中小企业融资外文翻译.docx

中小企业融资外文翻译.docx

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中小企业融资外文翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

原文：

FinancingofSMEs

Abstract

Themainsourcesoffinancingforsmallandmediumsizedenterprises（SMEs）areequity,tradecreditpaidontime,longandshorttermbankcredits,delayedpaymentontradecreditandotherdebt.Themarginalcostsofeachfinancinginstrumentaredrivenbyasymmetricinformationandtransactionscostsassociatedwithnonpayment.AccordingtothePeckingOrderTheory,firmswillchoosethecheapestsourceintermsofcost.Inthecaseofthestatictrade-offtheory,firmschoosefinancesothatthemarginalcostsacrossfinancingsourcesareallequal,thusanadditionalEurooffinancingisobtainedfromallthesourceswhereasunderthePeckingOrderTheorythesourceisdeterminedbyhowfardownthePeckingOrderthefirmispresentlylocated.Inthispaper,wearguethatbothofthesetheoriesmissthepointthatthemarginalcostsaredependentoftheuseofthefunds,andtheassetsideofthebalancesheetprimarilydeterminesthefinancingsourceforanadditionalEuro.AnempiricalanalysisonauniquedatasetofPortugueseSME’sconfirmsthatthecompositionoftheassetsideofthebalancesheethasanimpactofthetypeoffinancingusedandthePeckingOrderTheoryandthetraditionalStaticTrade-offtheoryarerejected.

ForSME’sthemainsourcesoffinancingareequity（internallygeneratedcash）,tradecredit,bankcreditandotherdebt.Thechoiceoffinancingisdrivenbythecostsofthesourceswhichisprimarilydeterminedbycostsofsolvingtheasymmetricinformationproblemandtheexpectedcostsassociatedwithnon-paymentofdebt.Asymmetricinformationcostsarisefromcollectingandanalysinginformationtosupportthedecisionofextendingcredit,andthenon-paymentcostsarefromcollectingthecollateralandsellingittorecoverthedebt.SinceSMEs’managementandshareholdersareoftenthesameperson,equityandinternallygeneratedfundshavenoasymmetricinformationcostsandequityisthereforethecheapestsource.

2.AssetsidetheoryofSMEfinancing

IntheprevioussectionwehavesuggestedthatSME’sinPortugalarefinancedusinginternalgeneratedcash,cheaptradecredits,longandshort-termbankloansandexpensivetradecreditsandotherloans.Inthissectionthemotivesbehindthedifferenttypesoffinancingarediscussed.

2.1.CheapTradecredits

Thefirstexternalfinancingsourcewewilldiscussistrade-credits.Tradecreditsareinterestingsincetheyrepresentfinancialservicesprovidedbynon-financialfirmsincompetitionwithfinancialintermediaries.Theearlyresearchwithinthisareafocusedontheroleoftradecreditsinrelationtothecreditchannelorthesocalled“Meltzer”effectandinrelationtotheefficiencyofmonetarypolicy.Thebasicideaisthatfirmswithdirectaccesstofinancialmarkets,ingenerallargewellknownfirms,issuetradecreditstosmallfinanciallyconstrainedfirms.Themorerecentresearchbreakstheroleoftradecreditsintoastrategicmotiveandfinancialmotiveforissuingandusingthesecredits.

Strategicmotives

Thefirsttheorycentersonasymmetricinformationregardingthefirm’sproducts.Tradecreditsareofferedtothebuyerssothatthebuyercanverifythequantityandqualitybeforesubmittingpayments.Byofferingtradefinancethesuppliersignalstothebuyersthattheyofferproductsofgoodquality.Sincesmallfirms,ingeneral,havenoreputationthenthesefirmsareforcedtousetradecreditstosignalthequalityoftheirproducts.Theuseoftradecreditsisthereforedrivenbyasymmetricinformationoftheproductsandisthereforemorelikelytobeusedbysmallfirms,ifthebuyerhaslittleinformationaboutthesupplier,ortheproductsarecomplicatedanditisdifficulttoassestheirquality.

Thesecondstrategicmotiveispricing.Offeringtradefinanceonfavorabletermsisthesameasapricereductionforthegoods.Thusfirmscanusetradecreditstopromotesaleswithoutofficiallyreducingpricesorusethemasatoolforpricediscriminationbetweendifferentbuyers.Tradecreditsaremostadvantageoustoriskyborrowerssincetheircostsofalternativefinancingarehigherthanforborrowerswithgoodcreditratings.Thustradecreditscanbeusedastoolfordirectpricediscriminationbutalsoasanindirecttool（ifallbuyersareofferedthesameterms）infavorofborrowerswithalowcreditstanding.

Tradecreditsarealsousedtodeveloplongtermrelationshipsbetweenthesupplierandthebuyers.Thisoftenmanifestsitselfbythesupplierextendingthecreditperiodincasethebuyerhastemporaryfinancialdifficulties.Comparedtofinancialinstitutionssuppliershavebetterknowledgeoftheindustryandarethereforebetterabletojudgewhetherthefirmhastemporaryproblemsortheproblemsareofamorepermanentnature.

Thelastmotiveinnotstrictlyastrategicmotivebutisbasedontransactionscosts.Tradecreditsareanefficientwayofperformingthetransactionssinceitispossibletoseparatebetweendeliveryandpayment.Inbasictermsthetruckdriverdeliveringthegoodsdoesnothavetorunaroundtofindthepersonresponsibleforpayingthebills.Thebuyeralsosavestransactionscostsbyreducingtheamountofcashrequiredon“hand”.

Financingmotives

Thebasisforthisviewisthatfirmscompetewithfinancialinstitutionsinofferingcredittootherfirms.Thetraditionalviewoffinancialinstitutionsisthattheyextendcredittofirmswhereasymmetricinformationisamajorproblem.Financialinstitutionshaveadvantagesincollectingandanalyzinginformationfrom,inparticular,smallerandmediumsizedfirmsthatsufferfromproblemsofasymmetricinformation.Thekeytothisadvantageoverfinancialmarketsliesinthecloserelationshipbetweenthebankandthefirmandinthepaymentfunction.Thefinancialinstitutionisabletomonitorthecashinflowandoutflowsofthefirmbymonitoringtheaccountsofthefirm.

Butwithtradecreditsnon-financialfirmsarecompetingwithfinancialinstitutionsinsolvingtheseproblemsandextendingcredit.Howcannon-financialinstitutionscompeteinthismarket?

PetersenandRajan[1997]brieflydiscussesseveralwaysthatsuppliersmayhaveadvantagesoverfinancialinstitutions.Thesupplierhasacloseworkingassociationwiththeborrowerandmorefrequentlyvisitsthepremisesthanafinancialinstitutiondoes.Thesizeandtimingofthelendersorderswiththesupplierprovidesinformationabouttheconditionsoftheborrowersbusiness.Noticethatthisinformationisavailabletothesupplierbeforeitisavailabletothefinancialinstitutionsincethefinancialinstitutionhastowaitforthecashflowassociatedwiththeorders.Theuseofearlypaymentdiscountsprovidesthesupplierwithanindicationofproblemswithcreditworthinessinthefirm.Againthesupplierobtainstheinformationbeforethefinancialinstitutiondoes.Thusthesuppliermaybeabletoobtaininformationaboutthecreditworthinessfasterandcheaperthanthefinancialinstitution.

Thesuppliermayalsohaveadvantagesincollectingpayments.Ifthesupplierhasatleastalocalmonopolyforthegoodsthentheabilitytowithholdfuturedeliveriesisapowerfulincentiveforthefirmtopay.Thisisaparticularpowerfulthreatiftheborroweronlyaccountsforasmallfractionofthesuppliersbusiness.Incaseofdefaultsthesuppliercanseizethegoodsandingeneralhasabetteruseforthemthanafinancialintermediarysizingthesamegoods.Throughitssalesnetworkthesuppliercansellthereclaimedgoodsfasterandatahigherpricethanwhatisavailabletoafinancialintermediary.Theseadvantages,ofcourse,dependonthedurabilityofthegoodsandhowmuchtheborrowerhastransformedthem.

Ifasymmetricinformationisoneofthedrivingforcestheexplanationoftradecreditsthenfirmscanusethefactthattheirsuppliershaveissuedthemcreditsinordertoobtainadditionalcreditfromthebanks.Thebanksareawarethatthesupplierhasbetterinformationthusthebankcanusetradecreditsassignalofthecreditworthinessofthefirm.

Thattradecreditsareingeneralsecuredbythegoodsdeliveredalsoputsalimitontheamountoftradecreditsthefirmcanobtain,thusthefirmcannotusetradecreditstofinancetheentireoperationsofthefirm.

Insummarythepredictionisthatthelevelofasymmetricinformationisrelativelylowbetweentheprovidersoftradecreditandtheborrowersduetotheissuer’sgeneralknowledgeofthefirmandtheindustry.IntheempiricalworkbelowthevariablesexplainingtheuseoftradecreditarecreditriskfactorsandCostofGoodsSold.Sincethesetradecreditsaresecuredbythematerialsdeliveredtothefirm,firmscannot“borrow”formorethanthedeliveryvalueofthegoodsandservices.

2.2Bankloans

Bankshavelessinformationthanprovidersoftradecreditandthecostsofgatheringinformationarealsohigherforbanksthanforprovidersoftradecredit.Providersoftradecreditsalsohaveanadvantageoverbanksinsellingthecollateraltheyhavethemselvesdelivered,butduetotheirsizeandnumberoftransactionsbankshaveanadvantageinsellinggeneralcollateralsuchasbuildings,machineryetc.Banksthereforeprefertoissueloansusingtangibleassetsascollateral,alsoduetoasymmetricinformation,theyarelesslikelytoissueloanstomoreopaquefirmssuchassmallandhighgrowthfirms.Banksarethereforewillingtolendlongtermprovidedthattangibleassetsareavailableforcollateral.Intheempiricalworkbelowtangibleassetsandcreditriskvariablesareexpectedtoexplaintheuseoflong-termbankloansandtheamountoflong-termbankloansarelimitedbythevalueoftangibleassets.

The