外文翻译--政府绩效:教训和挑战-精品.doc

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外文翻译--政府绩效:教训和挑战-精品.doc

中文4350字

外文文献翻译

原文:

GovernmentPerformance:

LessonandChallenges

ThisarticleconcentratesonattemptsbyOECDcountriestointroduceperformance-basedorresults-basedbudgetingandmanagement.Theneedtoenhancepublicsectorperformancehasbecomemoreurgentasgovernmentsfacemountingdemandsonpublicexpenditure,callsforhigherqualityservicesand,insomecountries,apublicincreasinglyunwillingtopayhighertaxes.Performancebudgetingandperformancemanagementseektomovethefocusofbudgeting,managementandaccountabilityawayfrominputstowardsresults,i.e.bettervalueformoney.DrawingondatafromtheOECD/WorldBankBudgetPracticesandProceduresDatabase,thearticleexploresthetrendsandcountryapproaches(differentphases,variousobjectives),discussesaccountabilitytothepublic(includingexternalperformanceauditing),andrecognisestheimportanceofcontextandawhole-of-governmentapproach,inparticularforchangingthebehaviourofkeyactorsandmotivatingpoliticianstouseperformanceinformation.Thelimitationsandtensionsofperformancebudgetingandperformancemanagementarealsodiscussed,aswellasproblemsofmeasurementandtheefficientuseofperformanceinformation.

Agreatdealofrhetorichassurroundedtheintroductionofperformancemanagementandbudgeting.Supportersclaimthatithasthecapacitytotransformgovernments.However,itisimportantthatthisreformshouldnotbeseenasapanaceaandthatgovernmentshaverealisticexpectationsaboutwhatitcanachieveandthetimeneededtoreachtheseobjectives.

Evencountriesthathavebeenusingthisapproachforover15yearscontinuetostrugglewithissuesofmeasurement;thisisespeciallythecaseforoutcomes.Akeychallengeforallcountriesisobtaininggoodqualityinformationwhichisvalid,reliable,andtimely.Numerouschallengescanbeencounteredincludingsettingclearobjectives,findingaccuratemeasuresofperformanceandhavinggoodsystemsofdatacollection.

Settingobjectives:

Forsomeagenciesorprogrammes,evensettingclearobjectivescanbeaproblemwhenthereisnoagreementonwhatthemissionis,ortherearediversemissions,overlappingandfragmentedprogrammes,andstakeholderswithdifferentinterests.

Findingaccuratemeasuresofperformance:

Thedesignofmeasuresismadedifficultbyfindingmeasuresforspecificactivities,andbyrelatingwhatanagencyorprogrammeactuallycontributestowardsachievingspecificoutcomes.Outputandoutcomemeasureseachpresentadifferentsetofchallenges(OECD,2002b).Outcomesaretechnicallymoredifficulttomeasure;theyarecomplexandinvolvetheinteractionofmanyfactors,plannedandunplanned.Also,thereareproblemswithtimelagissuesandinsomecasestheresultsarenotwithinthecontrolofthegovernment.Outcomes,however,haveastrongappealforthepublicandpoliticians.Mostcountriesappeartohaveadoptedacombinationofoutputsandoutcomes.

Establishingandmaintainingsystemsofdatacollection:

Toensurequalitythereneedstobeaprocessbywhichdatacollectedareverifiedandvalidated.However,settingupandmaintainingthesesystemscanbebothcomplexandcostly.AsdiscussedinSection6,theauditingofperformanceinformationcanhelptoimprovestandardsandprovidesomelegitimacyforthereportedresults.Itisespeciallychallengingtoassurethequalityofthedatawhenagenciesaredependentonthirdpartiestoprovidetheinformation.Thisisparticularlyaprobleminfederalistsystems(Curristine,2002).

Performancetargetshelptoclarifyperformanceexpectationsforanorganisationforagiventimeperiod.Countries,however,continuetostrugglewiththeissuesoftargetlevelandnumbers.Thereareproblemswithsettingtargetstoolowand/ortoohigh.Settingtargetstoolowmeansthatagenciesarenotchallengedtoimproveperformance.Settingthemtoohigh,whileitcanmotivateorganisations,alsocreatesunrealisticexpectationsandsituationsinwhichagencieswillfail(Perrin,2002).Ittakestimetogettherightlevelandtogetthecomparativedatatorealisethattargetsaresetattoohighortoolowalevel.

Toomanytargets:

Thereisalsoanissueabouthowmanytargetstohave.Toomanytargetscreateinformationoverloadandmakeitdifficulttoselectpriorities;toofewtargetscreatedistortioneffects.Againittakestimetogetarealisticbalance.Severalcountrieshavestartedoutwithalargenumberoftargetsandsubsequentlyreducedthem.Forexample,intheUnitedKingdomwhenperformanceagreementsfordepartmentswerefirstintroducedaspartofthecomprehensivespendingreviewin1998,therewereintotal600targetsacrossgovernment.Bythetimeoftherevisedspendingreviewin2002,thatnumberhadbeenreducedto130targets(H.M.Treasury,2004).

Avoidingdistortingbehaviour:

Thisisachallengeforallgovernments.Possibleperverseeffectsincludegoaldistortion–thatis,organisationsandmanagersfocusingonafewspecificindicatorsandtargets,usuallythemostachievableor“saleable”,attheexpenseoftheoverallobjectivesorprogramme.Inextremecasesofgoaldistortion,agenciesorstaff,underpressuretomeettargets,maydeliberatelypresentmisleadinginformation.

InmanyOECDcountries,theobjectiveofintroducingperformanceintothebudgetprocessistoimprovebudgetarydecisionmakingandtoactasanincentiveforagenciestoimproveperformance.Mostcountries,however,continuetostrugglewiththisapproach.Asdiscussedabove,oneofthekeyissuesisobtaininggoodqualityandreliableperformancedata.Briefly,otherchallengesincludeestablishingsomelinkbetweenfinancialinformationandperformanceinformation.Thisisparticularlychallengingforoutcomemeasures.Inmanycountriestherearealsoproblemswiththestructureofthebudgetandaccountingissues.Budgetstendtobestructuredinaccordancewithinstitutionalandfunctionalboundariesandnotaccordingtoresultscategories.Alsoifthereisnosystemofcostrecording,itisdifficulttorelatetruecoststoresults.

Gettingtherightmixofincentives:

Thisisparticularlyimportantwhencountriesuseperformanceinformationinresourceallocation.Afundamentalquestioniswhetherfinancialrewardsshouldbegivenforgoodperformanceandbadperformanceshouldbepunishedand,ifso,how.Punishingfailurebyremovingresourcescreatesaclearsignaltootheragenciesthatperformanceisconsideredimportant.However,itdoesnothelpaddresstheunderlyingcausesofpoorperformance.Indeedinsomecasesfailuretomeettargetscanbetheresultoflackoffundingorotherresources.Whilerewardinggoodperformanceisintuitivelyappealing,itdoesnottakeintoaccountcostissuesandgovernmentpriorities.Inaclimateofbudgetarysaving,aquestioniswhethertogiveadditionalfundingtoanagency,especiallyonethatisnotagovernmentpriority.Ineithercase,thereisalwaysthedangerthatlinkingresultstofinancialresourcescancreateincentivestodistortandcheatinpresentinginformation.

Oneofthemostdifficultchallengesistocreatearesults-basedculturewithinorganisationsandthroughoutgovernment.Toachievechangeinbehaviourandcultureacrossgovernmentrequiresawhole-of-governmentapproachandthecreationoftherightmixofincentivesthattakesaccountofhowtheactionsofkeyactorsinfluenceeachother.Mostcountriescontinuetostrugglewithachievingchangeinthebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians;thisisalong-termprocess.

Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofmanagersandemployeeswithingovernmentorganisationsiscrucial.Thisreformhasthepotentialtoimprovethefocusonorganisationalgoals,toprovidemanagerswithbetterinformationfordecisionmakingonprogrammes,budgetsandpolicies,andtoimproveinternalreportingandcontrols.Gainingthesebenefitsischallengingbecauseitrequirestechnicalaswellasculturalchange.Intechnicaltermsitcanbedifficulttomeasurewhatanagencydoesandtolinkorganisationalobjectivestoindividualgoals.Itisimportanttoobtainthebuy-inoffrontlineemployees;thiscanbefacilitatedbytherightmixofformalandinformalincentivesandcontrols.Obtainingthestrongsupportoftheorganisationalleadershipandmanagerscanbefacilitatedbygivingthemthenecessaryflexibilitytoachievegoals.Withoutthisflexibility,managerswillhavetheresponsibilityforachievingtargetswithouttheabilitytodeliver,andnoonewantstobeheldaccountablefortargetsthatarenotwithinhis/hercontrol.

Withinthecontextofagovernment-wideapproach,ifandhowtheperformanceinformationisusedbypoliticiansandtheMinistryofFinancecancreateincentiveswhichimpactonhowmanagersbehave.Ifperformanceinformationisrequiredbutnotusedbyleadersormanagersindecisionmaking,thereisadangerofitbecomingaburdenonorganisationsintermsofcostofinformationsystemsandstafftime.Theprovisionofthisinformation,inadditiontotherequirementsofthetraditionalcontrolmechanisms,caninterferewithgettingthejobdone.Ifthishappens,thenperformancemanagementandbudgetingcanbecomeadistraction,adistortionoranexpensivepaperexerciseratherthanameanstotransformorganisationsandanessentialpartofgoodmanagement.

Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofpoliticians:

AsdiscussedinSection7,thisisakeychallengefacingreformers.Thesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislatureandtheexecutivehelpstoreinforcetheneedforchangeandtopushreform,althoughitisparticularlydifficulttoobtainthesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislature.

Issuesofhorizontalandverticalco-ordination:

Manygoalsand

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