PrebbleRoL November BeijingWord文档格式.docx

PrebbleRoL November BeijingWord文档格式.docx

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1.Introduction2

1.1Theruleoflawandtaxavoidance2

1.2Generalanti-avoidancerules4

1.3Howdogeneralanti-avoidancerulesbreachtheprinciplesoftheruleoflaw?

5

1.4Whyaregeneralanti-avoidancerulesespeciallybad?

6

2.Theunderlyingvaluesoftheruleoflaw7

2.1Guidance7

2.2Liberty8

2.3Humandignity9

2.4EffectivelawandFuller9

2.5Aregeneralanti-avoidanceruleseffective?

10

3.Aregeneralanti-avoidancerulesjustifieddespitebreachingtheruleoflaw?

12

3.1Problemsofincometaxation12

3.2Theimportanceofcertainty14

3.3Themoralityoftaxavoidance15

4.Conclusion18

1.Introduction

1.1Theruleoflawandtaxavoidance

“Theruleoflaw”isacompendioustermforanumberofrelatedvaluesthatpeoplegenerallythinkgoodlawsshouldadhereto.Dicey’sfamiliarformulationheldthattheruleoflawrequires“theabsolutesupremacyorpredominanceofregularlawasopposedtotheinfluenceofarbitrarypower.”Itistheoreticallypossibletointerpretthisconditionasrequiringmerelythatthereshouldbelaws,asopposedtoaseriesofisolatedcommands.Nevertheless,theoristswritingsinceDiceyhavesupplementedDicey’sbasicformulationwithanumberofadditionalrequirementsthatthebasicformulationlogicallymustentailifitistobeofvalue.Inthepresentcontext,themostimportantoftheseisthatthelawshouldbecapableofguidingpeople.Inordertoguidepeople,lawsmustberelativelyclearandtheirapplicationrelativelycertain;

otherwisenoonewillknowwhatispermittedandwhatisforbidden.

Thatlawsshouldberelativelycertainseemsatfirsttobeareasonabledemand.Indeed,governmentsgenerallymanagetoensurethattheirlawsadequatelysatisfythiscondition.However,thecriterionhasprovenverydifficulttosatisfywhenitcomestoformulatingrulestocombatthattaxavoidance.

Taxavoidanceisaproblemforeverycountry.Avoidanceisnotevasion.Evasionmeanslyingaboutone’sincome.Forexample,acashbusinessmayunder-stateitstakingsorfailtofileanyreturnoftaxatall.Avoidanceisnotmitigation."

Mitigation"

isnotatermofart,butinthisarticle,andgenerallyinthepresentcontext,itmeansreducingone’staxinwaysthatagoverningstatuteclearlyencouragesorpermits;

forexample,takingadeductionforagifttocharity.

Avoidanceisbetweenthetwo.Avoidancemeans,approximately,contrivingtransactions,typicallybutnotnecessarilyartificialinnature,toreducetaxthatwouldotherwisebepayableaccordingtowhatappearstobethepolicyofthetaxingprovisioninquestion.Thisisadescriptionratherthanadefinition.Terminologyintheareaiscontroversial.Somepeopledenythatwecandrawameaningfuldistinctionbetweenavoidanceandmitigation.Somepeopledenythatthewordmitigationhasanyrighttoexistasameaningfulterminthiscontext.

Asageneralrule,thelawdoesnotrequirepeopletoarrangetheiraffairssothattheyincurthegreatestpossibletaxliability.Whenfacedwithtwopossiblewaysinwhichtoorganisetheirmoney,taxpayersarelegitimatelyentitledtochoosetheoptionthatrequiresthemtopaythelesseramountoftax.Therecomesapoint,however,wheregovernmentsbegintothinkthattaxpayersaregoingtoofarintheirattemptstodecreasetheirtaxliability:

atthispoint,taxpayersceasetoengageinlegitimatetaxmitigationandembarkonunacceptabletaxavoidance.

Usefuldefinitionsofthepointatwhichtaxmitigationbecomestaxavoidanceareelusive.LordDenninghassaidthatforanarrangementtoconstitutetaxavoidance,“youmustbeabletopredicate…that[thearrangement]wasimplementedinthatparticularwaysoastoavoidtax.”Thisdefinitionbringsusnoclosertoknowingwhatconstitutestaxavoidance,becauseallitsaysis“taxavoidancearrangementsarethosearrangementsthatlookliketaxavoidancearrangements.”Nevertheless,thedefinitionhighlightsthedifficultyofexhaustivelydefiningtaxavoidance,or,indeed,thedifficultyofdefiningtaxavoidanceintermsoflegalrulesatall.

Taxavoidanceisperhapsbestunderstoodthroughexamples,ratherthanbyanalysis.Examplesoftaxavoidancetransactionsfromdifferentjurisdictionsabound.Theytendtohaveanumberofidentifiablefeatures,forexample,artificiality,lackofbusinessoreconomicreality,lackoftruebusinessrisk,andtheexploitationofstatutoryloopholes.Avoidanceofteninvolvestaxpayersexploitingrulesthatweredesignedtoreduceunfairnessinthetaxsystemorusingexistinglegalstructuresinenterprisingwaysthatthelegislature,haditthoughtaboutthematter,wouldnothaveapproved.

Tohelptorecogniseavoidance,take,forexample,InlandRevenueCommissionersvBowaterPropertyDevelopmentsLtd,aUnitedKingdomcasethattheHouseofLordsdecidedin1988.Thatcaseinvolveddevelopmentlandtax,akindofcapitalgainstaxthatappliedtolandsalesifthedevelopmentvaluecomponentofthesalewasvaluedatmorethan£

50,000.Inatransactionpotentiallycaughtbythetax,Bowaterproposedtoselllandformorethan£

250,000toacompanycalledMiltonPipesLimited.

Insteadofsellingthelandasoneparcel,Bowatersegmentedthelandintofiveundividedshares.ItsoldonesharetoeachoffivesiblingcompaniesintheBowatergroupfor£

36,000pershare.Landinundividedshareslooksjustlikeland:

therewasnosubdivisionalsurvey.Therewerenoseparatetitles.ThefiveBowatercompaniesownedthelandinonetitle,justasamarriedcoupleownstheirhomeinonetitle.TheBowatercompanieswereasortofmodernmarriagewithfivespouses.Thesefivesaleshadnoeffectonthebeneficialownershipoftheland（using“beneficial”initssubstantivesenseratherthanwiththemeaningthatobtainsintrustlaw）.BothbeforeandafterthesalestheultimateownersweretheshareholdersintheBowatergroup.

ThefivecompaniesthensoldtheirundividedsharestoMiltonPipesfor£

50,000each.Thatis,eachcompanyboughtfor£

36,000andsoldfor£

50,000,makingaprofitof£

14,000,wellunderthethresholdof£

50,000.

Legally,therewerefiveseparatesalesfromBowaterandfivemoresalestoMiltonPipes.Economically,therewasjustonesalefromBowatertoMiltonPipes.Ignoringthiseconomicreality,however,theHouseofLordstreatedthetransactionsasgenuine.Bowateraccordinglyescapeddevelopmentlandtax.

1.2Generalanti-avoidancerules

Typically,governmentscombatavoidancebyaddingspecificandoftenverydetailedrulestotaxlegislation,beingrulesthatfrustrateonekindofavoidancetransactionoranother.Forinstance,jurisdictionsmightallowtaxpayercompaniestocarrylossesforwardandtosetthemoffagainsttheprofitsoffutureyears.Asananti-avoidancemeasure,suchjurisdictionstendtorequirecertainminimumcontinuityofownershipbetweenthelossyearandtheprofityear.Taxstatutesarerepletewithsuchrules.However,specificanti-avoidancerulescannotcombatthemorecreativeformsoftaxavoidancethatemploytransactionsthatgovernmentscannotpredict.Consequently,manytaxsystemsfeaturegeneralanti-avoidancerulesinadditiontospecificones.

Thereisconsiderablevariationintheformthatgeneralanti-avoidancerulestakeindifferentcountries.Nevertheless,thevariousformshaveroughlythesameeffect,atleastintheory.Generalanti-avoidancerulesallowtaxauthoritiestodisregardschemesthatwouldotherwisereducetaxliability.Thetransactionstowhichtheyapplyarevoidfortaxpurposes.Atransactionbeingvoid,thetaxlieswhereitfalls,althoughmoderngeneralanti-avoidancerulesoftenallowtaxauthoritiestoreconstructatransactiontoreflecttheeconomicrealityofthecircumstancesandtotaxthetaxpayeronthebasisofthereconstructedtransaction.

Anexampleofatypicalgeneralanti-avoidanceruleissection99ofNewZealand'

sIncomeTaxAct1976（NewZealand'

scurrentruleisnotsoreadilyquotablebecauseitisdisaggregatedintoseveralelements,butithasroughlythesamemeaningandeffect）.Section99relevantlyread:

Everyarrangementmadeorenteredinto,whetherbeforeorafterthecommencementofthisAct,shallbeabsolutelyvoidasagainsttheCommissionerforincometaxpurposesifandtotheextentthat,directlyorindirectly,—

（a）Itspurposeoreffectistaxavoidance;

or

（b）Whereithas2ormorepurposesoreffects,oneofitspurposesoreffects（notbeingamerelyincidentalpurposeoreffect）istaxavoidance,whetherornotanyotherorothersofitspurposesoreffectsrelateto,orarereferableto,ordinarybusinessorfamilydealings,—

whetherornotanypersonaffectedbythatarrangementisapartythereto.

Despitethegreatdifferencebetweenthelegalsystemsandculturesofthetwocountries,thecorrespondingGermanruleistoverysimilareffect:

（1）ThetaxActmaynotbecircumventedbyanabuseofpossiblelegalarrangements.Ifthereissuchanabuse,thetaxpayershallbetaxedasifhehadchosenanadequatelegalarrangement.

（2）Subsection1isapplicableifitsapplicabilityisnotexcludedexpresslybythelaw.

Countriesthathaveanti-avoidancerulesbroadlysimilarinformtoNewZealand’sandGermany’sincludeCanada,SouthAfrica,HongKong,andFrance.TheruleinAustraliawasformerlysimilar,butsince1981hasbeenframedinmuchmoredetail.TheUnitedKingdomdoesnothaveastatutorygeneralanti-avoidancerule,butitdoeshaveajudiciallydevelopedanti-avoidancerulethatcansometimeshaveroughlythesa