莫拉雷斯案判决.docx

莫拉雷斯案判决.docx

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莫拉雷斯案判决

527U.S.41

Chicagov.Morales

CERTIORARITOTHESUPREMECOURTOFILLINOIS

97-1121Argued:

December9,1998---Decided:

June10,1999

JusticeStevensannouncedthejudgmentoftheCourtanddeliveredtheopinionoftheCourtwithrespecttoPartsI,II,andV,andanopinionwithrespecttoPartsIII,IV,andVI,inwhichJusticeSouterandJusticeGinsburgjoin.

In1992,theChicagoCityCouncilenactedtheGangCongregationOrdinance,whichprohibits“criminalstreetgangmembers”from“loitering”withoneanotherorwithotherpersonsinanypublicplace.ThequestionpresentediswhethertheSupremeCourtofIllinoiscorrectlyheldthattheordinanceviolatestheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheFederalConstitution.

I

Beforetheordinancewasadopted,thecitycouncil’sCommitteeonPoliceandFireconductedhearingstoexploretheproblemscreatedbythecity’sstreetgangs,andmoreparticularly,theconsequencesofpublicloiteringbygangmembers.Witnessesincludedresidentsoftheneighborhoodswheregangmembersaremostactive,aswellassomeofthealdermenwhorepresentthoseareas.Basedonthatevidence,thecouncilmadeaseriesoffindingsthatareincludedinthetextoftheordinanceandexplainthereasonsforitsenactment.[n1]

Thecouncilfoundthatacontinuingincreaseincriminalstreetgangactivitywaslargelyresponsibleforthecity’srisingmurderrate,aswellasanescalationofviolentanddrugrelatedcrimes.Itnotedthatinmanyneighborhoodsthroughoutthecity,“theburgeoningpresenceofstreetgangmembersinpublicplaceshasintimidatedmanylawabidingcitizens.”177Ill.2d440,445,687N. E.2d53,58（1997）.Furthermore,thecouncilstatedthatgangmembers“establishcontroloveridentifiableareas…byloiteringinthoseareasandintimidatingothersfromenteringthoseareas;and. . .[m]embersofcriminalstreetgangsavoidarrestbycommittingnooffensepunishableunderexistinglawswhentheyknowthepolicearepresent... .”Ibid.Itfurtherfoundthat“loiteringinpublicplacesbycriminalstreetgangmemberscreatesajustifiablefearforthesafetyofpersonsandpropertyinthearea”andthat“[a]ggressiveactionisnecessarytopreservethecity'sstreetsandotherpublicplacessothatthepublicmayusesuchplaceswithoutfear.”Moreover,thecouncilconcludedthatthecity“hasaninterestindiscouragingallpersonsfromloiteringinpublicplaceswithcriminalgangmembers.”Ibid.

Theordinancecreatesacriminaloffensepunishablebyafineofupto$500,imprisonmentfornotmorethansixmonths,andarequirementtoperformupto120hoursofcommunityservice.Commissionoftheoffenseinvolvesfourpredicates.First,thepoliceofficermustreasonablybelievethatatleastoneofthetwoormorepersonspresentina“publicplace”isa“criminalstreetgangmembe[r].”Second,thepersonsmustbe“loitering,”whichtheordinancedefinesas“remain[ing]inanyoneplacewithnoapparentpurpose.”Third,theofficermustthenorder“all”ofthepersonstodisperseandremovethemselves“fromthearea.”Fourth,apersonmustdisobeytheofficer’sorder.Ifanyperson,whetheragangmemberornot,disobeystheofficer’sorder,thatpersonisguiltyofviolatingtheordinance.Ibid.[n2]

Twomonthsaftertheordinancewasadopted,theChicagoPoliceDepartmentpromulgatedGeneralOrder92-4toprovideguidelinestogovernitsenforcement.[n3]Thatorderpurportedtoestablishlimitationsontheenforcementdiscretionofpoliceofficers“toensurethattheanti-gangloiteringordinanceisnotenforcedinanarbitraryordiscriminatoryway.”ChicagoPoliceDepartment,GeneralOrder92-4,reprintedinApp.toPet.forCert.65a.Thelimitationsconfinetheauthoritytoarrestgangmemberswhoviolatetheordinancetosworn“membersoftheGangCrimeSection”andcertainotherdesignatedofficers,[n4]andestablishdetailedcriteriafordefiningstreetgangsandmembershipinsuchgangs.Id.,at66a-67a.Inaddition,theorderdirectsdistrictcommandersto“designateareasinwhichthepresenceofgangmembershasademonstrableeffectontheactivitiesoflawabidingpersonsinthesurroundingcommunity,”andprovidesthattheordinance“willbeenforcedonlywithinthedesignatedareas.”Id.,at68a-69a.Thecity,however,doesnotreleasethelocationsofthese“designatedareas”tothepublic.[n5]

II

Duringthethreeyearsofitsenforcement,[n6]thepoliceissuedover89,000dispersalordersandarrestedover42,000peopleforviolatingtheordinance.[n7]Intheensuingenforcementproceedings,twotrialjudgesupheldtheconstitutionalityoftheordinance,butelevenothersruledthatitwasinvalid.[n8]InrespondentYoukhana’scase,thetrialjudgeheldthatthe“ordinancefailstonotifyindividualswhatconductisprohibited,anditencouragesarbitraryandcapriciousenforcementbypolice.”[n9]

TheIllinoisAppellateCourtaffirmedthetrialcourt’srulingintheYoukhanacase,[n10]consolidatedandaffirmedotherpendingappealsinaccordancewithYoukhana,[n11]andreversedtheconvictionsofrespondentsGutierrez,Morales,andothers.[n12]TheAppellateCourtwaspersuadedthattheordinanceimpairedthefreedomofassemblyofnon-gangmembersinviolationoftheFirstAmendmenttotheFederalConstitutionandArticleIoftheIllinoisConstitution,thatitwasunconstitutionallyvague,thatitimproperlycriminalizedstatusratherthanconduct,andthatitjeopardizedrightsguaranteedundertheFourthAmendment.[n13]

TheIllinoisSupremeCourtaffirmed.Itheld“thatthegangloiteringordinanceviolatesdueprocessoflawinthatitisimpermissiblyvagueonitsfaceandanarbitraryrestrictiononpersonalliberties.”177Ill.2d,at447,687N.E.2d,at59.Thecourtdidnotreachthecontentionsthattheordinance“createsastatusoffense,permitsarrestswithoutprobablecauseorisoverbroad.”Ibid.

Insupportofitsvaguenessholding,thecourtpointedoutthatthedefinitionof“loitering”intheordinancedrewnodistinctionbetweeninnocentconductandconductcalculatedtocauseharm.[n14]“Moreover,thedefinitionof‘loiter’providedbytheordinancedoesnotassistinclearlyarticulatingtheproscriptionsoftheordinance.”Id.,at451-452,687N.E.2d,at60-61.Furthermore,itconcludedthattheordinancewas“notreasonablysusceptibletoalimitingconstructionwhichwouldaffirmitsvalidity.”[n15]

Wegrantedcertiorari,523U.S.___（1998）,andnowaffirm.LiketheIllinoisSupremeCourt,weconcludethattheordinanceenactedbythecityofChicagoisunconstitutionallyvague.

III

Thebasicfactualpredicateforthecity’sordinanceisnotindispute.Asthecityarguesinitsbrief,“theverypresenceofalargecollectionofobviouslybrazen,insistent,andlawlessgangmembersandhangers-ononthepublicwaysintimidatesresidents,whobecomeafraideventoleavetheirhomesandgoabouttheirbusiness.That,inturn,imperilscommunityresidents’senseofsafetyandsecurity,detractsfrompropertyvalues,andcanultimatelydestabilizeentireneighborhoods.”[n16]Thefindingsintheordinanceexplainthatitwasmotivatedbytheseconcerns.Wehavenodoubtthatalawthatdirectlyprohibitedsuchintimidatingconductwouldbeconstitutional,[n17]butthisordinancebroadlycoversasignificantamountofadditionalactivity.Uncertaintyaboutthescopeofthatadditionalcoverageprovidesthebasisforrespondents’claimthattheordinanceistoovague.

Weareconfrontedattheoutsetwiththecity’sclaimthatitwasimproperforthestatecourtstoconcludethattheordinanceisinvalidonitsface.Thecitycorrectlypointsoutthatimpreciselawscanbeattackedontheirfaceundertwodifferentdoctrines.[n18]First,theoverbreadthdoctrinepermitsthefacialinvalidationoflawsthatinhibittheexerciseofFirstAmendmentrightsiftheimpermissibleapplicationsofthelawaresubstantialwhen“judgedinrelationtothestatute’splainlylegitimatesweep.”Broadrickv.Oklahoma,413U.S.601,612-615（1973）.Second,evenifanenactmentdoesnotreachasubstantialamountofconstitutionallyprotectedconduct,itmaybeimpermissiblyvaguebecauseitfailstoestablishstandardsforthepoliceandpublicthataresufficienttoguardagainstthearbitrarydeprivationoflibertyinterests.Kolenderv.Lawson,461U.S.352,358（1983）.

Whilewe,liketheIllinoiscourts,concludethattheordinanceisinvalidonitsface,wedonotrelyontheoverbreadthdoctrine.Weagreewiththecity’ssubmissionthatthelawdoesnothaveasufficientlysubstantialimpactonconductprotectedbytheFirstAmendmenttorenderitunconstitutional.Theordinancedoesnotprohibitspeech.Becausetheterm“loiter”isdefinedasremaininginoneplace“withnoapparentpurpose,”itisalsoclearthatitdoesnotprohibitanyformofconductthatisapparentlyintendedtoconveyamessage.Byitsterms,theordinanceisinapplicabletoassembliesthataredesignedtodemonstrateagroup’ssupportof,oroppositionto,aparticularpointofview.Cf.Clarkv.CommunityforCreativeNon-Violence,468U.S.288（1984）;Gregoryv.Chicago,394U.S.111（1969）.ItsimpactonthesocialcontactbetweengangmembersandothersdoesnotimpairtheFirstAmendment“rightofassociation”thatourcaseshaverecognized.SeeDallasv.Stanglin,490U.S.19,23-25（1989）.

Ontheotherhand,astheUnitedStatesrecognizes,thefreedomtoloiterforinnocentpurposesispartofthe“liberty”protectedbytheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment.[n19]Wehaveexpresslyidentifiedthis“righttoremovefromoneplacetoanotheraccordingtoinclination”as“anattributeofpersonalliberty”protectedbytheConstitution.Williamsv.F