MTC物联网3GPP 安全相关可行性报告Word格式.docx

MTC物联网3GPP 安全相关可行性报告Word格式.docx

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Specificationsandreportsforimplementationofthe3GPPTMsystemshouldbeobtainedviathe3GPPOrganizationalPartners'

PublicationsOffices.

Keywords

SECURITY

CopyrightNotification

Nopartmaybereproducedexceptasauthorizedbywrittenpermission.

Thecopyrightandtheforegoingrestrictionextendtoreproductioninallmedia.

©

2010,3GPPOrganizationalPartners（ARIB,ATIS,CCSA,ETSI,TTA,TTC）.

Allrightsreserved.

UMTS™isaTradeMarkofETSIregisteredforthebenefitofitsmembers

3GPP™isaTradeMarkofETSIregisteredforthebenefitofitsMembersandofthe3GPPOrganizationalPartners

LTE™isaTradeMarkofETSIcurrentlybeingregisteredforthebenefitofitsMembersandofthe3GPPOrganizationalPartners

GSM®

andtheGSMlogoareregisteredandownedbytheGSMAssociation

Contents

Foreword

ThisTechnicalReporthasbeenproducedbythe3rdGenerationPartnershipProject（3GPP）.

ThecontentsofthepresentdocumentaresubjecttocontinuingworkwithintheTSGandmaychangefollowingformalTSGapproval.ShouldtheTSGmodifythecontentsofthepresentdocument,itwillbere-releasedbytheTSGwithanidentifyingchangeofreleasedateandanincreaseinversionnumberasfollows:

Versionx.y.z

where:

xthefirstdigit:

1presentedtoTSGforinformation;

2presentedtoTSGforapproval;

3orgreaterindicatesTSGapproveddocumentunderchangecontrol.

Ytheseconddigitisincrementedforallchangesofsubstance,i.e.technicalenhancements,corrections,updates,etc.

zthethirddigitisincrementedwheneditorialonlychangeshavebeenincorporatedinthedocument.

Introduction

MachinetoMachine（M2M）Communicationisseenasaformofdatacommunicationbetweenentitiesthatmayhavenohumaninteraction.OneofthechallengeswithM2McommunicationisthatdeployedM2Mequipmentsaremanagedremotelywithoutanydirecthumaninteractionwiththedevice.

ThisTechnicalReportconsiderstheM2MEquipmentasadevicethatcouldbeafullyself-containeddeviceoradevicewithinterfacestoattach,forexample,sensorsandon-siteserviceequipment.Thecurrent3GPPsystemdefinestheuseofaUSIM/ISIMapplicationinaUICCasameansofprotectingusers（untilnowmostlyhumanusersofmobileterminals）andnetworkoperatorsfromfraudulentuseofthenetwork.SincesomeoftheoriginalassumptionsontheuseofaUSIM/ISIMapplicationinaUICCdidnottakeintoaccounttherequirementsofM2MEquipmentandusers,thecurrentUICCbasedsolutionneedstobereviewedagainstthenewassumptionsthatarisefromM2M.

TR22.868presentsastudyonfacilitatingmachine-to-machine（M2M）communicationin3GPPsystems.ThisTechnicalReportgoesalongwiththeTR22.868,evaluatingfromasecurityperspectivethesolutionsthatmightaddresstheM2Musecases.OneofthechallengeshighlightedinTR22.868isthepossibleneedtobeabletoprovision（i.e.initializeand/orchangethesubscriptionof）M2Mequipmentremotely,i.e.withoutrequiringapersontoattendthelocationoftheM2Mequipment.Thiswascapturedinclause6ofTR22.868,aspossiblerequirementsthatcouldfacilitateM2Mcommunicationsin3GPPsystems,andmorespecificallyinclause5.2.2ofTR22.868whenhandlinglargenumbersofM2Mequipment.TR22.868mentionsonlyUICC-basedsolutionforM2Muse-casesanddoesnotexplicitlymentiontheneedtoinvestigateUICC-less-basedsolutions.

NOTE:

ForthereasonsexplainedintheDefinitionsclause,thetermMCIMisused 

asagenericterm 

throughoutthisdocumentandUSIMorISIMisconsideredasatypeofthegenericMCIM. 

However,wheneverUSIMandISIMarereferredtointheremainderofthisdocument,theyrefertothetraditionalUSIMorISIMthatresideontheUICC.

1Scope

ThescopeofthisTechnicalReportistostudytheremotesubscriptionmanagementforM2MEquipment（M2ME）whentheMachineCommunicationsIdentityModule（MCIM）applicationresidesintheUICCandwhentheMCIMapplicationresidesintheM2Mequipment.Theremotesubscriptionmanagementincludestaskssuchasremotesubscriptionprovisioningand/orremotechangeofsubscription.

ThescopeofthisstudyincludesthedefinitionofatrustmodelforremotesubscriptionmanagementforM2ME.Securitythreatsandsecurityrequirementsareidentified,andanevaluationofthecandidatesolutionsispresented.

Thesecurityimplicationsofthefollowingrequirementsarewithinthescopeofthestudy（basedonsection5.2.2ofTR22.868）

1.ThepossibilitytochangesubscriptionforM2MEsoutinthefield（e.g.aftercontractexpiry）withoutdirecthumanintervention.

2.ThepossibilitytoallocatetheM2MEatinitialpoweruptoanetworkoperatorwithoutdirecthumanintervention.

Furthermore,thisstudyincludesthefollowingitems:

-aninvestigationofcandidatesecuritysolutionsarchitecturesthatallowremotesubscriptionmanagementtotakeplaceinasecuremanner;

-anidentificationofcurrentUSIM/ISIMfunctionalitythatmayneedtobeincorporatedinaMCIMapplication,withorwithoutchangestoallowremotesubscriptionmanagementfortheM2ME;

-anidentificationoffunctionalityinthenetwork,intheUICCorintheM2ME,thatmayneedtobeaddedduetotheremotesubscriptionmanagementmethod;

-thestudymayidentifyprinciplerequirementsforprotectedstorageandtheexecutionenvironment（e.g.bycollaboratingwithrelevantworkinggroupssuchastheOMTPHardwaregroup）

ThisstudyisbeyondthescopeofthefirstrequirementidentifiedinSA1TR22.868sincesection5.2.2ofTR22.868containsarequirementtohave"

TamperSave/TheftproofterminalincludingaUICC"

.

2References

Thefollowingdocumentscontainprovisionswhich,throughreferenceinthistext,constituteprovisionsofthepresentdocument.

∙Referencesareeitherspecific（identifiedbydateofpublication,editionnumber,versionnumber,etc.）ornonspecific.

∙Foraspecificreference,subsequentrevisionsdonotapply.

∙Foranon-specificreference,thelatestversionapplies.Inthecaseofareferencetoa3GPPdocument（includingaGSMdocument）,anon-specificreferenceimplicitlyreferstothelatestversionofthatdocumentinthesameReleaseasthepresentdocument.

[1]3GPPTR21.905:

"

Vocabularyfor3GPPSpecifications"

.

[2]3GPPTR22.868:

StudyonFacilitatingMachinetoMachine"

[3]TrustedComputingGroup,"

MobileReferenceArchitectureandMobileTrustedModulespecifications"

https:

//www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/mobilephone/.

[4]GlobalPlatformDeviceApplicationSecurityManagement,http:

//www.globalplatform.org/specificationsdevice.asp.

[5]OMTPTrustedEnvironment:

OMTPTR0,

http:

//www.omtp.org/Publications/Display.aspx?

Id=03f37406-be24-424b-b177-dd0cb9dbc719

[6]OMTPAdvancedTrustedEnvironment:

OMTPTR1,

Id=24ad518b-6dba-4155-ad51-3143bd43a234

[7]GSMA/EICTAPrinciplesconcerninghandsettheft,GSMA:

SecurityPrinciplesRelatedtoHandsetTheft3.0.0

[8]ETSITS102 

221:

SmartCards;

UICC-Terminalinterface;

Physicalandlogicalcharacteristics"

[9]3GPP 

TS 

31.102:

CharacteristicsoftheUSIMApplication"

[10]3GPP 

31.103:

CharacteristicsoftheIPMultimediaServicesIdentityModule（ISIM）Application"

[11]3GPP 

31.101:

UICC-TerminalInterface,PhysicalandLogicalCharacteristics"

[12]ETSI 

101 

220:

Smartcards;

ETSInumberingsystemfortelecommunicationapplicationproviders"

[13]OMA-TS-DM_Bootstrap-V1_2:

OMADeviceManagementBootstrap"

//member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/Public_documents/DM/Permanent_documents/

[14]OMA-TS-DM-Security-V1_2:

OMADeviceManagementSecurity"

3Definitions,symbolsandabbreviations

3.1Definitions

Forthepurposesofthepresentdocument,thetermsanddefinitionsgiveninTR 

21.905 

[x]andthefollowingapply.Atermdefinedinthepresentdocumenttakesprecedenceoverthedefinitionofthesameterm,ifany,inTR 

[x].

TrustedEnvironment.TheTrustedenvironment（TRE）withtheM2MEprovidessomehardwareandsoftwareprotectionandseparationfortheprovisioning,storage,executionandmanagementofMCIMs.ATREcanbevalidatedatanytimebyanexternalagencythatisauthorisedtodoso.

MCIM:

ForthepurposesofthepresentdocumenttheMachineCommunicationIdentityModule（MCIM）isatermthatindicatesthecollectionofM2MsecuritydataandfunctionsforaM2MEforaccessinga3GPPnetwork.ThismaybeanIMSnetwork.MCIMmayresideonaUICCoronaTRE.

AsUSIMandISIMarebydefinitionlocatedontheUICC,thesetermscannotbeusedinthecontextofthisTRwhenthecorrespondingsecuritydataandfunctionsareintendedtoresideoutsidetheUICC.MCIMcanbeusedsimilarlyasUSIMandISIMareusedforaccessingnetworks,thedifferencebeingthatMCIMmayresideonaUICCoronaTRE.ForthepurposesofreadabilitywhereMCIMsarehostedbyaUICC,thetermMCIMcanrefertoapplicationssuchasUS