寻找美国梦外文文献翻译中英文.docx
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寻找美国梦外文文献翻译中英文
寻找美国梦外文翻译中英文
英文
Housingandunemployment:
Thesearchforthe“AmericanDream”
RobertReed,EjinduUme
Abstract
Thispaperconstructsamodelofsearchandbargainingacrosstwodifferentmarkets:
thelabormarketandthehousingmarket.Interestingly,themodelhighlightsthathousingpricesandfrictionsinthehousingmarkethaveaprofoundimpactonlabormarketactivitythroughthedesireofworkerstoeventuallypurchaseahome,the“AmericanDream.”Inparticular,higherhousingpricesadverselyaffectworkers’incentivesinthelabormarketasemploymentcaneventuallyleadtoaccesstohousingthroughtheabilitytopurchaseahome.Similarly,labormarketfrictionscanimpacthousingmarketactivity.Notably,tighterhousingmarketsareassociatedwithhigherunemploymentratesandlessjobcreation.Consequently,ourworksuggeststhatpolicymakersshouldbeverycarefulinimplementingpoliciestargetedtowardshousing–housingmarketsarelikelytogeneratesignificantexternaleffectstoothersectorsoftheeconomy,especiallythelabormarket.
Keywords:
Housing,Unemployment,Searchfrictions
Introduction
TherecentfinancialcrisisintheUnitedStatesdemonstratesthattherearesignificantlinkagesbetweenhousingmarketconditionsandlabormarketperformance.Therefore,itiscriticallyimportanttostarttakingalookatthedeepconnectionsbetweenlabormarketandhousingmarketactivity.Forexample,howdoeslabormarketactivityaffecthousingmarketbehavior?
Alternatively,howdohousingmarketconditionsimpacttheperformanceofthelabormarket?
Theseareimportant,butcomplicatedquestions–activityineachsectorfeedsintotheothersector.Consequently,ignoringsuchconnectionsalmostcertainlywouldleadtoineffectivepolicymaking.Yet–thatappearstobethemodusoperandiinpolicydiscussions–forexample,currentpolicydebatesaimedatpromotinghousingmarketactivityvirtuallyomitanydiscussionoftheroleoflabormarketconditionssuchaswagesorthedurationofunemploymentspells.
Inadditiontoignoringthelinkagesbetweenbothmarkets,muchexistingresearchignoresthattherearesignificantinformationfrictionswithineachmarket.Tobegin,workersgenerallyengageinarelativelylongperiodofjobsearchbeforefindingemployment.In2005,workerswereunemployedforanaverageof18.5weeks.Therefore,eveninastronglabormarket,workersgenerallyneededaround4.5monthstolocateasuccessfuljobmatch.Bycomparison,in2011,theaveragedurationofunemploymentwasmuchhigher–nearly10months.Italsotakesarelativelylongamountoftimetosellahome–aprocessthathasbecomenoticeablymoredifficultsincethehousingrecessionbegan.In2005,only22%ofhomeswerevacantformorethan6months.Bycomparison,inthefourthquarterof2011,around35%werevacant–nearly60%more.Inparticular, GenesoveandHan(2012) usingdatafromtheNationalAssociationofRealtorsfindthatsellertimesignificantlydependsonthelevelofmarketdemand.
Giventheseobservationsofpronounceddelay,thereareclearlyappreciabletransactionscostsineachmarket.Ittakestimetofindajob.Italsotakestimetofindahome-buyer.Consequently,thestandardWalrasianmarket-clearingparadigmdoesnotapplytoeithermarket.SincetheWalrasianclearingmechanismdoesnotapply,thestandardprice-takingmechanismisnotappropriatetostudythedeterminationofwagesorhomeprices.Moreover,theeffectsofpolicydependonthetimeinvolvedinthesearchprocessandtheprice-determinationmechanismineachmarket.Notably, Henley(1998) observes:
“UKeconomistshavebeenconcernedforsometimethatthehousingandlabourmarketsmaynotoperatetogetherinafrictionlessmanner.”
Howdoesactivityinthelabormarketandhousingmarketdependontheinformationfrictionsandnon-competitivepricedeterminationineachmarket?
Howshouldpolicymakersaccountfortheconnectionsbetweenhousingandlabormarketconditions?
Toadequatelyaddresstheseimportantconcerns,amodelthatclearlyanalyzesmarketfundamentalswith endogenous transactionscostsisrequired.Whileourultimateobjectiveistodevelopa generalequilibrium,search-theoreticmodeltoaddresstheconnectionsbetweenhousingandlabormarketoutcomes,weproceedinasequentialmannerthroughstudyingtwodifferent partialequilibrium settings.Tobegin,westudyapartial equilibriummodel ofthelabormarketwithexogenoushousingprices.Inthissetting,unemployedindividualsspendtimesearchingtofind jobvacancies.Onceaworkercontactsavacancy,workersengageinbargainingovertheirwagerate.Uponearninglabormarketincome,workerscanbeginsearchingforahometopurchasesothattheycanenjoythebenefitsofhomeownership.Thus,ourmodelintroducesanimportantconnectionbetweenhousingmarketconditionsandlabormarketactivity– thevalueoffindingajobextendsbeyondlaborincome,italsoincludesthediscountedbenefitofaccesstohousing.Notably,weareabletodemonstratethat housingmarketconditions areanimportantcomponentof labormarketincentives.
Inthismanner,thepursuitofthe“AmericanDream”isanimportantcomponentoflabormarketactivity.Therefore,frictionsinthehousingmarketcanaffectlabormarketoutcomes.Inparticular,tighterhousingconditionsandhigherhousingpricesactasaworkdisincentiveinthelabormarketbecausetheyinterruptthemechanismsbywhichemploymenteventuallyleadstoaccesstohousing.Consequently,tighterhousingmarketshaveasignificantnegativeexternaleffectonthelabormarketinwhichworkersdemandhigherwagesinbargainingwithfirms.Inturn,higherwagesleadtolessjobvacanciesandmoreunemployment.
Weturntodeterminationofhousingmarketactivity.Consistentwiththe“AmericanDream”hypothesis,thedemandforhousingcomesintothemarketasworkersfindjobs.Uponfindingasuitablehome,thebuyerandsellerbargainoverhousingprices.Aworker’ssurplusfromhomeownershipdependsonwages,theexpectedlengthoftimethattheywillremaininthehome,andtheutilityfromhomeownership.Theseller’ssurplusfromfindingabuyerdependsonthesalepriceofthehomeandtheamountoftimeitwouldtaketofindanalternativebuyer.Thus,labormarketconditionsthroughwagesandlaborforceparticipationratesmayalsoaffectpricesandtightnessinthehousingmarket.Asaresult,policiestargetedtowardsthelabormarketwouldalsotransmittohousingmarketactivity.
Finally,weconcludebystudyingageneralequilibriumsettinginwhichhousingpricesandwagesaresimultaneouslydetermined.Asonemightinferfromthepartialequilibriummodelofthelabormarket, economicconditions whichsupporthigherhousingpriceshaveanimportanteffectonlabormarketactivity.Forexample,iffrictionsfacingsellersinthehousingmarketarelower,pricesinthehousingmarketincrease.Inturn,wagesincreasesincethevalueofajobislowerwhenthehousingmarketistighter.So,lowerfrictionsinthehousingsectorcontributetolongerunemploymentspellsandlabormarketactivitysuchasvacancycreation.Thatis,housingmarketsarelikelytogeneratesignificantexternaleffectstoothersectorsoftheeconomy,especiallythelabormarket.
Consequently,ourworkcontributestoagrowingliteraturethatemphasizestheconnectionsbetweenhousingandlabormarkets.SomeoftheinitialobservationsonhousingandlabormarketswereprovidedbyOswald.Forexample, Oswald(1997) offersinitialevidencethathomeownershipratesareassociatedwithhigherunemploymentratesin OECDcountries.Inaddition,usingindividualobservationsonmarriedmalesinmetropolitanstatisticalareasintheUnitedStates, CoulsonandFisher(2009) findthatindividualsaremorelikelytobeunemployedifthelocal homeownership rateishigher.Morerecently, BlanchflowerandOswald(2013) alsoarguethatthehousingmarketcandisplacenegativeexternalitiesuponthelabormarket.Inparticular,theyobservethatthelong-runelasticitybetweenstateunemploymentratesandhomeownershipratesislargerthanone.Thatis,a1%increaseinthestatehomeownershipratewouldleadtoamorethan1%increaseinthestateunemploymentrate.Oneofthereasonsfortherelationshipstemsfromtheobservationthatstateswithhigherratesofhome-ownershipareassociatedwithlowerratesofbusinessformation.
Othercontributionsstudytherelationshipbetweenhousingandwages.Inparticular, CunninghamandReed(2013) studytheconsequencesofhousingequityforwagesamonghomeownersintheAmericanHousingSurvey.Notably,theyfindthatindividualsinanegativeequitypositionearnwagesthatarearound5%lowerthanotherhomeowners.Thatis,aweakhousingmarketcanbeassociatedwith lowerwages.Inthismanner,housingtightnessaffectswageswhichwouldbeexpectedtoaffecttheunemploymentrate.
Asweemphasize,CoulsonandFisherarguethattheWalrasianprice-takingmechanismisinappropriateforwagedeterminationinthelabormarket.Ifwagesaredeterminedthroughbargaining,higherlevelsofhomeownershipareassociatedwithlowerunemploymentratesbecausehomeownershiprestricts labormobility.However,CoulsonandFisherdonotincludea realestatemarket intheiranalysis.Consequently,incontrasttooursetting,theyareunabletolookattheimpactoflabormarketactivityonhousingconditions.Moreover,incontrasttoourframework,thedesiretopurchaseahomecannotinfluenceworkerincentivesorlabormarketperformance.Thatis,incontrastto CunninghamandReed(2013) westudyhowhousingpricesaffectwagesamongindividualswhodo not ownahome.Inthisway,wedonotproposethattherelationships