FMEASMTWord下载.docx
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N
RPN
Screenprintsolderpaste
Solderbridge
Visualinspectionreject
5
Stencilapertureopeningtoobig
3
Visualforsolderbridging
3
45
Reductionontheapertureopening.
RefertolatestDGdesign.
Buyoffstencilbeforeuse.
Metalmasktensionloose
Visualforsoldersmearing
Developmeasuringmethod&
frequencytoensurestencilisingoodcondition
Squeegeebladewornout
Visualforsoldersmearing
Changesqueegeebladeafter10,000prints
Squeegeedownstopandpressuretominimumsetting–justenoughtohaveacleansweep
Cont.
Nosolder
ICTtestdetectedfailed
Stencilopeningclogged
6
Visualformissingprint
90
Re-softensolderpasteonstencileveryhourly.
Timesetting:
1minutes
Useautomaticsolder
pastesoftenermachine
InsufficientSolderpasteonthestencil
Maintainsatleast10mm“hotdog”rollingeffect
Insufficientsolder
8
Squeegeepressuretoohigh
LSMthicknessmeasurement
144
Chipshooting
Misalignment>
25%
VisualInspection
SkippedPCBfiducial
3XVisualinspectionformisalignment
SMTEngineeringtoensureplacementprogrammedwithPCBfiducialmarkson.
IndividualX-Yteaching
SMTEngineeringtouseoriginalCADdataforNCprogram.Individualteachingisnotallowed.
Onlypatternoffsetisallowed.
Missingcomponent
Visual
Vacuumsensordirty
Visualinspection
Weeklymaintenance
fornozzle#1
ICPlacement
25%QFP
Skippedlocalfiducial
3XVisualinspection
75
SMTEngineeringtoensureall20milQFPplacementsprogrammedwithlocalfiducialmarks.
QFPSolderbridge
Pressedtoohardwhenplacing
3XVisualinspection
5
Alterplacementheightuntilnodepression.
Setprevacuumcheckto1
Hotairreflow
Component
thermalshock
ICT/FTtestdetectedfailed
8
Causedbyhighpre-heatramprate
Defectivecomponent
72
Maintainspre-heatrampratebelow3º
C/sec
Mid-chipsolderballs
Causedbyhighpre-heatramprate
Visualinspectionforsolderballs
Maintains60secminimumfor100º
Cto150º
C
PoorWetting
ICT/FTtestdetectedfailed
Causedbyinsufficientheatappliedtothejoints
Opencircuit
Thermalprofilingshalltagtothecoolestpointoftheboard/component
Maxpeaktemp235º
C
at215º
C>
15sec
3.0Severity(R)
Severityisanassessmentoftheseriousnessoftheeffectofthepotentialfailuremodetothecustomer.Severityappliestotheeffectonly.Ifthecustomeraffectedbyafailuremodeistheassemblyplantortheproductuser,assessingtheseveritymaylieoutsidetheimmediateprocessengineer’steamfieldofexperienceorknowledge.Inthesecases,thedesignFMEAdesignengineer,andorsubsequentmanufacturingorassemblyplantprocessengineershouldbeconsulted.Severityshouldbeona“1”to“10”scale.
Effect
Criteria:
SeverityofEffect
Ranking
Remarks
Hazardouswithoutwarning
Mayendangermachineorassemblyoperator.Failurewilloccurwithoutwarning
10
Hazardouswithwarning
Mayendangermachineorassemblyoperator.Failurewilloccurwithwarning
9
Veryhigh
Majordisruptiontoproductionline.100%oftheproductmayhavetobescrapped.
High
Minordisruptiontoproductionline.Productmayhavetobesortedandaportion(lessthan100%)
7
Moderate
Minordisruptiontoproductionline.Aportion(lessthan100%)oftheproductmayhavetobescrapped(nosorting).
Low
Minordisruptiontoproductionline.100%ofproductmayhavetobereworked.Customerexperiencesomedissatisfaction
VeryLow
Minordisruptiontoproductionline.Theproductmayhavetobesortedandaportion(lessthan100%)reworked.Fit&
finish/squeakrattleitemdoesnotconform.Defectnoticedbymostcustomers.
4
Minor
Minordisruptiontoproductionline.Aportion(lessthan100%oftheproductmayhavetobereworkedonlinebutoutofstation.
Veryminor
Minordisruptiontoproduction.Aportion(lessthan100%)oftheproductmayhavetobereworkedonlinebutinstation.
2
None
Noeffect
1
4.0Occurrence(O)
ProbabilityofFailure
Possiblefailurerates
Veryhigh:
Failureisalmostinevitable
1in2
1in3
High:
generallyassociatedwithprocessessimilartopreviousprocesseswhichhaveexperiencedoccasionalfailuresbutnotinmajorproportions
1in8
1in20
Moderate:
Generallyassociatedwithprocessessimilartopreviousprocesseswhichhaveexperiencedoccasionalfailures,butnotinmajorproportions.
1in80
1in400
1in2,000
Low:
Onlyisolatedfailuresassociatedwithalmostidenticalprocesses
1in15,000
VeryLow:
Onlyisolatedfailuresassociatedalmostidenticalprocesses
1in150,000
Remote:
Failureisunlikely.Nofailureseverassociatedwithalmostidenticalprocesses
Lessthan1in1,500,000
5.0Detection(D)
Likelihoodtheexistenceofadefectwillbedetectedbyprocesscontrolbeforeornextsubsequentprocess,orbeforepartofcomponentleavesthemanufacturingorassemblylocation
Almostimpossible
Noknowncontrol(s)availabletodetectfailuremode
Veryremote
Veryremotelikelihoodcurrentcontrol(s)willdetectfailuremode
Remote
Remotelikelihoodcurrentcontrolswilldetectfailuremode
Verylowlikelihoodcurrentcontrolswilldetectfailuremode
Lowlikelihoodcurrentcontrolswilldetectfailuremode
Moderatelikelihoodcurrentcontrolswilldetectfailuremode
Moderatelyhigh
Moderatelyhighlikelihoodcurrentcontrolswilldetectfailuremode
Highlikelihoodcurrentcontrolswilldetectfailuremode
Veryhighlikelihoodcurrentcontrolswilldetectfailuremode
Almostcertain
Currentcontrolsalmostcertaintodetectthefailuremode.Reliabledetectioncontrolsareknownwithsimilarprocesses
Failuremodeandeffectanalysis
1.Introduction
Productsandprocessthatfailtoperformforcustomersareobviouslynotgoingtobeconsideredhighquality.Proactivequalitystrategiesfocusonfailureprevention–virtualeliminationofthepossibilityofprematurefailure–andmistake-proofing,asfaraspossible.Manytoolsexistfortheanalysisofperformancefailure,consequence,andrisk.Thesetoolsareusedinbothproactiveandreactivemodes.Oneofthemostversatiletools,FMEAfocusesonfailuremodes,mechanismsandeffects.Intheproactiveapplication,FMEAcanbeadaptedtofocusonfailureprevention.
FMEAseekstoidentifypossiblefailuremodesandmechanisms,theeffectsorconsequencesthatfailuremodesmayhaveonperformance,methodsofdetectingtheidentifiedfailuremodes,andpossiblemeansforprevention.
ThenetresultsfromeffectiveFMEAworkareproductandprocessactionplansforelimination,oratleastmitigation,ofthefailuremodes.
2.FMEAisabsolutelyessentialinsounddesignpractice,formproductandprocessdefinition,startinginqualityplanningandqualityfunctiondeploymentandcontinuingthroughthedevelopmentstages.FMEAencouragesasystematiccradle-to-graveviewofaproductorprocess.Itiswidelyusedinmaintainability,safety,andsurvivabilityanalysis;
itsbroadbasemakesiteffectiveinbothproductandprocessperformanceimprovement.
Fromasystemdevelopmentperspective,FMEAencourages
a.Thesystematicevaluationofaproductorprocessatspecifiedlevelofsystemcomplexity[thesystem,subsystemandcomponentlevel]
b.Thepostula