第4章全球各地的公司治理.ppt

第4章全球各地的公司治理.ppt

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INTERNATIONALFINANCIALMANAGEMENT,EUN/RESNICK,FifthEdition,Copyright2009byTheMcGraw-HillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.,McGraw-Hill/Irwin,4-1,ChapterOutline,4.1GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssues4.2TheAgencyProblem4.3RemediesfortheAgencyProblem4.4ConsequencesofLaw4.5CorporateGovernanceReform,4-2,什么是公司治理？

公司治理是公司的控制权和现金流借此在公司股东、管理人员和公司的其他利益相关者之间进行分配的经济、法律和制度方面的框架。

3,4.1GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssues,1、Thepubliccorporation（上市公司）,whichisjointlyownedbyamultitudeofshareholdersprotectedwithlimitedliability,isamajororganizationalinnovationofvasteconomicconsequences.2、上市公司的优势Itisanefficientrisksharingmechanismthatallowscorporationstoraiselargeamountsofcapital.,4-4,4.1GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssues,3、Akeyweaknessofthepubliccorporation（上市公司的致命弱点）istheconflictofinterestbetweenmanagersandshareholders.4、管理人员和股东利益冲突的原因

（1）所有权分散下，Inprinciple,shareholderselectaboardofdirectors,whointurnhireandfirethemanagerswhoactuallyrunthecompany.Inreality,management-friendlyinsidersoftendominatetheboardofdirectors,withrelativelyfewoutsidedirectorswhocanindependentlymonitorthemanagement.,4-5,4.1GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssues,Furthermore,withdiffusedownership,mostshareholdershavestrongenoughincentivetoincurthecostsofmonitoringmanagementthemselves.

（2）所有权集中下，大股东和外部小股东之间的利益冲突比经济人和股东之间的利益和冲突要严重。

LLSVshowsthat各国在以下fouracepts存在差异,4-6,4.1GovernanceandthePublicCorporation:

KeyIssues,Thecentralproblemincorporategovernanceishowtobestprotectoutsiderinvestorsfromexpropriationbythecontrollinginsiderssothattheformercanreceivefairreturnsontheirinvestment,Thedetailissuesarethefollowingagencyproblemremedieslawandgovernanceconsequencesoflawreformofgovernance,4.2TheAgencyProblem,1、Agencyproblemreferstothepossibleconflictsofinterestbetweenself-interestedmanagersasagentsandshareholdersofthefirmwhoaretheprincipals.,Whythereisagencyproblem?

Nocompletecontract,8,4.2TheAgencyProblem,Shareholdersallocatedecision-makingauthoritytothemanagers.Thatswhythemanagersarehiredinthefirstplace.Manyshareholdersarenotqualifiedtomakecomplexbusinessdecisions.Ashareholderwithadiversifiedportfoliowouldnothavethetimetodevotetomakingthenumerousdecisionsateachofhismanycompaniesanyway.2、Themanagershaveresidualcontrolright（剩余控制权）,4-9,4.2TheAgencyProblem,3、Themanagershaveresidualcontrolrightsothatthemanagerscandosomethingssuchas:

P82提供高津贴浪费公司资金,10,4.2TheAgencyProblem,4、Freecashflow（自由现金流）willmaketheagencyproblemmoreseriousbecause

（1）独立于资本市场。

（2）更多的补偿金。

（3）社会的政治的影响力、声望Theheartoftheagencyproblemis管理者外部投资者如何处理自由现金流所产生的利益冲突。

11,4.2TheAgencyProblem,Havingtheshort-termcontrolofthefirmsassets,managersmightbetemptedtoactinthemanagersshort-termbestinterestinsteadoftheshareholderslong-termbestinterest.Consumptionoflavishperquisitesisoneexample.Outrightstealingisanotherexample.SomeRussianoilcompaniesareknowntoselloiltomanager-ownedtradingcompaniesatbelowmarketprices.Evenatthat,theydontalwaysbothertocollectthebills!

4-12,TheAgencyProblematEnron,Enronhadabout3,500subsidiariesandaffiliatesManyofthesewererunandpartlyownedbyEnronexecutives.Inretrospect,conflictofinterestshouldhavebeenanobviousconcern.ThepartnershipsdidhundredsofmillionsofdollarsoftransactionswithEnronitself,insomecasesbuyingassetsfromthecompanyorsellingassetstoit.Theproblemisthis:

Wheredidtheexecutivesloyaltieslie?

Aretheytryingtonegotiatethebestdealforthecompanythatemploysthemandtheshareholderswhoownthecompany,orthebestdealforthepartnershipwheretheyhadanownershipstake?

4-13,TheAgencyProblematEnron,Theboardofdirectorsclaimedthatthesepartnershipswithexecutiveownershipallowedthefirmtospeedupcontracting.Toprotectitselfindealingswiththesepartnerships,thecompanysaysthatitsetupsafeguardsthatrequiredtopcompanyofficersandtheboardtoreviewandapprovedealsbetweenEnronandthepartnerships.Clearlythesesafeguardswereinsufficient.,4-14,4.3RemediesfortheAgencyProblem,4.3.1boardofdirector董事会4.3.2incentivecontract激励合同4.3.3concentratedownership所有权集中4.3.4accountingtransparency会计透明度4.3.5debt债务4.3.6overseasstocklisting海外股票上市4.3.7marketforcorporatecontrol公司控制权市场,4-15,4.3.1boardofdirector,1、IntheU.S.,shareholdershavetherighttoelecttheboardofdirectors.2、董事会的作用Iftheboardremainsindependentofmanagement,itcanserveasaneffectivemechanismforcurbingtheagencyproblem.,16,4.3.1CorporateBoards,3、Thestructureandlegalchargeofcorporateboardsvarygreatlyacrosscounties.（不同国家在公司董事会的结构和法律责任方面存在差异）德国InGermanytheboardisnotlegallychargedwithrepresentingtheinterestsofshareholders,butisratherchargedwithrepresentingtheinterestsofstakeholders（e.g.workers,creditors,etc.）aswellasshareholders.,4-17,4.3.1CorporateBoards,Thestructureandlegalchargeofcorporateboardsvarygreatlyacrosscounties.英国InEngland,themajorityofpubliccompaniesvoluntarilyabidebytheCodeofBestPracticeoncorporategovernance.ItrecommendsthereshouldbeatleastthreeoutsidedirectorsandtheboardchairmanandtheCEOshouldbedifferentindividuals.,4-18,4.3.1CorporateBoards,Thestructureandlegalchargeofcorporateboardsvarygreatlyacrosscounties.日本InJapan,mostcorporateboardsareinsider-dominatedandprimarilyconcernedwiththewelfareofthekeiretsutowhichthecompanybelongs.4、选择董事会的原则巴菲特认为：

与公司有着最大个人经济利益关系的人。

4-19,4.3.2IncentiveContracts,Itisdifficulttodesignacompensationschemethatgivesexecutivesanincentivetoworkhardatincreasingshareholderwealth.Accounting-basedschemesaresubjecttomanipulation.ArthurAndersensinvolvementwiththeEnrondebacleisanegregiousexample.Executivestockoptionsareanincreasinglypopularformofincentivecompatiblecompensation.,4-20,ExecutiveStockOptions,ExecutiveStockOptionsexisttoaligntheinterestsofshareholdersandmanagers.ExecutiveStockOptionsarecalloptions（technicallywarrants）ontheemployersshares.Inalienable:

theoptioncantbesold.Typicalmaturityis10years.Typicalvestingperiodis3years.ExecutiveStockOptionsgiveexecutivesanimportanttaxbreak:

grantsofat-the-moneyoptionsarenotconsideredtaxableincome.（Taxesaredueiftheoptionisexercised.）,4-21,ValuingExecutiveCompensation,FASBallowsfirmstorecordzeroexpenseforgrantsofat-the-moneyexecutivestockoptions.Howevertheeconomicvalueofalong-livedcalloptionisenormous,especiallygiventhepropensityoffirmstoresettheexercisepriceafterdropsinthepriceofthestock.Duetotheinalienability,theoptionsareworthlesstotheexecutivethantheycostthecompany.Theexecutivecanonlyexercise,notsellhisoptions.Thushecannevercapturethespeculativevalueonlytheintrinsicvalue.This“deadweightloss”isovercomebytheincentivecompatibilityforthegrantor.,4-22,4.3.3ConcentratedOwnership,Anotherwaytoalleviatetheagencyproblemistoconcentrateshareholdings.IntheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom,concentratedownershipisrelativelyrare.Elsewhereintheworld,however,concentratedownershipisthenorm.,4-23,4.3.3ConcentratedOwnership,管理层持股P86管理层所有的股权量与公司的价值和绩效之间存在非线性关系。

管理防御指经理人在公司内、外部控制机制下，选择有利于维护自身职位并追求自身效用最大化的行为。

24,4.3.5Debt,1、负债的好处Ifmanagersfailtopayinterestandprincipaltocreditors,thecompanycanbeforcedintobankruptcyandmanagersmaylosetheirjobs.Borrowingcanhaveamajordisciplinaryeffectonmanagers,motivatingthemtocurbprivateperquisitesandwastefulinvestmentsandtrimbloatedorganizations.2、过度负债的不足Excessivedebtcreatesitsownagencyproblems,however.p87.,4-25,4.3.6OverseasStockListing,Companiesdomiciledincountrieswithweakinvestorprotectioncanbondthemselvescrediblytobetterinvestorprotectionbylistingtheirstocksincountrieswithstronginvestorprotection.,4-26,4.3.7TheMarketforCorporateControl,并购行为对经理层产生约束。

Ifamanagementteamisreallyout-of-control,overtimethesharepricewilldecline.Atsomepoint,acorporateraiderwillbuyupenoughsharestogaincontroloftheboard.Thentheraidereitherfiresthefecklessmanagersandturnsthefirmaroundorhesellseverythinginsightforthebreak-upvalue.Eitherway,theoldmanagersareoutofajob.Thethreatofthisunemploymentmaykeeptheminline.,4-27,4.3.8LawandCorporateGovernance,Commerciallegalsystemsofmostcountriesderivefromarelativelyfewlegalorigins.EnglishcommonlawFrenchcivillawGermancivillawScandinaviancivillaw斯勘的纳维亚大陆法Thusthecontentoflawprotectinginvestorsrightsvariesagreatdealacrosscountries.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthequalityoflawenforcementvariesagreatdealacrosscountries.,4-28,4.4ConsequencesofLaw,Protectionofinvestorsrightshasmajoreconomicconsequences.Theseconsequencesinclude影响包括所有权与控制权模式.控制权的私人利益.资本市场与估值,4-29,ConsequencesofLaw:

Italyvs.U.K.,ItalyhasaFrenchcivillawtraditionwithweakshareholderprotection,whereastheUnitedKingdom,withitsEnglishcommonlawtradition,providesstronginvestorprotection.InItaly（U.K.）,thethreelargestshareholdersown58percent（19percent）ofthecompany,onaverage.CompanyownershipisthushighlyconcentratedinItalyandmorediffuseintheUnitedKingdom.,4-30,ConsequencesofLaw:

Italyvs.U.K.,Inaddition,asof1999,only247companiesarelistedonthestockexchangeinItaly,whereas2,292companiesarelistedintheUnitedKingdom.Inthesameyear,thestockmarketcapitalizationasaproportionoftheannualGDPwas71percentinItalybut248percentintheUnitedKingd