会计财务管理类外文文献翻译外文翻译中英文翻译Word文件下载.docx

1、 外文翻译译文1并购的收益来源资本市场领域研究的另一个课题是收入的一般来源当收入只是别人非盈利成果时资本市场领域的研究人员还不能确认资产已被重新分配使之创造财富的盈利回升虽然金融经济学家不能合理解释为什么并购是别人的非盈利目标的成果但是研究人员推断这些合乎逻辑的假设值的目标收益不仅是重新通过并购得到的也是分配产生的结果一些研究者认为股东的利益是从债券持有人处得来的丹尼斯和麦康奈尔1986不支持这个意见另外一个观点是利润是从目标公司的资源税操作衍生而来的从学术上讲这个证据是存在的但不明确奥尔巴赫和雷苏斯1987推测在可能情况下税款这个因素占好处的20说明是足够重要的它将影响并购的决策吉尔森198

2、8等人却发现众多有关税收优惠的定义问题交易成本和信息费复杂化的说法以及税前利润方面肯定是并购活动产生的原因或者说并购是公司实现税收优惠的最合适方法在一个几项研究中贾雷尔1988等人发现大部分的并购活动也不能归因于税收方面的原因施莱弗和萨默斯1988声称利润从并购产生因为新的董事会违反嵌入施莱弗和萨默斯1988声称利润从并购产生原因是新的董事会违反了公司与利益相关者群体的嵌入式就业条件链接并购目标公司管理不佳的表现研究是由施莱佛和维什尼1988审查的他们的研究表明公司还没有建立完善的管理机制来制止执行者开展的活动这个活动是不会为股东创造价值的此外莫克1988等分析这种敌意收购时声称收购发生的过快

3、或者下属企业和管理当局不能尽快地减少相关程序或其他相匹配模型结果验证了这一事实有代理成本新股东们认为这一成本将能够被减少收购公司的负面影响提出为什么并购活动能够开始进行的问题鲁巴特肯1983提供了对这种有明显难度问题的一个可能解释他认为与并购有关的行政上的困难会消除潜在的利润他还断言在使用该方法可能不足以发现利润这与詹森1986并购投标人利润公司量化复杂性的观点一致其结论解释了在投标人利润匮乏的情况下并购活动仍然活跃的原因鲁巴特肯1983认为只有特定类型的并购战略才可能对购买公司的股东有好处除了这些论点罗尔1986在同意有效率的市场假说的同时声称在经验性地评估工作的目标和招标公司的集体价值后并

4、购是不能令人信服他们没有办法估计投标人的假设因此他制定了傲慢自大假说的规定即并购的总利润是确定的罗尔1986换句话说管理层继续对目标公司超值估价这些结果显示金融界的研究人员是如何结合自由现金流假设代理理论以及效率市场的事件研究方法来解释并购活动的合理化的然而金融研究人员驳斥了金融经济学家中央假说以及一个市场公司控制权假设是约束经理的一个重要手段这一事件的研究是创造价值的量化的有效方法而股票市场则能够恰当地估价公司学者们使用现有的数据事件研究方法之外的其他方法提出有关并购的利润的特定减免索罗弗斯克莱福特和谢勒1987年二例如他们声称长期的结果通常显示相比国内市场标准并购目标执行一般高于行业平均水

5、平的8左右此外它们的财政收入表现既不增加也不减少与并购后相当这些研究人员不相信股市场总是有效-一个基本假设-提出对并购相比于金融学者提供的不同表现的解释谢勒1988推测由于股市并不总是能够正确估计股票价值一些企业将在任何特定时间被高估了这使他们能够购买其他公司但有些公司将被低估这是他们感兴趣的目标被高估的公司会研究可能的的目标公司了解他们是否有被低估导致其股价上升这个发现被低估的公司将被购买他们的新股票价格只是表达了一种市场调整企业在审查后没有低估的将不会被购买在被并购的目标中它们的股票价格可能回归到以前的水平作者托马斯 施特劳布国籍德国出处并购频繁失败的原因 原文1The Origins o

6、f earnings through MAsAnother of the capital market schools field of study is the origins of earnings in general When earnings are just the outcome of somebody elses disprofit the capital market schools researchers cannot confirm that assets have been redistributed so as to create wealth by picking

7、up profitability However although financial economists cannot reasonably explain the gains in MA targets as somebody elses disprofitsresearchers deduce that it is logical to suppose that value is not just re-allocated through MAs but is producedSome researchers believe that shareholder profits come

8、from bondholders lossesDennis and McConnel 1986 do not uphold this opinion An additional perspective is that profits are derived from tax manipulations of the target firms resources In the literature the evidence for this is however ambiguous Auerbach and Reishus 1987 surmised that in possibly 20 of

9、 cases tax benefits are sufficiently important to affect the MA decision Gilson et al 1988 nevertheless found that a multitude of problems concerning definitions of tax benefits transaction costs and information costs complicate the claim that tax profits are definitely the reason for MA activitieso

10、r that MAs are the most suitable method for companies to realize tax benefits In an evaluation of several studies Jarrell et al 1988 found that much of the MA activity could not be attributed to tax reasonsShleifer and Summers 1988 claim that profits are derived from MAs because a new board breaches

11、 the embedded employment conditions between the company and the stakeholder groups Studies that link MAs to poor target company management performance were examined by Shleifer and Vishny 1988c Their study shows that firms have not succeeded in establishing controls to prevent managers from carrying

12、 out activities that do not increase the stockholder valueMoreover Morck et als 1988 analysis of hostile takeovers claims that such takeovers take place in swiftly changing or declining businesses and in firms wherethe management is not able to minimize procedures fast enough or model other adaptati

13、ons The results verify the fact that there are agency costs that the new hareholders think they will be able to decreaseThe negative consequences of MAs for the buying companies raise the question why MA activities are undertaken at all A number of potential explanations for this apparent puzzle are

14、 offered by Lubatkin 1983 who suggests that the administrative difficulties associated with MAs could erase potential profits His further assertion that the methods in use have possibly not been sufficient to uncover profits is consistent with Jensens 1986 argument of the complexity of quantifying p

15、rofits for MA bidder companies As a concluding explanation for MAs permanence despite the lack of profits for the bidders Lubatkin 1983 suggests that just specific types of MA strategies might profit the buying companys shareholdersBesides these arguments Roll 1986 while agreeing with the efficient

16、market hypothesis claims that the empiric work that evaluates the target and bidding companies collective value after an MA is unconvincing no way related to the bidders supposition that their estimations are He consequently formulated the hubris hypothesis which states that MAs aggregate profits ar

17、e in correct Roll1986 In other words managements continue to over valuate target firmsThese results demonstrate how the financial schools researchers combine the ypotheses of free cash flow a market for corporate control the agency theory and efficient markets with the event studies method to improv

18、e the rationalization in respect of MA activity However a number of financial researchers refute the financial economists central hypothesis as well as the hypothesis that a market for corporate control is a key instrument for disciplining managers that event studies are a valid method of quantifyin

19、g value creation and that the share market is capable of precisely valuing firmsScholars who use other methods than event studies of existing data make specific deductions with regard to MA profits Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987 b for example claim that long-term-based results usually reveal that MA t

20、argets perform above the industry average - at around 8 - compared to their home market standards Furthermore their financial income performances neither increased nor declined considerably after the MAThose researchers who do not believe that the share market is always efficient a basic assumption

21、- suggest different explanations for MA performance than the ones offered by financial scholars Scherer 1988 hypothesizes that because the stock market does not always properly value stock some firms will be overvalued at any given point in time enabling them to purchase other firms but some firms w

22、ill be undervalued which renders them interesting targets Companies that are overvalued will examine possible target companies to find out if they have been underestimatedcausing their share price to increaseFirms that are discovered to be underestimated are purchased and their new share price simpl

23、y expresses a market correction Firms that are not purchased after being examined were not underestimated and their share prices return to the level prior to their being possible MA targetsAuthorProf Dr oec Thomas StraubNationalityGermanyOriginate from Reasons for Frequent failure in Mergers and Acq

24、uisitions译文2评价成功的客观标准客观的措施是建立在公开信息之上的容易获得信息是因为利用了外部信息的优点由于外部信息不受到答辩人的偏见基于外部数据就可以比较不同的研究成果同时外部信息也苦于缺乏差异如外部经济波动的影响工业企业的具体因素以及其他收购等具体因素或各种因素对结果影响很大从而限制了外部信息的解释力运用客观成功措施研究人员研究了使并购成功的两个方面战略上的成功和财务上的成功并购财务上的成功已经在不同的研究中被标准化最后创造价值是公司的核心目标因此在财务上价值创造的成功是并购成功的一个标准有两种在财务上成功的数据源已被用于确定兼并和收购成功股票的市场数据和公司的会计数据股市会响应公

25、司合并和收购的公告这意味着股东估计将收购公司的创造价值或评估已收购公司的销毁价值如果他们希望收购能够增加收购公司的的价值创造股票价格将上涨如果他们希望收购能够摧毁收购公司的价值股票价格将下跌当然这只有与股票价格的发展无关的行业或特定的股票市场的发展可以考虑这些不相关的影响即所谓不正常的股市反应不同时期使用了前后公告例如阿格拉瓦尔1992等调查股市的影响公布在前其结果直到5年后才宣布其他的如哈布利安芬克尔斯坦1999测量5天的异常收益率在合并后的前5天然而这种假设是建立在能够正常地反应公布及预计并购的所有可能产生的影响之上的虽然长期收购具有捕捉长期发展的优势但是它们会受到合并后发生事件的影响阿格

26、拉瓦尔1992等在765项收购研究中发现与去年同期研究相比收购的累积异常收益率在510之间芬克尔斯坦1999则发现没有任何影响同样鲁巴特肯1987在439项有关公司收购的研究中发现没有重大的股票在不同的市场有时间效应18-64个月后的兼并与收购鲁巴特肯斯里尼瓦桑曼切尔特1997年也发现并购后的第2天第16天以及第56天无异常收益布赫纳1990调查的90个公司的股票的市场表现也认为是无相关联系的其结果表明收购没有使抽样公司的市场价值增加1990a 自己的译本在另一项研究中布赫纳1990发现封闭后12个月的平均异常收益率恢复到-10布赫纳 1990c300在对波士顿咨询集团2004的研究中作者发现

27、在收购平均创造价值表现上大多数并购是失败的因为高风险活动所以这是异常现象但是如果一家公司从事很多兼并和收购就平均而言实际上是可能创造价值的根据有关财务执行情况的调查结果鲁巴特肯奥尼尔1987发现并购交易显着增加公司的非系统风险而减少系统性风险该系统风险下降是因为兼并和收购遵循一种产品或市场推广的目标这降低了系统行业在大多数情况下的市场风险但是非系统性风险取决于公司大力增加的特性一些公司在并购后表现得非常好但另外一些现象是并购后变得松散然后这大大增加了非系统性风险对股市信息使用相应的金融理论假设市场能够正确地估计公司的价值与战略根据这个假设收购将正确地评估股市从而代表其有潜在的价值衡量并购成功的

28、与否在建立在合并前的会计数据和合并后的会计数据的基础之上的常用的尺度是资产回报股本息税前利润销售或收购公司的利润回报库斯维特1985在3500项大规模收购的研究中发现一年后公司获得了533的平均增长居留权库斯维特1985还认为一年后收购企业将增加340的市场回报同样布赫纳1990探讨了110项德国并购事件发现在并购交易3年后才能得到资本回报以及股本回报他发现平均而言收购公司会恶化财务性能作者弗洛里 弗伦施国籍美国 出处从社会角度看并购原文2Objective success measuresObjective measures are based on publicly available i

29、nformation The advantage of using external information is that the information is readily available As external information does not suffer from respondents biases it is possible to compare results from different studies based on external data At the same external information suffers from a lack of

30、differentiation External effects such as economic fluctuations industry specific factors as well as firm specific factors such as other acquisitions or divestures strongly affect the result and thus limit the explanatory power of external informationUsing objective success measures researchers have

31、studied the success of mergers and acquisitions in two different dimensions strategic success and financial successFinancial success of mergers and acquisitions has been measured in many different studiesUltimately value creation is the core objective of firms Hence value creation respectively finan

32、cial success is a useful success measure for mergers and acquisitions There are two different sources of data for financial success that have been used to identify success of mergers and acquisitions Stock market data and accounting data of firmsStock markets react to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions That means that stockholders evaluate the expected value creation or value destruction of acquisitions for acquiring firms and acquired firms If they expect that an acquisition creates value for the acquiring firm stock prices go up If they expect that an acquisition des