing beard of the barber. Or, just as juggling was forbidden in some areas of Europe for religious and moral reasons, one imposed a ban on paradoxes because they were seen as infringing upon the laws of God and of nature. The devil was considered the father of the paradox, because as a fallen

30、angel, he represented a contradiction in himself, which then Goethe lets Mephisto answer to Fausts question as to who he was: A “part of that power that would always work evil, but always engenders good”. To pronounce the modern scientific verdict about paradoxes was left to Bertrand Russell and Alf

31、red North Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica, and with that science saved itself in modern times conclusively on the side of the seemingly safe ground of morality.The theory that I have chosen with its implicit ethics does not claim any truth nor loyalty to some master, guru, secretary general,

32、or redeemer. Even what important constructivist teachers like Heinz von Foerster, Humberto R. Maturana, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Paul Watzlawick und Niklas Luhmann say or said is interesting for me only as long it is useful in the process of making rigid situations flexible. If it is not useful in tha

33、t respect it does not interest me! My responsibility as a social worker means to me precisely an increased attention and precisely this intelligent flexibility. Responsibility means being attentive, being present with myself and my clients means dissolving constancy in the solution of increased possibilities, means a freeing from certainty, only t