外文翻译--公司的核心竞争力文档格式.docx

外文翻译--公司的核心竞争力文档格式.docx

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外文出处 

HarvardBusinessReview 

May-June1990

外文作者 

普拉哈拉德

原文：

Themostpowerfulwaytoprevailinglobalcompetitionisstillinvisibletomanycompanies.Duringthe1980s,topexecutiveswerejudgedontheirabilitytorestructure,declutter,anddelayertheircorporations.Inthe1990s,they'

llbejudgedontheirabilitytoidentify,cultivate,andexploitthecorecompetenciesthatmakegrowthpossibleindeed,they'

llhavetorethinktheconceptofthecorporationitself.

ConsiderthelasttenyearsofGTEandNEC.Intheearly1980s,GTEwaswellpositionedtobecomeamajorplayerintheevolvinginformationtechnologyindustry.Itwasactiveintelecommunications.Itsoperationsspannedavarietyofbusinessesincludingtelephones,switchingandtransmissionsystems,digitalPABX,semiconductors,packetswitching,satellites,defensesystems,andlightingproducts.AndGTE'

sEntertainmentProductsGroup,whichproducedSylvaniacolorTVs,hadapositioninrelateddisplaytechnologies.In1980,GTE'

ssaleswere$9.98billion,andnetcashflowwas$1.73billion.NEC,incontrast,wasmuchsmaller,at$3.8billioninsales.Ithadacomparabletechnologicalbaseandcomputerbusinesses,butithadnoexperienceasanoperatingtelecommunicationscompany.

YetlookatthepositionsofGTEandNECin1988.GTE'

s1988saleswere$16.46billion,andNEC’ssaleswereconsiderablyhigherat$21.89billion.GTEhas,ineffect,becomeatelephoneoperatingcompanywithapositionindefenseandlightingproducts.GTE'

sotherbusinessesaresmallinglobalterms.GTEhasdivested 

SylvaniaTVandTelenet,putswitching,transmission,anddigitalPABXintojointventures,andcloseddownsemiconductors.Asaresult,theinternationalpositionofGTEhaseroded.NonU.S.revenueasapercentoftotalrevenuedroppedfrom20%to15%between1980and1988.

NEChasemergedastheworldleaderinsemiconductorsandasafirsttierplayerintelecommunicationsproductsandcomputers.Ithasconsolidateditspositioninmainframecomputers.Ithasmovedbeyondpublicswitchingandtransmissiontoincludesuchlifestyleproductsasmobiletelephones,facsimilemachines,andlaptopcomputersbridgingthegapbetweentelecommunicationsandofficeautomation.NECistheonlycompanyintheworldtobeinthetopfiveinrevenueintelecommunications,semiconductors,andmainframes.Whydidthesetwocompanies,startingwithcomparablebusinessportfolios,performsodifferently?

LargelybecauseNECconceivedofitselfintermsof"

corecompetencies,"

andGTEdidnot.

RethinkingtheCorporation

Once,thediversifiedcorporationcouldsimplypointitsbusinessunitsatparticularendproductmarketsandadmonishthemtobecomeworldleaders.Butwithmarketboundarieschangingevermorequickly,targetsareelusiveandcaptureisatbesttemporary.Afewcompanieshaveproventhemselvesadeptatinventingnewmarkets,quicklyenteringemergingmarkets,anddramaticallyshiftingpatternsofcustomerchoiceinestablishedmarkets.Thesearetheonestoemulate.Thecriticaltaskformanagementistocreateanorganizationcapableofinfusingproductswithirresistiblefunctionalityor,betteryet,creatingproductsthatcustomersneedbuthavenotyetevenimagined）

Thisisadeceptivelydifficulttask.Ultimately,itrequiresradicalchangeinthemanagementofmajorcompanies.Itmeans,firstofall,thattopmanagementsofWesterncompaniesmustassumeresponsibilityforcompetitivedecline.Everyoneknowsabouthighinterestrates,Japaneseprotectionism,outdatedantitrustlaws,obstreperousunions,andimpatientinvestors.Whatishardertosee,orhardertoacknowledge,ishowlittleaddedmomentumcompaniesactuallygetfrompoliticalormacroeconomic"

relief."

BoththetheoryandpracticeofWesternmanagementhave 

createdadragonourforwardmotion.Itistheprinciplesofmanagementthatareinneedofreform.

NECversusGTE,again,isinstructiveandonlyoneofmanysuchcomparativecasesweanalyzedtounderstandthechangingbasisforgloballeadership.Earlyinthe1970s,NECarticulatedastrategicintenttoexploittheconvergenceofcomputingandcommunications,whatitcalled"

C&

C"

Success,topmanagementreckoned,wouldhingeonacquiringcompetencies,particularlyinsemiconductors.Managementadoptedanappropriate"

strategicarchitecture,"

summarizedbyC&

C,andthencommunicateditsintenttothewholeorganizationandtheoutsideworldduringthemid1970s.

NECconstituteda"

CCommittee"

oftopmanagerstooverseethedevelopmentofcoreproductsandcorecompetencies.NECputinplacecoordinationgroupsandcommitteesthatcutacrosstheinterestsofindividualbusinesses.Consistentwithitsstrategicarchitecture,NECshiftedenormousresourcestostrengthenitspositionincomponentsandcentralprocessors.Byusingcollaborativearrangementstomultiplyinternalresources,NECwasabletoaccumulateabroadarrayofcorecompetencies.

NECcarefullyidentifiedthreeinterrelatedstreamsoftechnologicalandmarketevolution.Topmanagementdeterminedthatcomputingwouldevolvefromlargemainframestodistributedprocessing,componentsfromsimpleICstoVLSI,andcommunicationsfrommechanicalcrossbarexchangetocomplexdigitalsystemswenowcallISDN.Asthingsevolvedfurther,NECreasoned,thecomputing,communications,andcomponentsbusinesseswouldsooverlapthatitwouldbeveryhardtodistinguishamongthem,andthattherewouldbeenormousopportunitiesforanycompanythathadbuiltthecompetenciesneededtoserveallthreemarkets.

NECtopmanagementdeterminedthatsemiconductorswouldbethecompany'

smostimportant"

coreproduct."

Itenteredintomyriadstrategicalliancesover100asof1987aimedatbuildingcompetenciesrapidlyandatlowcost.Inmainframecomputers,itsmostnotedrelationshipwaswithHoneywellandBull.Almostallthecollaborativearrangementsinthesemiconductorcomponentfieldwereoriented 

towardtechnologyaccess.Astheyenteredcollaborativearrangements,NEC’soperatingmanagersunderstoodtherationaleforthesealliancesandthegoalofinternalizingpartnerskills.NEC'

sdirectorofresearchsummedupitscompetenceacquisitionduringthe1970sand1980sthisway:

"

Fromaninvestmentstandpoint,itwasmuchquickerandcheapertouseforeigntechnology.Therewasn'

taneedforustodevelopnewideas.”

NosuchclarityofstrategicintentandstrategicarchitectureappearedtoexistatGTE.Althoughseniorexecutivesdiscussedtheimplicationsoftheevolvinginformationtechnologyindustry,nocommonlyacceptedviewofwhichcompetencieswouldberequiredtocompeteinthatindustrywerecommunicatedwidely.Whilesignificantstaffworkwasdonetoidentifykeytechnologies,seniorlinemanagerscontinuedtoactasiftheyweremanagingindependentbusinessunits.Decentralizationmadeitdifficulttofocusoncorecompetencies.Instead,individualbusinessesbecameincreasinglydependentonoutsidersforcriticalskills,andcollaborationbecamearoutetostagedexits.Today,withanewmanagementteaminplace,GTEhasrepositioneditselftoapplyitscompetenciestoemergingmarketsintelecommunicationsservices.

TheRootsofCompetitiveAdvantage

ThedistinctionweobservedinthewayNECandGTEconceivedofthemselvesaportfolioofcompetenciesversusaportfolioofbusinesseswasrepeatedacrossmanyindustries.From1980to1988,Canongrewby264%,Hondaby200%.ComparethatwithXeroxandChrysler.AndifWesternmanagerswereonceanxiousaboutthelowcostandhighqualityofJapaneseimports,theyarenowover;

whelmedbythepaceatwhichJapaneserivalsareinventingnewmarkets,creatingnewproducts,andenhancingthem.Canonhasgivenuspersonalcopiers;

Hondahasmovedfrommotorcyclestofourwheeloffroadbuggies.Sonydevelopedthe8mmcamcorder,Yamaha,thedigitalpiano.Komatsudevelopedanunderwaterremotecontrolledbulldozer,whileCasio'

slatestgambitisasmallscreencolorLCDtelevision.Whowouldhaveanticipatedtheevolutionofthesevanguardmarkets?

Inmoreestablishedmarkets,theJapanesechallengehasbeenjustasdisquieting. 

Japanesecompaniesaregeneratingablizzardoffeaturesandfunctionalenhancementsthatbringtechnologicalsophisticationtoeverydayproducts.Japanesecarproducershavebeenpioneeringfourwheelsteering,fourvalve-percylinderengines,incarnavigationsystems,andsophisticatedelectronicenginemanagementsystems.Onthestrengthofitsproductfeatures,Canonisnowaplayerinfacsimiletransmissionmachines,desktoplaserprinters,evensemiconductormanufacturingequipment.

Intheshortrun,acompany'

scompetitivenessderivesfromtheprice/performanceattributesofcurrentproducts.Butthesurvivorsofthefirstwaveofglobalcompetition,WesternandJapanesealike,areallconvergingonsimilarandformidablestandardsforproductcostandqualityminimumhurdlesforcontinuedcompetition,butlessandlessimportantassourcesofdifferentialadvantage.Inthelongrun,competitivenessderivesfromanabilitytobuild,atlowercostandmorespeedilythancompetitors,thecorecompetenciesthatspawnunanticipatedproducts.Therealsourcesofadvantagearetobefoundinmanagement'

sabilitytoconsolidatecorporatewidetechnologiesandproductionskillsintocompetenciesthatempowerindividualbusinessestoadaptquicklytochangingopportunities.

Seniorexecutiveswhoclaimthattheycannotbuildcorecompetencieseitherbecausetheyfeeltheautonomyofbusinessunitsissacrosanctorbecausetheirfeetareheldtothequarterlybudgetfireshouldthinkagain.TheprobleminmanyWesterncompaniesisnotthattheir