租赁会计中英文外文文献翻译2016年最新译文Word文件下载.docx

租赁会计中英文外文文献翻译2016年最新译文Word文件下载.docx

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Commentletteractivity:

Aresponsetoproposedchangesinleaseaccounting

作者：

FernandoComiran,CarolGraham

期刊：

ResearchinAccountingRegulation,28卷，109-117页年份：

2016

原文

Abstract

Thisstudyexaminesthemotivationsthatleadsomefirmstolobby,viacommentletters,againstthechangesinaccountingforleasesproposedbyFASB/IASB.Thereareatleastthreedistinctmotivationsforacompanytolobbyagainsttheproposedchanges:

ahighperceivedcostofimplementation/operation,abeliefthatthechangeswillincreasethecostofcapital,andadesireonthepartofmanagementtoavoidanyadministrativeburdenassociatedwiththechanges.Ourresearchsuggeststhatcompaniesthatengageinlobbyingareconcernedwiththecostsofsuchchanges（renegotiationofdebtcovenants,auditorfees,changeinITsystems,etc.）,buttheyalsoseemtobemotivatedbytheiraccountingmanager'

sdesiretoavoidanyadditionaleffortthatthechangeswillrequire.

Keywords：

Leases，Commentletters，FASB

1.Introduction

AtthesuggestionoftheSECin2005,theFASBundertooka

controversialjointprojectwiththeIASBaimedatconvergingleaseaccountingstandards.MorethanadecadelateronFebruary25,2016,AccountingStandardsUpdate（ASU）No.2016-02LeaseswasissuedandwillbeeffectiveformostcompaniesafterDecember18,2018.1Thisreportprovidesananalysisofthemorethan1400commentletterssenttotheFASB/IASBinresponsetoaccountingchangesproposedviaASC840and842Leases.AlthoughtheeconomicimpactofthechangesproposedbytheFASB/IASBwasnotclear,theygeneratedstrongoppositionfromcompanies.Ouranalysisrevealsthatapproximately80%ofthecommentletterlobbyingfirmswereagainsttheproposedchanges.Whilethereisasubstantialbodyofempiricalresearchdevotedtounderstandingtheimplicationsofleaseaccounting,littleprimaryresearchhasbeenconductedinthisarea.Thispaperprovidesananalysisoftheentitiesthatengagedincommentletterlobbyingaroundthisissue,thetoneofthecommentletterstheysent,andasummaryofthespecificreasonstheygaveinoppositiontothechanges.Wealsoprovidesomerelatedempiricalfindings.Thereasonsfor,andpotentialmotivationsbehind,lobbyingagainstwhatisarguablyoneofthemostcontentiousissuesincontemporaryaccounting,shouldbeofinteresttopractitioners,regulatorsandacademicsalike.Consistentwithpriorstudies（e.g.Anantharaman,2015;

Francis,1987;

Fried,2012;

Ramanna,2008）weusethetermlobbyinginanarrowcontext,referringspecificallytocommentletter

lobbying.

Thepurposeofthejointprojectwastoaddressconcernsthatthecurrentstandard（SFAS13）doesnotmeettheneedsofinvestors.Morespecifically,theexistingaccountingmodelhasbeencriticized,amongotherreasons,becauseitrepresentsoneofthelargestformsofoff-balancesheetaccountingandfailstoprovideafaithfulrepresentationofleasingtransactions[www.fasb.org].Themaineffectofthenewstandardwillbetoendtheuseofoperatingleasesandinsteadrequirecapitalizationofallleases.TheFASB'

sobjectivewastoincreasefinancialstatementcomparabilitybypreventingsimilartransactionsfrombeingreporteddifferently,ascurrentlyhappensduetothebright-linerulesofSFAS132thatdifferentiatebetweenoperatingandcapitalleases.Ex-ante,itisnotclearwhyfirmswouldlobbyfororagainsttheproposedchanges.Ifstakeholdersunderstandtheimplicationsofoff-balancesheetleases,thechangesshouldhaveminimaleffect.However,ifagroupofstakeholdersisnotcorrectlyadjustingforoperatingleases,itispossiblethattheproposedchangescouldincreasetheirriskassessmentforcompanies.Itisevidentfromthecommentlettersthatmostcompaniesareagainsttheproposedchange.Thisstudyexamineswhethercompaniesareopposedtotheproposedleasechangesbecausetheywishtoobfuscatetheirperceivedrisk,orbecausetheyperceivethatthenewruleswillincreasetheiroperationalcostsortheircostofcapital.

Thispapercontributestothecurrentliteratureonlobbyingbyanalyzingthespecificobjectionstotheproposedchangesfromthecommentlettersandbyinvestigatingwhetherlobbyingfirmshaveuniquecharacteristicsthatcouldraiseredflagsforinvestors.Thisstudyalsocomplementsthecurrentliteraturebyanalyzingthebehavioroffirmswhenmanagementcompensationisnotexpectedtobenegativelyaffected.

2.Literaturereview

TheBoards'

primaryconcernthatcurrentleaseaccountingdoesnotalwaysfaithfullyrepresentleasingtransactionsand,assuch,maydisadvantagesomeinvestors,isborneoutbyextantacademicresearchbutnotconclusively.Anumberofpaperspresentevidencethatcompaniesstructuretheirleasesinordertokeepthemoff-balancesheet（OBS）,andthatsomemarketparticipantsdonotfullyadjustforinformationavailableinthefootnotes.ImhoffandThomas（1988）showthatcapitalleasesdecreasedafterSFAS13,andprovideevidencethatfirmswanttokeepleasesOBS.Cornaggia,Franzen,andSimin（2012）corroboratethisviewbydocumentinghighlevelsofexcessiveoperatingleasesamongfirmsinvestigatedbytheSEC（orDepartmentofJustice）foraccountingmisrepresentation（orfraud）.Ge（2006）presentsevidencethatOBSleasesarenegativelyrelatedtofutureearningsandstockperformanceandthatinvestorsseemtovaluethemasiftheywerepositivelyrelatedtofutureperformance.Researchinvestigatingwhethermarketparticipantsreact

differentlytorecognitionthantodisclosureonfinancialstatementsalsosupportstheFASB/IASBviewthatleasesoughttobecapitalized.Anumberofpapers（e.g.Aboody,1996;

Ahmed,Emre,&

Lobo,2006;

Callahan,Smith,&

Spencer,2013;

Davis-Fridayetal.,2004）findthatinvestorsreactmorestronglytorecognitionthandisclosureinfootnotes.Thereishowevernoconsensusregardinghowwellmarketparticipantsadjustforoperatingleases.WhileDhaliwal,Lee,andNeamtiu（2011）findthatinvestorsdoadjustforoperatingleases,theirresultsimplythattheydosolessthanforcapitalleases.Ontheotherhand,Altamuro,Johnston,Pandit,andZhang（2014）provideevidenceconsistentwithbondinvestorsusingOBSinformationtodeterminespreadsintheabsenceofaStandardandPoorcreditrating.Krische,Sanders,andSmith（2012）findthat,relativetootherformsofearningsmanagement,analystsattachlessimportancetoleasestructuring.Finally,Bratten,Choudhary,andSchipper（2013）findthatthereisnostatisticaldifferencebetweenrecognitionofcapitalleasesandthedisclosureofoperatingleases.Theauthorsconcludethatthisisevidencethatcapitalizingleasesisnotnecessarysincethemarketsalreadyadjustforthese.

OneofthemainargumentsagainsttheBoards'

proposalrelatestothecoststhatthechangeswouldengenderatbothmacroandmicrolevels.A2012reportpublishedbyChangandAdamsConsultingclaimedthat,best-casescenario,theproposedchangeswouldcosttheU.S.economy190,000

jobsandreducetheU.S.GrossDomesticProduct（GDP）by$27.5billionannually.3,4Currentacademicliterature（e.g.Cornaggia,Franzen,&

Simin,2013;

Singh,2012;

Wicker&

Young,2011）supportsthenotionthattheproposedchangesinaccountingforleaseswouldsignificantly,andadversely,impactthefinancialratiosofleasingfirms.Regardingmorespecificleasingissues,Hales,Venkataraman,andWilks（2012）arguethattheinclusionofarenewalperiodcouldmakeitharderforfirmstoraisecapitalunlesstheydisclosetheminimumobligationperiodandtherenewalperiodseparately.Finally,anecdotalevidencefromthemediaandcommentlettersimpliesthatoflargerconcerntofirmsisthehighcostsofimplementingtherulechanges（e.g.,increasesinauditorfees,changesinITsystemstotrackleases）andtheeconomiceffectsassociatedwiththeproposedchanges（e.g.,higherborrowingcosts）.Themediahoweverhasbeensilentaboutthedifferentialeffectsforfirmswithdifferentincentives.

Thisstudyalsocomplementsthecurrentlobbyingliteraturebyanalyzingthebehavioroffirmsevenwhenmanagementcompensationisnotexpectedtobestronglynegativelyaffected.Previousresearchonlobbyingbehavior（e.g.Beatty&

Weber,2006;

Dechow,Hutton,&

Sloan,1996;

Ramanna,2008）hasshownthatfirmsaremorelikelytoengageinlobbyingwiththeFASBwhenproposedchangesarelikelytoaffectmanagement'

sself-interest（e.g.,compensation）.Leasingpresentsan

interestingcomplementtotheextantlobbyingliteraturegiventhatthebalancesheetratherthantheincomestatementisprimarilyexpectedtobeaffected.

3.Hypothesesdevelopment

Therearetwoopposingtheoriesthatmightexplainfirms'

strongresponsetotheproposedchangesinaccountingforleases.Oneviewmaintainsthatfirmsstructureleasestotakeadvantageoftheiroff-balance-sheetcharacteristicsandthatoftenthechoiceforleasescanonlybeexplainedbyanintenttokeepobligationsoffbalancesheetandthushidetheirtruerisk.Theotherview（asnotedinthecommentletterssenttotheFASBandbasedonanecdotalevidencefromthemedia）maintainsthatcostsassociatedwithimplementation（e.g.,changesinITsystems,coststokeeptrackofleases,increasesinborrowingcostsduetohigherleverageratios,andrenegotiationsofdebtcovenants）outweighthebenefitsoftheproject.Thepresentresearchaddressesbothofthesetheoriesandtriestoidentifythemotivationbehindfirms'

lobbyingagainsttheproposedchangesinaccounting