跨国企业和国际财务管理文献翻译.docx

跨国企业和国际财务管理文献翻译.docx

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跨国企业和国际财务管理文献翻译

原文：

InternationalFinancialManagementandMultinationalEnterprises

Introduction

Thischapterprovidesaselective,criticalsurveyoftheacademicliteratureonthefinancialmanagementpolicyofmultinationalenterprises（MNEs）.Thefocusofmuchcurrentresearchinterestcanbecapturedintwomajorthemeswhichalsodominatethisanalysis.ThefirstisfinancialmanagementpolicyinrelationshiptotheincreasingvolatilityofrealandfinancialassetpricesintheinternationalfinancialenvironmentwithinwhichMNEsoperate.Thisdictatesonethemeofthischapter:

theimpactoffinancialrisk,inparticularmarketrisk,onMNEsandanappraisalofevolvingfinancialriskmanagementpractices.

Thesecondthemeisinternationalmarketsegmentation（ChoiandRajan1997）.Theglobalizationofinternationalbusinessactivityhasevolvedalongwithincreasingfinancialmarketintegration,particularlyincapitalmarkets.Toalimitedextentthishasbeenacpaniedbyincreasedharmonizationandstandardizationofbothinternationalregulatoryandaccountingpractices（Robertsetal.1998）.Despitesuchtrends,theasymmetricincidenceofaccountingstandardsregulations,andtaxationhashadsignificanttacticalandstrategicfinancialmanagementimplicationsforMNEs（ChoiandLevich1990,1997;Grayetal.1995;Meeketal.1995;Oxelheimetal.1998）.Weevaluatethenature,incidence,andimplicationsofsuchmarketsegmentationforselectedaspectsofMNEfinancialmanagementactivity.

ItisclearfromthecontextofouranalysisthatwebelievefinancialfactorstohaveimportantimplicationsfortheparativeadvantageofMNEslocatedindifferentjurisdictions,andalsothatfinancialmanagementplaysacriticalroleindecidinganMNE’spetitiveprosperity.ThisbeliefissupportedbysurveysofMNEs（RawlsandSmithson1990;Marshall2000）.Marshall（2000）reportstheresultsofasurveyofthe200largestMNEswhichrevealthat87percentofAsianPacific-basedMNEsstatethatforeignexchangeriskmanagementisatleastasimportantasbusinessriskmanagement.Nonetheless,todatenogenerallyacceptedtheoreticalunderpinninghasyetbeenprovideddemonstratingthatfinancialfactorsalonearebothnecessaryandsufficienttorationalizetheexistenceofMNEs,.Wefurtherdiscussthisissueinthecontextofmodesofmarketentryandparticipationinalatersection.

Theremainderofthechapteriseasilysummarized.Section2discussestheenhancedimportanceofrecentincreasesinassetpricevolatility,relatingittocountryriskandinternationalinvestmentappraisal.Theclassificationandmeasurementofriskexposureisconsideredinsection3.Particularattentionisgiventorecentlydevelopedtechniquessuchasvalue-at-riskandcash-flow-at-risk.Section4isconcernedwiththemanagementoffinancialriskbyMNEs.Inparticular,adistinctionismadebetweenmanagementpoliciesdesignedprimarilytohedgerisk,andthoseintendingtoexploititspotentialtocreatepetitiveadvantage.ThissectionalsoevaluatesempiricalstudiesofMNEriskmanagement.Section5addressesissuesrelatingtotheeffectiveimplementationofariskmanagementsystemwithinthegovernancestructureofanMNE.Brifeconcludingremarksfollowtogetherwithsomesuggestionsforfutureresearch..

THENATUREOFFINANCIALRISK

OuremphasisonfinancialriskandtheevolutionofMNEriskmanagementpracticeshasbeenmotivatedbyanumberoffactors,themostimportantbeingthetrendtowardincreasingglobalfinancialmarketintegration（Lessard1997）andtheenhancedvolatilityinthefinancialenvironmentwithinwhichMNEsoperate.Welaterevaluatestudieswhicharguethatthesefactorscanconfercertainadvantagestointernationalizationofafirm’sactivities.Inpreparationforthisanalysiswechroniclecertainmajorrecentdevelopmentsintheglobalfinancialenvironment,whichindicatetheincreasingimportanceofmarketriskinglobalfinancialmarkets.

Exchangeratevariability

FollowingthecollapseoftheBrettonWoodssystemoffixedexchangeratesintheearly1970s,exchangeratefluctuationshavebeeincreasinglyvolatile,punctuatedbyoccasionalepisodesofexchangeratecrises.Between1970andmid-2000,theYen/USdollarexchangeratehasmovedfrom361to107andtheDeutschmark/USdollarratehasfallenfrom4.2to1.9.However,thedollarhasappreciatedbyabouttwo-thirdsagainststerlingoverthesameperiod.ThecrisisintheEuropeanMonetarySystem（ERM）inSeptember1992ledtosignificantfallsinthevalueofsterlingandtheItalianLira,whilethecurrenciesofThailand,Indonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,andSouthKorealostbetweenone-thirdandthree-quartersoftheirvalueinthesecondhalfof1997.Therehavealsobeenmajormovementsinexchangeratesfollowingshifitsinthemonetarypolicystanceofcertaingovernments,suchasthetightermonetarypolicyfollowedintheearlydaysoftheThatcheradministrationintheUK.Indeed,theaveragevolatilityofexchangerates,whichisintheregionof10-15perentperyear,issufficienttoeliminatetheaverageprofitmarginforthetypicalmultinationalcorporation.

Interestratevariability

Interestratevolatilityhassimilarlyaffectedcorporatefundingcosts,cashflows,andnetassetvaluessincetheearly1970sintheUS,andalthoughtheysubsequentlydeclined,achangeinpolicybytheFederalReservecausedasharpincreaseinboththelevelandvolatilityofratesin1979.Interestratespeakedin1981,andthenfellslowly.Since1983,therehavebeenfourmoreUSinterestratecycles.AccordingtoJorion（1996）,theincreasein1994eliminatedover$1.5trilliondollarfromfixedineportfolios.Interestrateshavealsobeemoreandmorevolatilesincemanycentralbanksbegantoabandontargetinginterestratesasapolicyobjectiveinfavouroftargetingmoneysupplygrowthorinflation.IntheUK,interestratesshotupinthelate1980sandearly1990sduetoinflationarypressurescausedbyarelaxationinmonetarypolicy,butthenfellsubstantiallywithsterling’swithdrawalfromtheERMinSeptember1992.

Equitymarketvariability

Equitymarketshavealsobeeextremelyvolatile.Duringtheinflationaryperiodsoftheearly1970s,pricesincreasedsignificantlyonlytofallsharplyduringthebearmarketof1974-5followinga300percenthikeinthepriceofoil.Aglobalrecoverythenensued,withminorpricereversalsin1982-3,andthemarketpeakedin1987.OnBlackMonday,19October1987,pricesplunged.USequitieslost23percentoftheirvalue,equivalenttooverUS$1trillioninequitycapital.Thiswasfollowedbyanotherrecoveryoverthenexttenyears,sustainedworldwidewiththeexceptionofJapan,wheretheNikkeiindexfellfrom39000in1989to17000in1992,acapitallossofUS$2.7trillion.Finallyfrommid-toend1997,thestockmarketsofBangkok,Jakarta,KualaLumpur,andManilalostUS$370billion,or63percentofthefourcountryes’binedGDP,whiletheSeoulstockmarketdeclined60percent.

moditypricevariabilityandothersourcesofincreasedrisk

modityprices,particularlythoseinprimaryproductmarkets,havealsobeensubjecttolargefluctuationssincethe1970s,atrendestablishedsubsequenttotheoilpricerisesof1973-4.Thisvariabilityalsohadspollovereffectsinotherfinancialmarkets,particularlyequitymarkets,therebycorroboratingtheviewthatitisfundamentallyincorrecttotreatfinancialmarketsinisolationfromoneanthor.Significantregulatoryandlegalchanges,theglobalizationofthefinancialservicesindustry,andlegalchanges,theglobalizationofthefinancialservicesindustry,andtheemergenceofoffshorefinancialactivityhavealsoincreasedfinancialrisks.Finally,riskassociatedwiththeenhancedglobalriskhasresultedfromincreasedlevelsofworldtrade,majorchangesintradepolicy,theeconomicandpoliticaltransitionoftheformerSovietbloc,thegrowthoftheEU,andtheemergenceoftheAsiantigereconomiesaseconomicpower.

Countryrisk

Thisincreasingfinancialmarketvolatilityhaspotentiallyimportantconsequencesforboththeissueofinternationalinvestmentappraisal,andalsotheappropriatemeasureofcountryrisk.Beforeweconsidermethodologicalissuesrelatingtothemeasurementofcountryrisk,therearesomementatorswhoarguethatcountryriskisdiversifiable（unsystematic）andthatthereshouldbenocorrections.Recentassetpricingbehaviourininternationalfinancialmarketsprovidessubstantialevidenceofcross-marketcorrelation（systematicrisk）suggestingcountryriskisnon-diversifiableeveninaglobalportfolio,andhenceshouldbeincorporated.Onthemeasurementaspects,Damodoran（2000）hasarguedthattheriskpremiuminanyequitymarketcanbeconceptualizedas:

EquityMarketRiskPremiuminCountryA=BasePremiumforMatureEquityMarket（US）+CountryPremiumforCountryA.

IncalculatingthebasepremiumfortheUSmarket,anapproachbaseduponhistoricalpremiumremainsstandard.Here,actualequityreturnsareestimatedoverasufficientlylongtimeframeandparedtotheactualreturnsearnedondefault-free（usuallygovernment）securities.Theannualizeddifferenceisthencalculatedandrepresentsthehistoricalpremium.Thismethodyieldssubstantialdifferencesinthepremiumsweobservebeingusedinpractice:

evenforthecaseoftheUSAestimatesrangefrom4percentto12percent.Thisisallthemoresurprisinggiventhatmostcalculationsuseidenticaldata,theIbbotsonAssociatesdatabaseofhistoricalreturns.

Weconjectureseveralreasonsexistforthisdivergence.First:

differencesintimeperiodsused.Proponentsoftheuseofshortertimeperiodsarguethatsuchestimatesaremorerelevant,astheaverager