利用博弈论和战略性推理来防止和发现舞弊外文翻译.docx

利用博弈论和战略性推理来防止和发现舞弊外文翻译.docx

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利用博弈论和战略性推理来防止和发现舞弊外文翻译

外文翻译

原文：

UsingGameTheoryandStrategicReasoningConceptstoPreventandDetectFraud

INTRODUCTION

Thiscommentaryreviewsacademicresearchfromseveraldisciplinesforinsightsregardinghowauditingstandardsandauditresearchcanassistauditorsindetectinganddeterringfraudulentfinancialreporting（hereafterfraud）.Reducinganddetectingfraudisahighpriorityintheauditprofessionaswitnessedbyrecentregulationsintendedtoimproveauditors'abilitytodetectfraud,suchasSASNo.99,andtheoft-citednotionthatactionstakentoreducetheprospectoffraudshoulddampenstockmarketvolatility{WallStreetJournal2002）.Webelieveitwillbecomeanevenhigherpriorityinthefuture.Someleadersintheprofessionarguethatunintentionalfinancialstatementerrorwilldiminishbecauseoftechnologyandthatfuturedemandforauditswilldependlargelyontheirabilitytodetectordeterfraud（Elliott2002）.Accordingly,improvingfrauddetectionanddeterrencemaybecriticalfortheviabilityoftheauditprofession.

Webelievethatauditingstandardsmustcompensateforauditors'judgmentlimitationstoeffectivelydetectanddeterfraud.Therefore,weencouragestandardsthatexplicitlyrecognizethestrategicnatureoffraudandthathelpauditorseffectivelyreasoninthefraudsetting.Ourreviewfocusesonassistingauditorsinperformingthreekeytasks—fraudriskassessment,auditplanning,andauditplanimplementation—andsuggestsfourmainfindingsandrecommendations

●Currentfraudchecklistsmayinhibitauditors'abilitytopredictfraud.Werecommendthatauditorsstructuretheirfraudriskassessmentstofacilitateeffectivepredictionsandprovideideasondoingso.

●Becausetheauditcanmanipulatesomefraudcues,auditplanningshouldemphasizethatthesecuesmustbecautiouslyreliedonwhenassessingfraudrisk.

●Becauseauditproceduresaregenerallyquitepredictable,auditplansshouldvarythetiming,type,andrandomnessofaudittests.

●Auditpolicyshouldencouragefrequentupdatesoffraudjudgments

THEFRAUDSETTING

Carefuldistinctionbetweenthefraudsettingandotherauditsettingsfacilitatesouranalysisofpriorresearchfindingsandobservationsofthepracticeenvironment.Unintentionalnonfraudulentfinancialstatementerrorsarestaticinthattheirincidenceisunaffectedbytheanticipatedaudit.Butfraudisintentionalandstrategicsuchthatitsincidenceisaffectedbytheanticipatedaudit.Bloomfield（1997）arguesthatinterdependencebetweenthebehavioroftheauditorandtheauditeecharacterizesthisintentional/strategicsetting.Notsurprisingly,frauddetectionresearchsuggeststhatauditriskismisspecifiedwhenauditorsignorethisinterdependence（FellinghamandNewman1985;Shibano1990）.

Theanalyticmethodsthatincorporatestrategicinterdependencerelylargelyongametheory,whichseekstopredictbehaviorbasedonaplayer'sbestresponsegiventheplayers'motivationsaswellastheanticipatedactionsoftheopponent（s）.Althoughexperiencedauditorsoftenconsiderthestrategicimplicationsoffraudintheirauditplans,researchsuggeststhatauditstandardsandpracticeaidsinhibitthisprocess.

Understandingtheboundariesofgametheoryisimportantfordetermininghowauditstandardsmightfacilitateauditors’sconsiderationofstrategicbehavior.Forexample,predictinganauditee’sresponsetoanticipatedauditorbehaviorisverydifficult.ConsiderMorgenstern’s（1935/1976）examplewherebySherlockHolmesleavesLondon’sVictoriaStationforDover.,pursuedbyhisopponent,Moriarity.Holmesgetsoffwhenthetrainstopsatanintermediatestation,becausehecorrectlyanticipatedthatMoriarityhastakenafastertraintotraphiminDover.IfMoriarityhadbeenmoreclever,thenhealsowouldhavestoppedattheintermediatestation.But,ifMoriaritywasthatclever,thenHolmeswouldhaveanticipatedthisandgoneontoDover,andsoon.Morgenstem（1935/1976,174）states,”Becauseofsomuchthinking,theymightnothavebeenabletoactatallortheintellectuallyweakerofthetwowouldhavesurrenderedtotheother.”

Inthissimpleexample,MoriaritywouldhaveescapedifhecorrectlyanticipatedwhatHolmesknew—aconceptknownas"commonknowledge"（Sunder2002）.Sunder（2002,313）discusseshowtheconceptofcommonknowledgeappliestoauditingandnotesthatthisconcepthas"barelybeentouched"inthefieldofauditing.Whilemostresearchersagreethatdeterminingpriorknowledgeisdifficult,auditstandardsshouldattempttofacilitatethethinkingrequiredtopredictanauditees'response.Werefertotheauditor'sabilitytoanticipatetheauditees'responsetoauditorchoicesas"strategicreasoning."Importantempiricalquestionsincludehowandtowhatextentindividualsengageinsuchreasoning（Camerer1990,1997）.Exploringpriorresearchcanhelpclarifyhowauditstandardsmightfacilitatesuchjudgments

LevelsofStrategicReasoning

Auditingresearchspecifiesdifferentlevelsofstrategicreasoning.ZimbelmanandWaller（1999）definereasoningthatisnotstrategicaszero-orderreasoningandspecifytwolevelsofstrategicreasoning:

first-andhigher-order.Zero-orderreasoningmeansplayersonlyconsiderconditionsthatdirectlyaffectthembutnotothers.Theauditriskmodelandsingle-persondecisiontheoryimplyzero-orderreasoning.Whenengagedinzero-orderreasoning,theauditorsimplyconsidershisownincentives,suchasauditfees,samplingcosts,andpenalties.Theauditorassessesmisstatementriskassumingauditeebehaviorisnotaffectedbytheauditproceduresusedandperformstheaudittomaximizethecost-benefittrade-off.Ifauditeebehaviorisnotaffectedbytheaudit,whichseemsunlikelywhenfraudriskispresent,thenzero-orderreasoningisoptimal（FellinghamandNewman1985）

Incontrast,first-orderstrategicreasoningmeansthattheauditorconsidersconditionsthatdirectlyaffecttheauditee.Nowauditorsassumethatauditeesusezero-orderreasoninganddevelopauditplansthatconsidertheauditee'sincentives.Forexample,whenanauditeehasincentivestoconcealinformation,theauditormodifiestheauditplantodetecttheconcealment.However,whenassessingfraudrisk,theauditordoesnotconsiderwhethertheauditeehasanticipatedtheauditors'behavior.Becausetheauditordoesnotconsiderhowtheauditplanmightimpactmanagements'behavior,theauditorwilllikelyusestandardapproachesfamiliartomanagement.

Higher-orderstrategicreasoningmeansthattheauditorconsidersadditional,potentiallyinfinite,layersofcomplexity,includinghowmanagementmayanticipatetheauditors'behavior.Forexample,managementinitiallyusesfirst-orderreasoningtoconsiderhowaconditionfacingtheauditor,whouseszero-orderreasoning,affectstheauditors'standardtests,perhapsbyadjustingsamplesizes.However,anauditorusinghigher-orderreasoningmayadjusttheauditplanbyintroducingnonstandardproceduresthatanticipatemanagements'decisioninducedbytheconditionfacingtheauditor.Manyresearchersbelievethatthisreasoningis,atleast,unnaturalanddifficult;onlyahandfulofauditingstudiesexaminethisissue

AuditingStudiesonStrategicReasoning

Bloomfield（1995,72）arguesthatstrategicreasoningischallengingbecauseofstrategicdependence:

"thedegreetowhichachangeintheauditors'expectationofthemanagers'actionaffectsthemanagers'action."Strategicdependenceisgreatestwheneachplayers'bestresponsechangesdramaticallybasedontheexpectedbestresponseoftheotherplayer.Bloomfield（1997）collectsempiricaldataandconcludesthatbothauditorandauditeehavedifficultypredictingeachothers'bestresponsewhenstrategicdependenceishigh.

ZimbelmanandWaller（1999）alsoexaminestrategicreasoning,findingthatafterrepeatedtrialsinanexperimentalauditgame,auditeesareinfluencedbyaconditionthatdirectlyinfluencestheauditor—suggestingfirst-orderstrategicreasoningtakesplace.Thisstudyillustratesthedifficultyofdeterminingthelevelofstrategicreasoninginvolvedinjudgment.Forexample,theauthorsmustassumethathigher-orderreasoningisunlikelywhengeneratingandtestingtheirpredictions.Also,becauseofthepracticalproblemsofusingpracticingauditorsormanagerstoengageinafraudstudysuchasthis,Bloomfield（1997）andZimbelmanandWaller（1999）relyoncollege-levelaccountingstudents'judgmentsforempiricaldata.

Limitationsaside,importantpolicyimplicationscancomefrombehavioralgametheoryresearch.Giventhatcurrentauditstandardsbasedontheauditriskmodelfailtoconsiderthestrategicinterdependenceoftheauditorandauditee,werecommendthatsuchstandardsidentifyprocessesbasedonstrategicreasoning（cf.,Kinney1988）.Althoughwedonotexpectauditstandardstoformallyincorporategametheory,webelievethatstandardsbasedoncarefulconsiderationofthegame-theoreticsettingcanencouragestrategicreasoningandleadtosignificantimprovementsinfrauddetectionanddeterrence.Below,wedescribehowsucheffortsatstrategicreasoningmightimproveauditors'abilitytodetectanddeterfraudandrecommendauditpracticesthataredesignedtofacilitatesuchreasoning.

FRAUDRISKASSESSMENT

CognitiveChallengeswithProcessingFraudCues

Formanyyears,auditstandardskepttheauditorfocusedonredflagcuesforpredictingfraud.SASNos.53（AICPA1988）,82（AICPA1997）,and99（AICPA2002）allcontainextensivelistsoffraudriskcues.Thesestandardsledauditorstodevelopcheckliststhatensureeachcueisconsidered（Sheltonetal.2001）.Thechecklistsassumefirst-orderreasoningandalertauditorstomanagements'attitudes,i