金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献Word文档格式.docx

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献Word文档格式.docx

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ComparativeFinancialSystems

1WhatisaFinancialSystem?

Thepurposeofafinancialsystemistochannelfundsfromagentswithsurplusestoagentswithdeficits.Inthetraditionalliteraturetherehavebeentwoapproachestoanalyzingthisprocess.Thefirstistoconsiderhowagentsinteractthroughfinancialmarkets.Thesecondlooksattheoperationoffinancialintermediariessuchasbanksandinsurancecompanies.Fiftyyearsago,thefinancialsystemcouldbeneatlybifurcatedinthisway.Richhouse-holdsandlargefirmsusedtheequityandbondmarkets,whilelesswealthyhouse-holdsandmediumandsmallfirmsusedbanks,insurancecompaniesandotherfinancialinstitutions.Table1,forexample,showstheownershipofcorporateequitiesin1950.Householdsownedover90percent.By2000itcanbeseenthatthesituationhadchangeddramatically.Bythenhouseholdsheldlessthan40percent,nonbankintermediaries,primarilypensionfundsandmutualfunds,heldover40percent.Thischangeillustrateswhyitisnolongerpossibletoconsidertheroleoffinancialmarketsandfinancialinstitutionsseparately.Ratherthanintermediatingdirectlybetweenhouseholdsandfirms,financialinstitutionshaveincreasinglycometointermediatebetweenhouseholdsandmarkets,ontheonehand,andbetweenfirmsandmarkets,ontheother.Thismakesitnecessarytoconsiderthefinancialsystemasanirreduciblewhole.

Thenotionthatafinancialsystemtransfersresourcesbetweenhouseholdsandfirmsis,ofcourse,asimplification.Governmentsusuallyplayasignificantroleinthefinancialsystem.Theyaremajorborrowers,particularlyduringtimesofwar,recession,orwhenlargeinfrastructureprojectsarebeingundertaken.Theysometimesalsosavesignificantamountsoffunds.Forexample,whencountriessuchasNorwayandmanyMiddleEasternStateshaveaccesstolargeamountsofnaturalresources（oil）,thegovernmentmayacquirelargetrustfundsonbehalfofthepopulation.

Inadditiontotheirrolesasborrowersorsavers,governmentsusuallyplayanumberofotherimportantroles.Centralbankstypicallyissuefiatmoneyandareextensivelyinvolvedinthepaymentssystem.Financialsystemswithunregulatedmarketsandintermediaries,suchastheUSinthelatenineteenthcentury,oftenexperiencefinancialcrises.Thedesiretoeliminatethesecrisesledmanygovernmentstointerveneinasignificantwayinthefinancialsystem.Centralbanksorsomeotherregulatoryauthorityarechargedwithregulatingthebankingsystemandotherintermediaries,suchasinsurancecompanies.Soinmostcountriesgovernmentsplayanimportantroleintheoperationoffinancialsystems.Thisinterventionmeansthatthepoliticalsystem,whichdeterminesthegovernmentanditspolicies,isalsorelevantforthefinancialsystem.

Therearesomehistoricalinstanceswherefinancialmarketsandinstitutionshaveoperatedintheabsenceofawell-definedlegalsystem,relyinginsteadonreputationandotherimplicitmechanisms.However,inmostfinancialsystemsthelawplaysanimportantrole.Itdetermineswhatkindsofcontractsarefeasible,whatkindsofgovernancemechanismscanbeusedforcorporations,therestrictionsthatcanbeplacedonsecuritiesandsoforth.Hence,thelegalsystemisanimportantcomponentofafinancialsystem.

Afinancialsystemismuchmorethanallofthis,however.Animportantpre-requisiteoftheabilitytowritecontractsandenforcerightsofvariouskindsisasystemofaccounting.Inadditiontoallowingcontractstobewritten,anaccountingsystemallowsinvestorstovalueacompanymoreeasilyandtoassesshowmuchitwouldbeprudenttolendtoit.Accountinginformationisonlyonetypeofinformation（albeitthemostimportant）requiredbyfinancialsystems.Theincentivestogenerateanddisseminateinformationarecrucialfeaturesofafinancialsystem.Withoutsignificantamountsofhumancapitalitwillnotbepossibleforanyofthesecomponentsofafinancialsystemtooperateeffectively.Well-trainedlawyers,accountantsandfinancialprofessionalssuchasbankersarecrucialforaneffectivefinancialsystem,astheexperienceofEasternEuropedemonstrates.

Theliteratureoncomparativefinancialsystemsisatanearlystage.OursurveybuildsonpreviousoverviewsbyAllen（1993）,AllenandGale（1995）andThakor（1996）.Theseoverviewshavefocusedontwosetsofissues.

（1）Normative:

Howeffectivearedifferenttypesoffinancialsystematvariousfunctions?

（2）Positive:

Whatdrivestheevolutionofthefinancialsystem?

ThefirstsetofissuesisconsideredinSections2-6,whichfocusonissuesofinvestmentandsaving,growth,risksharing,informationprovisionandcorporategovernance,respectively.Section7considerstheinfluenceoflawandpoliticsonthefinancialsystemwhileSection8looksattherolefinancialcriseshavehadinshapingthefinancialsystem.Section9containsconcluding

remarks.

2InvestmentandSaving

Oneoftheprimarypurposesofthefinancialsystemistoallowsavingstobeinvestedinfirms.Inaseriesofimportantpapers,Mayer（1988,1990）documentshowfirmsobtainedfundsandfinancedinvestmentinanumberofdifferentcountries.Table2showstheresultsfromthemostrecentsetofstudies,basedondatafrom1970-1989,usingMayer’smethodology.Thefiguresusedataobtainedfromsources-and-uses-of-fundsstatements.ForFrance,thedataarefromBertero（1994）,whilefortheUS,UK,JapanandGermanytheyarefromCorbettandJenkinson（1996）.Itcanbeseenthatinternalfinanceisbyfarthemostimportantsourceoffundsinallcountries.BankfinanceismoderatelyimportantinmostcountriesandparticularlyimportantinJapanandFrance.BondfinanceisonlyimportantintheUSandequityfinanceiseitherunimportantornegative（i.e.,sharesarebeingrepurchasedinaggregate）inallcountries.Mayer’sstudiesandthoseusinghismethodologyhavehadanimportantimpactbecausetheyhaveraisedthequestionofhowimportantfinancialmarketsareintermsofprovidingfundsforinvestment.Itseemsthat,atleastintheaggregate,equitymarketsareunimportantwhilebondmarketsareimportantonlyintheUS.Thesefindingscontraststronglywiththeemphasisonequityandbondmarketsinthetraditionalfinanceliterature.Bankfinanceisimportantinallcountries,butnotasimportantasinternalfinance.

Anotherperspectiveonhowthefinancialsystemoperatesisobtainedbylookingatsavingsandtheholdingoffinancialassets.Table3showstherelativeimportanceofbanksandmarketsintheUS,UK,Japan,FranceandGermany.ItcanbeseenthattheUSisatoneextremeandGermanyattheother.IntheUS,banksarerelativelyunimportant:

theratioofassetstoGDPisonly53%,aboutathirdtheGermanratioof152%.Ontheotherhand,theUSratioofequitymarketcapitalizationtoGDPis82%,threetimestheGermanratioof24%.JapanandtheUKareinterestingintermediatecaseswherebanksandmarketsarebothimportant.InFrance,banksareimportantandmarketslessso.TheUSandUKareoftenreferredtoasmarket-basedsystemswhileGermany,JapanandFranceareoftenreferredtoasbank-basedsystems.Table4showsthetotalportfolioallocationofassetsultimatelyownedbythehouseholdsector.IntheUSandUK,equityisamuchmoreimportantcomponentofhouseholdassetsthaninJapan,GermanyandFrance.Forcashandcashequivalents（whichincludesbankaccounts）,thereverseistrue.Tables3and4provideaninterestingcontrasttoTable2.Onewouldexpectthat,inthelongrun,householdportfolioswouldreflectthefinancingpatternsoffirms.Sinceinternalfinanceaccruestoequityholders,onemightexpectthatequitywouldbemuchmoreimportantinJapan,FranceandGermany.Thereare,ofcourse,differencesinthedatasetsunderlyingthedifferenttables.Forexample,householdportfoliosconsistoffinancialassetsandexcludeprivatelyheldfirms,whereasthesources-and-uses-of-fundsdataincludeallfirms.Nevertheless,itseemsunlikelythatthesedifferencescouldcausesuchhugediscrepancies.Itispuzzlingthatthesedifferentwaysofviewingthefinancialsystemproducesuchradicallydifferentresults.

Anotherpuzzleconcerninginternalversusexternalfinanceisthedifferencebetweenthedevelopedworldandemergingcountries.AlthoughitistruefortheUS,UK,Japan,France,Germanyandformostotherdevelopedcountriesthatinternalfinancedominatesexternalfinance,thisisnotthecaseforemergingcountries.SinghandHamid（1992）andSingh（1995）showthat,forarangeofemergingeconomies,externalfinanceismoreimportantthaninternalfinance.Moreover,equityisthemostimportantfinancinginstrumentanddominatesdebt.Thisdifferencebetweentheindustrializednationsandtheemergingcountrieshassofarreceivedlittleattention.

Thereisalargetheoreticalliteratureontheoperationofandrationaleforinternalcapitalmarkets.Internalcapitalmarketsdifferfromexternalcapitalmarketsbecauseofasymmetricinformation,investmentincentives,assetspecificity,controlrights,transactioncostsorincompletemarketsTherehasalsobeenconsiderabledebateontherelationshipbetweenliquidityandinvestment（see,forexample,Fazzari,HubbardandPetersen（1988）,Hoshi,KashyapandScharfstein（1991））thatthelenderwillnotcarryoutthethreatinpractice,theincentiveeffectdisappears.Althoughthelender’sbehaviorisnowexpostoptimal,bothpartiesmaybeworseoffexante.

Thetimeinconsistencyofcommitmentsthatareoptimalexanteandsuboptimalexpostistypicalincontractingproblems.Thecontractcommitsonetocertaincoursesofactioninordertoinfluencethebehavioroftheotherparty.Thenoncethatparty’sbehaviorhasbeendetermin