布兰查德宏观经济学第七版第7版英文版chapter21.docx

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布兰查德宏观经济学第七版第7版英文版chapter21.docx

布兰查德宏观经济学第七版第7版英文版chapter21

Macroeconomics,7e(Blanchard)

Chapter21:

ShouldPolicyMakersbeRestrained?

21.1UncertaintyandPolicy

1)In1994,Republicansintroducedtheir"ContractwithAmerica."Thisplan

A)includedaPAYGOrule.

B)wouldrestricttheabilityofmonetarypolicytoaffecttheeconomyintheshortrun.

C)includedalineitemveto.

D)wouldmaketheFederalReserveevenmoreindependentthanitalreadyis.

E)alloftheabove

Answer:

C

Diff:

1

2)EconometricmodelsoftheU.S.economygenerallyagree

A)onthequantitativeimpactofmonetarypolicyoverahorizonofseveralyears.

B)thatanincreaseinmoneygrowthwillincreaseoutputintheshortrun.

C)thatanincreaseinmoneygrowthwilldecreaseoutputintheshortrun.

D)thatanincreaseinmoneygrowthwilldecreaseoutputinthelongrun.

E)that"rationalexpectations"isthebestwaytogeneratepolicyforecasts.

Answer:

B

Diff:

1

3)Allofthemacroeconometricmodelscurrentlyinuse

A)originateintheUnitedStates.

B)incorporaterationalexpectationsintotheirpredictions.

C)originatewithgovernmentorinternationalagencies.

D)originatewithcommercialfirmswhoselltheirforecaststootherfirmsandgovernments.

E)noneoftheabove

Answer:

E

Diff:

1

4)Forthisquestion,assumethatthethereexistsuncertaintyabouttheimpactofmonetarypolicyonthemacroeconomy.Giventhisinformation,itwouldbemostappropriateforthecentralbanktoincreasemoneygrowth

A)atthemidpointofarecession.

B)bymorethantheincreasethatwillyieldthedesiredresponse.

C)bylessthantheincreasethatwillyieldthedesiredresponse.

D)byanamountequaltotheincreasethatwillyieldthedesiredresponse.

E)onlyafteritiscertainthattheeconomyhasenteredarecession.

Answer:

C

Diff:

2

5)Giventheuncertaintyabouttheeffectsofmacropolicy,economistsgenerallyproposethat

A)macropoliciesshouldbemoreactive,thelowerthelevelofunemploymentorinflation.

B)changesinmoneygrowthshouldonlybeusedforfinetuningtheeconomy,notforcorrectinglargeimbalances(suchashighinflation).

C)moneygrowthshouldbesetatzerobyconstitutionalamendment.

D)electedofficialsshouldhavemoreinputinthedeterminationofmonetarypolicy.

E)noneoftheabove

Answer:

E

Diff:

2

6)Asuncertaintyabouttheeffectsofpolicyonoutputdecreases,wewouldexpectthat

A)policymakerswouldbemorefrequentlyimplementfinetuningpolicies.

B)policymakerswouldimplementmoreactivepolicies.

C)policymakerswouldimplementlessactivepolicies.

D)bothAandB

E)bothAandC

Answer:

D

Diff:

1

7)Whoisbestknownforarguingaboutthefinetuningofmonetarypolicy?

A)Friedman

B)Keynes

C)Modigliani

D)Greenspan

E)Bernanke

Answer:

C

Diff:

1

8)Explainwhetheruncertaintyshouldcausepolicymakerstodomoreordolesstostabilizetheeconomy.

Answer:

Asuncertaintyincreases,policymakersshoulddoless.Alternatively,moreactivepolicieswouldactuallyleadtomoreuncertainty.Thisisbasedon,asBlanchardnotes,multiplicativeuncertainty.

Diff:

1

9)WhatweresomeofthekeyfeaturesintermsoffiscalpolicyoftheStabilityandGrowthPactsignedin1997bywould-bemembersoftheEuro?

Answer:

TheStabilityandGrowthpact:

(1)committedcountriestobalancetheirbudgetsinthemediumrun;

(2)countriesavoidexcessivedeficits;and(3)imposedsanctionsoncountriesthatranexcessivedeficits.

Diff:

2

10)WhatarethenewrulesoftheEuroPlusPactadoptedin2011?

Answer:

ItrequiresmembercountriestotranslatetheSGPrulesintonationallegislation,eitherthroughaconstitutionalamendmentoraframeworklaw.

Diff:

2

11)WhatarethemainrulesoftheBudgetEnforcementActof1990?

Answer:

Thetwomainrulesare:

1)itimposedconstraintsonspending;2)itrequiresthatanewtransferprogramcouldonlybeadoptedifitcouldbeshownnottoincreasedeficitsinthefuture.

Diff:

2

12)ExplainspendingcapssetbytheBudgetEnforcementAct.

Answer:

TheBudgetEnforcementActimposedconstrainsonspending.Theseconstraints,calledspendingcaps,weresetondiscretionaryspendingforthefollowingfiveyears.Thesecapsweresetinsuchawayastorequiresmallbutsteadydecreaseindiscretionaryspending(inrealterms).Explicitprovisionsweremadeforemergencies.

Diff:

2

21.2ExpectationsandPolicy

1)Theideathattheeconomyoperateslikeacomplicated,predictablemachineisanimportantaspectof

A)gametheory.

B)attritiontheory.

C)thetheoryofstrategicinteraction.

D)timeinconsistencytheory.

E)optimalcontroltheory.

Answer:

E

Diff:

1

2)Inmacroeconomics,gametheoryfocusesonthestrategicinteractionsbetweenwhichofthefollowinggroupsofagents?

A)individuals;firms

B)individualsandfirms;policymakers

C)policymakers;economicforecasters

D)individualsandfirms;economicforecasters

Answer:

B

Diff:

1

3)Whichofthefollowingbestdefinestimeinconsistency?

A)theincreasinginaccuracyofeconometricmodelsasthetimehorizonbecomeslonger

B)thetendencyfortheriseinoutputtobegreaterintheearlyyearsofapresident'sterm,andsmallerinthelateryears

C)theeffectsofpoliticalelectoralcyclesonthebusinesscycle

D)thetendencyforpolicymakerstodeviatefromapre-announcedoptimalpolicyonceagentsintheeconomyhaveadjustedtheirbehaviorandexpectationsbasedonthepre-announcedpolicy

E)theeffectofeconomicuncertaintyonshort-runstabilizationpolicy

Answer:

D

Diff:

1

4)Theexistenceofthetimeinconsistencyprobleminmacropolicysuggestswhichofthefollowing?

A)Usefiscalandmonetarypolicytofinetunetheeconomy.

B)Reducetheindependenceofthecentralbank.

C)Appointsomeonewhoismoreconservative(economically)thantherestofthegovernmenttoheadthecentralbank.

D)Intervenefrequentlyintheforeignexchangemarket.

E)Eliminaterationalexpectationsfromeconometricmodelsusedforforecasting.

Answer:

C

Diff:

1

5)OncepeoplebelievetheFed'scommitmenttokeepunemploymentatthenaturalrate,theFedcanreduceunemploymentbelowthenaturalrate

A)inboththeshortrunandthelongrun.

B)inboththeshortrunandthelongrun,butonlyafterchangingpeoples'expectations.

C)inthelongrun,butnottheshortrun.

D)intheshortrun,butnotinthelongrun.

E)noneoftheabove

Answer:

D

Diff:

1

6)Tosolvethe"timeinconsistency"probleminmacropolicy,anationmaywellhaveto

A)restrictitselfinthepresentfromtakingcertainpolicymovesinthefuture.

B)liftallrestrictionsonfuturepolicymoves.

C)presentpolicymovestothepublic,forexample,inareferendum.

D)usethecourtstosettlepolicydisputes.

E)makethecentralbankmoreresponsivetothepopularwill.

Answer:

A

Diff:

1

7)Researchindicatesthatthemoreindependentthecentralbank,

A)thesmallerthebudgetdeficit.

B)thehigherthenominalinterestrate.

C)thelowertherateofinflation.

D)thelargerthetimeinconsistencyprobleminmakingpolicy.

E)thegreaterthelikelihoodofa"warofattrition"overpolicy.

Answer:

C

Diff:

1

8)Onesurprisinginsightfromviewingpolicyasa"game"isthat

A)centralbankersshouldprojectanimageofbeingconservativeoneconomicpolicymatters,regardlessoftheirpersonalviews.

B)itismoredifficulttocontrolinflationwhenthecentralbankishighlyindependent.

C)uncertaintyovertheimpactofpolicymakeslittledifferenceindesigninganoptimalpolicy.

D)moneygrowthhaslittleornoimpactoninflationinthelongrun.

E)decreasingmoneygrowthmaysubstantiallyincreasetherateofinflationinthelongrun.

Answer:

A

Diff:

1

9)Whichofthefollowingisthemostpowerfulargumentforputtingrestraintsonpolicymakers(asopposedtoself-restraintbypolicymakersthemselves)?

A)timeinconsistency

B)uncertaintyaboutOkun'scoefficient

C)uncertaintyaboutthenaturalrateofunemployment

D)uncertaintyaboutthetimingofpolicyimpacts

E)disagreementsabouttheproperstructureofaneconometricmodel

Answer:

A

Diff:

1

10)Todealwiththetimeinconsistencyproblemassociatedwithmonetarypolicy,somehavesuggestedthat

A)theheadofthecentralbankbechosenbyelection.

B)thecentralbankimplementexpansionarymonetarypolicypriortoelectionyears.

C)electedofficialsshouldhaveadirectinfluenceontheimplementationofmonetarypolicy.

D)alloftheabove

E)noneoftheabove

Answer:

E

Diff:

1

11)ResearchforanumberofOECDcountriessuggeststhatinflationwillbelower

A)themoreindependentthecentralbank.

B)thelessindependentthecentralbank.

C)iftheheadsofcentralbanksarechosenbyelection.

D)whenthetermsoftheheadsofcentralbankscoincidewiththetermsofelectedofficials.

Answer:

A

Diff:

1

12)Gametheoryanalysisofmacropolicysuggeststhatasvotersbecomemoreshort-sighted

A)policymakerswillbetemptedtoraisetaxes.

B)policymakerswillbeforcedtobalancethebudget.

C)policymakerswilladoptpoliciestodaytoachievebalancedbudgetsinthefuture.

D)alloftheabove

E)noneoftheabove

Answer:

E

Diff:

1

13)Whichofthetheoryisbettertothinkaboutpolicy?

A)gametheory

B)optimalcontroltheory

C)expectationstheory

D)noneoftheabove

Answer:

A

Diff:

1

14)Thehostagetakingexamplewasdevelopedby

A)JohnNash.

B)KydlandandPrescott.

C)JohnHarsanyi.

D)ReinhardSelten.

Answer:

B

Diff:

1

15)Whichofthefollowingisnotanexampleoftheissueoftimeinconsistency?

A)acentralbankannouncedtomaintainlowinflationandatthesametimeincreasedmoneysupply

B)agovernmentstatedthattheywillnotnegotiatewithhostageta

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