开放的中国经济下的汇率短期与长期战略.docx

开放的中国经济下的汇率短期与长期战略.docx

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开放的中国经济下的汇率短期与长期战略

TheRenminbiExchangeRateintheIncreasinglyOpenEconomyofChina:

AShort-RunSolutionandALong-RunStrategy

Chen-yuanTung

AssistantResearchFellow

InstituteofInternationalRelations

NationalChengchiUniversity

E-mail:

ctung@jhu.edu

Tel:

886-2-8237-7356

Abstract:

ApracticalapproachfortheChinesegovernmenttosolvethecurrentcurrencydilemmaistoallowtheRMBtoappreciateby10-15%immediatelyandchangetheRMBexchangerateregimefromthede-facto事实上fixedUSdollarpegtoanewmechanismlinkingtheRMBtoabasketofcurrencies,whileexpandingthefloatingbandoftheRMBexchangeratefrom1%to5-7%.

Nevertheless,thereisnotimetablefortheadjustmentoftheexchangerateofRMBaslongastheChinesegovernmentcantoleratetheeconomicoverheatingandimbalanceresultedfromtheundervaluedexchangerate.But,aslongasChina’seconomyremainsoverheatedandtheexpectationofanRMBrevaluationpersists,internationalhotmoneymaycontinuetoflowintoChinaandwouldprobablycause“self-fulfillingprophecy”自我实现的预言appreciationoftheRMB.

JELclassification:

F31,F41.

Keywords:

Renminbiexchangerate;exchangerateregime;impossibletrinity三元悖论;balance-of-paymentcrisesmodels;hotmoney.

*PaperpresentedattheWesternEconomicAssociationInternational6thPacificRimConference,LingnanUniversity,HongKong,January15-16,2005.

I.Introduction

OnJanuary1,1994,ChinaadoptedanewmanagedfloatregimewiththeRenminbi（RMB）exchangerateat8.7perUSdollar（USD）withanarrowbandof0.25%ofthepreviousday’sreferencerate参考汇率.Underthenewregime,theRMB/USDexchangeratebegantoappreciateto8.3inMay1995and8.28inOctober1997.DuringtheAsianfinancialcrisis,thetradingbandwasnarrowedfurtherandtheexchangerateofRMB8.28perdollarhasbeenmaintainedtothepresent（January2005）.Thus,althoughtheofficially-claimedexchangerateregimeisstillamanagedfloatregime,Chinahasessentiallyoperateditssystemasade-factofixedpegtothedollarsince1994.

AstablecurrencyregimehasservedChinawell,beingroutinelycitedbyChinesepolicymakersandforeignpundits学者alikeasanimportantfactorinfacilitatingChina’sgrowthmiracleoverthepastdecade,particularlyattractingforeigndirectinvestment（FDI）andfacilitatetrade.InthewakeoftheAsianfinancialcrisisof1997-98,China’scommitmenttoafaxedexchangeratetothedollarwaswidelypraisedasakeyanchorfortheglobalfinancialsystem.

However,thegenerallysupportiveglobalconsensusregardingChina’sstableexchange-rateregimehasevaporatedoverthepastthreeyears.FromearlyJanuaryof2002toearlyJanuaryof2004,theUSdollardepreciatedagainsttheEurobyaround40%,againsttheJapaneseYenby25%,againsttheTaiwandollar,theSingaporeandollar,andtheKoreanWonby5-12%.In2004,theUSdollarcontinuestodepreciateagainstthesecurrenciesby4.1-15.6%andthetrendisexpectedtocontinue.UnderChina’sde-factofixedexchangerateregime,theRMBhasdepreciatedagainsttheabovecurrenciesbythesamemarginsinnominalterms.Fromthebeginningof2002totheendofsummer2004,thetrade-weightedexchangerateoftheRMBdepreciatedby8%,whichiscontributingtotheimbalancedRMBexchangeratesystem.（GoldsteinandLardy2004）

Thenominaldepreciation名义oftheRMBhasresultedinwidespreadcomplainsthatChinaisunfairlymanipulating操纵itscurrencytogainacompetitivetradeadvantage.Nevertheless,theChinesegovernmenthasfirmlyinsistedonthede-factofixedRMB/USDexchangerateinordertoprotectexportcompetitivenessandavoidfurtherunemploymentpressure.（GovernorZhouXiaochuan2003）TheChinesegovernmentarguedthatthestableRMBexchangerateisinbothChina’sandglobalinterest.（Hung2004）

AttheheartofthedebateonChina’sexchangeratepolicyaretworelatedissues:

thelevelandregimeoftheRMBexchangerate.Morespecifically,whatistheappropriatelevelandappropriateregimeoftheRMBexchangerateundercurrentChineseeconomicsituations?

Furthermore,shouldChinachangeeitheroneofthelevelorregimeoftheRMBexchangerateorbothundercurrentcircumstances?

Thispaperbeginsbyprovidingtwotheoreticalperspectivesontheaboveissues:

theprincipleoftheimpossibletrinityandself-fulfillingbalance-of-paymentscrisesmodels.Basedonthetheoreticalperspectives,thepaperelaboratesChina’sexternalimbalanceandcitesseveralestimatesofeconometricmodelsonthefairvalueoftheRMBexchangerate.Then,thepaperdiscussesChina’sinternalimbalanceresultedfromexternalimbalance.Finally,thepaperassessesChina’scurrentpolicytoaddressbothexternalandinternalimbalancesandprovidesanalternativesolutiontotheRMBexchangerateissue.

II.TheoreticalPerspectives

1.TheImpossibleTrinity

Internationalmonetarytheoryincludestheironprincipleoftheimpossibletrinity,whichsaysthatacountrymustgiveuponeofthreegoals–exchange-ratestability,monetaryindependence,orfinancial-marketintegration;itcannothaveallthreesimultaneously.Figure1isasimpleschematicillustrationoftheimpossibletrinity.Eachofthethreesideshasanattraction–therespectiveallureofmonetaryindependence,exchange-ratestability,andfullfinancialintegration.Onecanattainanypairofattributes:

thefirsttwoattheapex顶点marked“capitalcontrols,”thesecondtwoatthevertexmarked“monetaryunion,”orthefirstandthirdatthevertexmarked“purefloat.”Butonecannotbeonallthreesidessimultaneously.

Figure1.TheImpossibleTrinity

Source:

Frankel1999:

7.

However,thegradualintegratedglobalcapitalmarkethasforcedeconomicentitiestochooseeithermonetaryunionorpurefloatfortheirexchangerateregime.Toavoidattacksonexchangeratesbyinternationalspeculators,fewerandfewereconomicentitiestendtochooseothersystems.Monetaryunionandpurefloatingarethetworegimesthatcannotbyconstructionbesubjectedtospeculativeattack.（Frankel1999:

5-7）.

Forinstance,attheendof2001,amongthe185economicentitieslistedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund（IMF）,theentitiesadoptingapurefloatexchangerateregimeconstituted65%oftheglobalGDP,whereasthoseentitiesintroducingamonetaryunionexchangerateregimeconstituted20%oftheglobalGDP.Theentitiesintheothersixcategoriesconstitutedonly15%oftheglobalGDP（Zhu2003:

143）.

Duetotheofficiallyclosedcapitalaccount,theChinesegovernmenthadbeenabletoremainautonomousovermonetarypolicyandmaintainthede-factofixedexchangerateby2002.However,withtheincreasingopennessoftheChineseeconomy,theproblemofincreasingcapitalaccountleakage渗inChinaisworsening.AccordingtotheIMFestimate,during1994-2002,theerrorandomissionslineiteminChina’sbalanceofpaymentamountedtoUS$14billionayear,andthecapitalflight资本外duringthenineyearstotaledUS$122billion.In2002,withthesurginginflowsofspeculativehotmoney,theerrorandomissionsaccountdramaticallyreversed,postingUS$7.8billionofsurplus（InternationalMonetaryFund2002）.

Furthermore,Gunter（2004）estimates,basedonbothbalanceofpaymentsandresidual误差measuresforChina,thecapitalflightwasUS$69billionperyearduring1994-2001andreachedoverUS$100billionperyearduring1997-2000.HeestimatesthataboutUS$900billionhasfled逃跑ChinaorhasbeenconvertedtodollarsorgoldwithinChinasince1984until2001.

Therefore,China’ssituationisnotsimplywhetherChinashouldopenupitscapitalaccount,buthowChinarespondstoitsexchangerategivencurrenthugecapitalaccountleakage.Basedontheimpossibletrinity,Chinawillbegraduallyforcedtochooseeithermonetaryunionorpureflowinthelongterm.

2.Self-fulfillingBalance-of-PaymentsCrisesModels

However,intheshortterm,theincreasinglylargeloopholesincapitalaccountcontrolsmightshakethede-factofixedexchangerateregimeinChinabyspeculativehotmoney.Existingmodelsofspeculativeattacksandbalance-of-paymentscrisesfallintotwobroadcategories,thosewhereacollapseistheinevitableconsequenceofsomefundamentalimbalanceandthosewhereacollapseresultsfromself-fulfillingexpectations.

ThefirstcategoryoriginatesfromtheKrugman（1979）modelwhereabalance-of-paymentscrisisisgeneratedbyamonetaryauthoritywhichoperatesapolicyofdomesticcreditexpansionwhilesimultaneouslyfixingtheexchangerate.Foreignexchangereservesinevitablyrunoutandthefixedratehastobeabandoned.Krugmanshowsthat,withforward-lookingexchangemarkets,thefinalstageofthecrisisinvolvesasuddendiscretelossofreservesinaspeculativeattack.

Underconditionsofopencapitalmarkets,ifreservesreachacriticallevel（whichneednotbeaslowaszero）,asuddenspeculativeattachcouldforcetheadjustmenttotakeplacerapidly,andunderunpleasantconditions.IntheEastAsiancrisisof1997-98,forinstance,theeconomiesthathadrundowntheirreservessufferedsharpcrises（Thailand,Korea,etc.）,whiletheeconomieswithhighlevelsofreserveholdingsweretheonesabletorideoutthestorm（Taiwan,HongKong,andChina）.

ThesecondcategoryofmodelsarisesfromtheObstfeld（1986and1996）studies.Obstfeldassertsthatbalance-of-paymentscrisesmayindeedbepurelyself-fulfillingeventsratherthantheinevitableresultofunsustainablemacroeconomicpolicies.Hepointsoutthattheeconomypossessesacontinuumofequilibria,eachcorrespondingtoadifferentsubjectiveassessmentofthelikelihoodofanexchangeratecollapse.Ifspeculatorsbelievethatacurrencywillcomeunderattack,theira