巴菲特致股东的信.docx

巴菲特致股东的信.docx

《巴菲特致股东的信.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《巴菲特致股东的信.docx（102页珍藏版）》请在冰点文库上搜索。

巴菲特致股东的信

巴菲特致股东的信

BERKSHIREHATHAWAYINC.

TotheShareholdersofBerkshireHathawayInc.:

Ourgaininnetworthduring2009was$21.8billion,whichincreasedtheper-sharebookvalueofboth

ourClassAandClassBstockby19.8%.Overthelast45years（thatis,sincepresentmanagementtookover）

bookvaluehasgrownfrom$19to$84,487,arateof20.3%compoundedannually.*

Berkshire’srecentacquisitionofBurlingtonNorthernSantaFe（BNSF）hasaddedatleast65,000

shareholderstothe500,000orsoalreadyonourbooks.It’simportanttoCharlieMunger,

mylong-timepartner,

andmethatallofourownersunderstandBerkshire’soperations,goals,limitationsandculture.Ineachannual

report,consequently,werestatetheeconomicprinciplesthatguideus.Thisyeartheseprinciplesappearonpages

89-94andIurgeallofyou–butparticularlyournewshareholders–toreadthem.

Berkshirehasadheredtothese

principlesfordecadesandwillcontinuetodosolongafterI’mgone.

Inthisletterwewillalsoreviewsomeofthebasicsofourbusiness,hopingtoprovidebothafreshman

orientationsessionforourBNSFnewcomersandarefreshercourseforBerkshireveterans.

HowWeMeasureOurselves

Ourmetricsforevaluatingourmanagerialperformancearedisplayedonthefacingpage.Fromthestart,

CharlieandIhavebelievedinhavingarationalandunbendingstandardformeasuringwhatwehave–orhave

not–accomplished.Thatkeepsusfromthetemptationofseeingwherethearrowof

performancelandsandthen

paintingthebull’seyearoundit.

SelectingtheS&P500asourbogeywasaneasychoicebecauseourshareholders,atvirtuallynocost,can

matchitsperformancebyholdinganindexfund.Whyshouldtheypayusformerelyduplicatingthatresult?

AmoredifficultdecisionforuswashowtomeasuretheprogressofBerkshireversustheS&P.Thereare

goodargumentsforsimplyusingthechangeinourstockprice.Overanextendedperiodoftime,infact,thatis

thebesttest.Butyear-to-yearmarketpricescanbeextraordinarilyerratic.Evenevaluationscoveringaslongasa

decadecanbegreatlydistortedbyfoolishlyhighorlowpricesatthebeginningorendofthemeasurement

period.SteveBallmer,ofMicrosoft,andJeffImmelt,ofGE,cantellyouaboutthat

problem,sufferingastheydo

fromthenosebleedpricesatwhichtheirstockstradedwhentheywerehandedthemanagerialbaton.

TheidealstandardformeasuringouryearlyprogresswouldbethechangeinBerkshire’sper-shareintrinsic

value.Alas,thatvaluecannotbecalculatedwithanythingclosetoprecision,soweinsteaduseacrudeproxyfor

it:

per-sharebookvalue.Relyingonthisyardstickhasitsshortcomings,whichwediscussonpages92and93.

Additionally,bookvalueatmostcompaniesunderstatesintrinsicvalue,andthatiscertainlythecaseat

Berkshire.Inaggregate,ourbusinessesareworthconsiderablymorethanthevaluesatwhichtheyarecarriedon

ourbooks.Inourall-importantinsurancebusiness,moreover,thedifferenceishuge.Evenso,CharlieandI

believethatourbookvalue–understatedthoughitis–suppliesthemostuseful

trackingdeviceforchangesin

intrinsicvalue.Bythismeasurement,astheopeningparagraphofthisletterstates,ourbookvaluesincethestart

offiscal1965hasgrownatarateof20.3%compoundedannually.

*Allper-sharefiguresusedinthisreportapplytoBerkshire’sAshares.Figuresfor

theBsharesare

1/1500thofthoseshownforA.

Weshouldnotethathadweinsteadchosenmarketpricesasouryardstick,Berkshire’s

resultswould

lookbetter,showingagainsincethestartoffiscal1965of22%compoundedannually.Surprisingly,thismodest

differenceinannualcompoundingrateleadstoan801,516%market-valuegainfortheentire45-yearperiod

comparedtothebook-valuegainof434,057%（shownonpage2）.Ourmarketgainisbetterbecausein1965

Berkshiresharessoldatanappropriatediscounttothebookvalueofitsunderearningtextileassets,whereas

todayBerkshiresharesregularlysellatapremiumtotheaccountingvaluesofitsfirst-classbusinesses.

Summedup,thetableonpage2conveysthreemessages,twopositiveandonehugelynegative.First,

wehaveneverhadanyfive-yearperiodbeginningwith1965-69andendingwith2005-09–andtherehavebeen

41ofthese–duringwhichourgaininbookvaluedidnotexceedtheS&P’sgain.Second,

thoughwehavelagged

theS&Pinsomeyearsthatwerepositiveforthemarket,wehaveconsistentlydonebetterthantheS&Pinthe

elevenyearsduringwhichitdeliverednegativeresults.Inotherwords,ourdefensehas

beenbetterthanour

offense,andthat’slikelytocontinue.

Thebigminusisthatourperformanceadvantagehasshrunkdramaticallyasoursizehasgrown,an

unpleasanttrendthatiscertaintocontinue.Tobesure,Berkshirehasmanyoutstandingbusinessesandacadreof

trulygreatmanagers,operatingwithinanunusualcorporateculturethatletsthemmaximizetheirtalents.Charlie

andIbelievethesefactorswillcontinuetoproducebetter-than-averageresultsovertime.Buthugesumsforge

theirownanchorandourfutureadvantage,ifany,willbeasmallfractionofourhistoricaledge.

WhatWeDon’tDo

Longago,Charlielaidouthisstrongestambition:

“AllIwanttoknowiswhereI’mgoingtodie,soI’ll

nevergothere.”ThatbitofwisdomwasinspiredbyJacobi,thegreatPrussianmathematician,whocounseled

“Invert,alwaysinvert”asanaidtosolvingdifficultproblems.（Icanreportaswellthatthisinversionapproach

worksonalessloftylevel:

Singacountrysonginreverse,andyouwillquicklyrecoveryourcar,houseand

wife.）

HereareafewexamplesofhowweapplyCharlie’sthinkingatBerkshire:

•CharlieandIavoidbusinesseswhosefutureswecan’tevaluate,nomatterhowexciting

their

productsmaybe.Inthepast,itrequirednobrillianceforpeopletoforeseethefabulousgrowth

thatawaitedsuchindustriesasautos（in1910）,aircraft（in1930）andtelevisionsets（in1950）.But

thefuturethenalsoincludedcompetitivedynamicsthatwoulddecimatealmostallofthe

companiesenteringthoseindustries.Eventhesurvivorstendedtocomeawaybleeding.

JustbecauseCharlieandIcanclearlyseedramaticgrowthaheadforanindustrydoesnotmean

wecanjudgewhatitsprofitmarginsandreturnsoncapitalwillbeasahostofcompetitorsbattle

forsupremacy.AtBerkshirewewillstickwithbusinesseswhoseprofitpicturefordecadesto

comeseemsreasonablypredictable.Eventhen,wewillmakeplentyofmistakes.

•Wewillneverbecomedependentonthekindnessofstrangers.Too-big-to-failisnot

afallback

positionatBerkshire.Instead,wewillalwaysarrangeouraffairssothatanyrequirementsforcash

wemayconceivablyhavewillbedwarfedbyourownliquidity.Moreover,thatliquiditywillbe

constantlyrefreshedbyagusherofearningsfromourmanyanddiversebusinesses.

WhenthefinancialsystemwentintocardiacarrestinSeptember2008,Berkshirewasasupplier

ofliquidityandcapitaltothesystem,notasupplicant.Attheverypeakofthecrisis,wepoured

$15.5billionintoabusinessworldthatcouldotherwiselookonlytothefederalgovernmentfor

help.Ofthat,$9billionwenttobolstercapitalatthreehighly-regardedandpreviously-secure

Americanbusinessesthatneeded–withoutdelay–ourtangiblevoteofconfidence.The

remaining

$6.5billionsatisfiedourcommitmenttohelpfundthepurchaseofWrigley,adealthatwas

completedwithoutpausewhile,elsewhere,panicreigned.

Wepayasteeppricetomaintainourpremierfinancialstrength.The$20billion-plusofcashequivalent

assetsthatwecustomarilyholdisearningapittanceatpresent.Butwesleepwell.

•Wetendtoletourmanysubsidiariesoperateontheirown,withoutoursupervisingand

monitoringthemtoanydegree.Thatmeanswearesometimeslateinspottingmanagement

problemsandthatbothoperatingandcapitaldecisionsareoccasionallymadewithwhichCharlie

andIwouldhavedisagreedhadwebeenconsulted.Mostofourmanagers,however,usethe

independencewegrantthemmagnificently,rewardingourconfidencebymaintaininganowneroriented

attitudethatisinvaluableandtooseldomfoundinhugeorganizations.Wewouldrather

sufferthevisiblecostsofafewbaddecisionsthanincurthemanyinvisiblecoststhatcomefrom

decisionsmadetooslowly–ornotatall–becauseofastiflingbureaucracy.

WithouracquisitionofBNSF,wenowhaveabout257,000employeesandliterallyhundredsof

differentoperatingunits.Wehopetohavemanymoreofeach.ButwewillneverallowBerkshire

tobecomesomemonoliththatisoverrunwithcommittees,budgetpresentationsandmultiple

layersofmanagement.Instead,weplantooperateasacollectionofseparately-managedmediumsized

andlargebusinesses,mostofwhosedecision-makingoccursattheoperatinglevel.Charlie

andIwilllimitourselvestoallocatingcapital,controllingenterpriserisk,choosingmanagersand

settingtheircompensation.

•WemakenoattempttowooWallStreet.Investorswhobuyandsellbaseduponmediaor

analyst

commentaryarenotforus.InsteadwewantpartnerswhojoinusatBerkshirebecausetheywish

tomakealong-terminvestmentinabusinesstheythemselvesunderstandandbecauseit’s

onethat

followspolicieswithwhichtheyconcur.IfCharlieandIweretogointoasmallventurewitha

fewpartners,wewouldseekindividualsinsyncwithus,knowingthatcommongoalsandashared

destinymakeforahappybusiness“marriage”betweenownersandmanagers.Scalin