Nuit3正文goalsWord文档下载推荐.docx

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Asamixed-motivesnegotiationmodel,theDualConcernModelpartitionsthecooperativenessandcompetitivenesspolesoftheuni-dimensionalmodelintotwodistinctdimensions:

concernforselfandconcernforotherparty’soutcome.①Themodelarguesthatnegotiatoraspiration/expectationisinfluencedbyconcernforself,andyetmoderatedbyconcernfortheotherparty’soutcome.Alongthetwodimensionsofconcern,theDualConcernModelpredictsthatvariouscombinationsofnegotiatorconcernforselfandfortheotherparty’soutcomecanleadtotheadoptionoffournegotiationstrategies:

（1）problem-solving,

（2）contending,（3）yielding,and（4）inaction.Thesestrategiesaredepictedinthefigurebelow.Adoptionofaparticularstrategyinfluencesnegotiatoraspiration,subsequentbehavior,andeventualnegotiationoutcome.

ConcernAboutOther’sOutcomes

HighYielding（让步）Problem-Solving

LowInaction（无行动）Contending（竞争）

ConcernAbout

LowHighOwnOutcomes

Figure:

TheDualConcernModelandrelevantstrategies

双重关注模式和相关策略

EffectiveConflictManagement

图所示二维模型为双重关心模型。

模型假定存在利益冲突的双方分别关心两个方面：

关心他们自身的成果（如横轴所示）；

关心他人成果（如纵轴所示）。

这些可以表示为从零（漠不关心）到高（极度关心）的任何一点。

纵轴通常表示协同性的坐标，横轴通常表示过度自信的坐标。

理论上，我们可以根据人们对自身成果的关心程度和对他人成果的关心程度，识别出二维空间里的无数个点，并从这个双重模型中归纳出五个冲突管理的主要战略。

位于模型右下方的是争夺战略（又称竞争或强制）。

采用此种战略的一方维持他们自身的利益并且试图劝说对方屈服。

位于模型左上方的是屈服战略（又称适应或被迫）。

屈服战略包括减少自身的期望，以“让他人获胜”，并在此过程中获得他或她想要得到的。

位于模型左下方的是不作为战略（又称逃避）。

不作为战略通常与撤回或被动同义，当事人选择退却，沉默。

位于模型右上方的是解决问题战略（又称合作和融合）。

在解决问题的战略中，双方积极地寻求方法从而最大化他们共同的来自冲突的成果。

位于中间的是折中战略（Compromising）。

折中式的冲突管理战略表示冲突者要付出一半努力来达成自己的结果，还有付出一半努力帮助对方达成结果。

Asillustratedinthefigure,thosewhohavestrongconcernsforthemselvesbutlittleconcernfortheotherpartytendnottoyieldtoother’sdemands.Theiraspirationlevelsareusuallyhighandrigid,whichmakesthemevenmoreresistanttomakingconcessions（i.e.acontendingstrategy）,resultingin“win-lose”agreements.Ontheotherhand,whenanegotiator’sconcernforselfiscoupledwithaninstrumental（versusgenuine）concernfortheotherparty,negotiationstrategyandbehaviorarepredictedtofocusonproblem-solving,whichhasthegreatestpotentialinreachingintegrative（i.e.win-win）agreements.②InthecontextoftheDualConcernModel,thisstudyassumesnegotiators’concernfortheotherpartytobeinstrumentalasnegotiatorsaimtoimpresstheotherpartyinordertoeventuallyadvancetheirowninterestsinfutureinteractions.

Whileanumberofstudiesrefertotheconceptofnegotiatormixed-motives,directempiricalsupportfortheDualConcernModelisrelativelyscarce.Empiricalevidenceisfoundintwoearlierstudiesinwhichsignificantpositiveinteractioneffectswerepresentbetweenresistancetoyielding,accountability,andexpectationofcontinuousfutureinteractiononjointprofits.③Whileresistancetoyieldingandaccountabilityprovidefortheconcernforselfdimension,itwasfoundthattheexpectationofcontinuousfutureinteractionvariablefacilitatedaninstrumentalconcernfortheotherparty.

Anotherstudyontheissueofnegotiatormixed-motivesfoundthatnegotiatorswith“fixed-pie”expectationsofeventualnegotiationoutcomesweremorelikelytoachievesuboptimalagreementsandweremorevulnerabletoinformationavailabilityandinformationprocessingerrors.Relativelybetteroutcomesresultedwhennegotiatorsadoptedamoremixed-motiveexpectationonthenegotiationprocess.

Accountability（责任）

Researchhasshownthatanegotiatorbehavesdifferentlywhenthereismorethanhis/herownwelfareatstake.Acommonexampleiswhennegotiatorsrepresenttheinterestsoftheirconstituentsinthebargainingprocess.Negotiators,asrepresentativesoftheirconstituency,areatleastasstronglyinfluencedbytheirrespectiveconstituentsasbyeachother.

Priorstudieshaveshownthatnegotiatorswhowereheldhighlyaccountabletriedhardertopleasetheirconstituentsthanthosewhowerenotandwerelikelytobelesscompromising.Suchafindingisparticularlysalientwhennegotiatorslackedspecificinformationabouttheirconstituents’preference.Insuchcases,negotiatorswouldperceiveagreatdealwasexpectedofthemandtendedtosethigherpersonalgoalsandmaketougherinitialfirstoffers.Subsequently,highaccountabilitywasfoundtoslowconcessionmakingandpromoteacontendingnegotiationstrategywhenconstituentshadpowerover（orwouldbeinformedof）theoutcomesofthenegotiation.

Despitepositiveevidenceonthelinkbetweenaccountability,negotiatorgoals,andresistancetoyielding（i.e.acontendingstrategy）,thedirecteffectofaccountabilityonjointprofits（双方利益）islessclear.Inthediscussionofthesocialstructureofnegotiation,researcherspointoutthatnegotiatorsoftenareinaparadoxicalsituationastheyhavetodealwithtwosetsofpressures:

theconstituency’sdemandforfirmnessandtheopposingnegotiator’sdemandforconcessions.Theisolatedeffect（孤立影响）ofaccountabilityonnegotiationoutcomeswouldbemoderatedbylong-termrelationshipsforgedbetweenthenegotiatorsthemselvesandbyrespectiveconstituent’svisiblemanagementofthenegotiationprocess.④

AsadirecttestoftheDualConcernModel,researchersmanipulatethelevelofaccountabilitytoproxyfornegotiators’concernforself.Contrarytoexpectation,theyfindthathighaccountabilitydoesnotnecessarilyleadtolowerjointprofits.Thatis,highlyaccountablenegotiatorsachievemoreintegrativeoutcomes（i.e.higherjointprofits）whentheyexpectfutureinteractionwiththeiropponents.

Thisstudypredictsthathighaccountabilitytotheconstituencywillraisethenegotiator’sconcernforself,heightennegotiatorexpectationbysettingahigherprofitgoal,andsubsequentlyinfluencenegotiationbehavior.Contingentuponthemoderatingfactorsdiscussedabove,thenegotiatormayormaynotachievespecificnegotiationoutcomes,suchaslowerjointprofitsandgreaterdifferencesbetweenfinaloffers.Consequently,aformalhypothesisisofferedonlyontheeffectofaccountabilityonprofitgoals（i.e.averagetargetedprofits）.Specificaccountabilityeffectsonnegotiationoutcomes（i.e.jointprofitsanddifferencesbetweenfinaloffers）areleftasanopenresearchquestionwithoutaformalhypothesis.

Hypothesis:

Negotiatorswillsethighertargetedprofitsinahigh-accountabilityconditionthanthoseinalow-accountabilitycondition.

Note1:

Ingeneral,advocatesoftheone-dimensionalapproachinnegotiatormotivespredictthatthenegotiatorwithahigherlevelofaspiration/expectationtendstoobtainalargershareofthejointprofit.Negotiatorswithhigheraspirationsmakesmallerconcessions,takelongertoreachagreements,andearnhigherprofits.

Notes:

①Asamixed-motivesnegotiationmodel,theDualConcernModelpartitionsthecooperativenessandcompetitivenesspolesoftheuni-dimensionalmodelintotwodistinctdimensions:

concernforselfandconcernforotherparty’soutcome.

partition:

divideintopartsorsections分成

全句译为：

作为一个混合目标谈判模式，“双重关注模式”把单方面模式中的合作和竞争两极分成两个明确的方面：

对自身利益的关注和对对方结局的关注。

②Ontheotherhand,whenanegotiator’sconcernforselfiscoupledwithaninstrumental（versusgenuine）concernfortheotherparty,negotiationstrategyandbehaviorarepredictedtofocusonproblem-solving,whichhasthegreatestpotentialinreachingintegrative（i.e.win-win）agreements.

instrumental：

beingthemeansofbringingsth.about有用性的

全句译为：

另一方面，当谈判者对自身利益的关注和对对方“有用性的”（而不是“真正的”）关注结合在一起时，可以预见其谈判策略和行为都会集中在解决问题上，这样一来，就有很大的可能达到令双方满意的一致的协议（即：

双赢）。

③Empiricalevidenceisfoundintwoearlierstudiesinwhichsignificantpositiveinteractioneffectswerepresentbetweenresistancetoyielding,accountability,andexpectationofcontinuousfutureinteractiononjointprofits

empiricalevidence:

evidence（informationthatgivesareasonforbelievingsthorprovessth）basedonobservationorexperiment,notontheory以观察或实验为根据的证据或实际情况

在此前的两个研究的实际情况中发现：

在对让步的抵制、责任和将来双方就共同的利益继续交流的期望这几个方面，都存在着很大的正面的交流效果。

④Theisolatedeffectofaccountabilityonnegotiationoutcomeswouldbemoderatedbylong-termrelationshipsforgedbetweenthenegotiatorsthemselvesandbytheirmanagementofthenegotiationprocess’svisibilitytorespectiveconstituents.

constituents:

memberofadistricthavingitsownelectedrepresentativeintheparliament原意为：

选区的选民，此处意指：

所代表（被服务）的对象

通过谈判者之间长期以来所形成的关系，以及通过为谈判者各自所代表的对象所看得见的对谈判过程的管理，谈判责任对谈判结果所产生的孤立影响还是会得到一些缓解的。

Tips

Putyourselfinyouropponent’spositionandyouwillfixyourgoalsmoreacceptabletoyouropponent,thusleadingtoasuccessfulnegotiation.

Guardagainst:

themoreresponsibilityyouhaveinthenegotiation,thehigheryourgoalsmaybe.

PassageTwo

MultipleNegotiationGoals

PlanningforMultipleGoals

Muchoftheloadplacedoncognitiveresourcesinnegotiationisaresultofthenumberofgoalswhicharetobeaccomplishedinthenegotiation.Specifically,previousresearchhasfocusedonthreetypesofgoalspursuedinnegotiation.First,instrumentalgoalsaretaskoriented,suchasobtainingmoney,goods,services,orinformation.Generally,bargainersmustbeconcernedwithmultipleinstrumentalgoalsinasinglenegotiation.Second,relationalgoalshavetodowithgainingpower,avoidingsubjectiontotheother’spower,andbuildingaleveloftrust.Inshort-termrelationships,ornegotiationsthatinvolveonlyonesession,relationalgoalsmayberelativelyunimportantcomparedtonegotiationswheremultiplesessionsareanticipated.Therefore,inlong-termnegotiationrelationships,relationalgoalsarelikelytoplayamoreimportantroleinhowthenegotiationismanaged.Thi