proposal例文.docx

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proposal例文

TheoptimumCorporateGovernanceforChineseCompany

Contentpage

1.0Introduction3

2.0Background4

2.1Theresearchquestion5

2.2GoalandAimsoftheresearch5

2.3Thewaytoachieveaimsandreachthegoal5

3.0LiteratureReviews8

4.0DissertationStructure11

5.0Methodology12

6.0Conclusion13

Reference14

1.0Introduction

Thepurposeforthisreportistoprovidearesearchproposalregardingto“TheOptimumCorporateGovernanceforChineseCompany”.Firstlythereportprovidesabackgroundfortheresearch,statesthecurrentCorporateGovernanceproblemsthatexistinChinesecompanies.Baseontheproblemstatement,theresearchquestioncanbedecided.Inordertoanswertheresearchquestion,thereareresearchgoalandarmsneedtoachieve.Thereportspecifiesthewaystoachieveresearcharmsandresearchgoal,providesanunderstandingofhowtoaccomplishthisresearch.Briefhistoryreviewofcorporategovernanceisgiveninordertohaveperceptionoftheconcept.Thestructureofthewholedissertationcomposeisalsoprovide.Finallythisreportdescribestheresearchmethodologyfortheresearch.

2.0Background

Inthe20century,theeconomicaldevelopmentinthewestdevelopedcountrieshasbeensuccessfullyachieved.Therearetwofactors.Oneisthedevelopmentofthesciencetechnique.Theotheroneisthereformationoforganizationmethodineconomicalaction.Afterentering21stcentury,ChinaistryingtodoeconomicalsystemreformationinordertodevelopandimprovetheChinesemarketeconomicbuilding.Thetargetofeconomicalsystemreformationistobuildmoderncorporatesystemreformation.Inthemoderncorporatesystem,companieswhicharetherepresentativeofmoderncorporatesystemplaymoreandmoreimportantrole.Withtheseparationofownershipandoperationitisnecessarytohaveacorporategovernanceproblem.Corporategovernancenotonlyhasbecomeimportantproblemsofmoderncorporatesystem,butalsoisthewaytostrengththecompetitionpowerandtoimproveoperation.Theproducefactorsreorganizeinglobalscopeandthecompetitionbecomesstrongerandstronger.Thecountries’developmentdependsonthecorporatedevelopment.Perfectcorporategovernancenotonlyisthekeyofcorporatelivinganddeveloping,butalsoisconnectedwithoveralleconomicalpower.Perfectcorporategovernancebringstherightencouragingsystemtodirectorsandmanagingandmakesmoreefficientuseoftheresource.Especially,ChinahadenteredtheWTO,andallcompanieshavetofacetheinternationalcompetition.However,thecorporategovernanceinChinaishalf-baked.Inmanycases,keymanagersgaincontrolovertheshareholders’generalmeetingwhichmeansmostofdecisionsisdirectlymadebytheseniormanagersintheirinterests.Becauseofthisgovernancestructure,astringofcorporatescandalshasemerged.Inordertohaveahealthenvironmentforcompanies,theChinesecorporategovernanceisneededtoreforminurgent.

2.1Theresearchquestion

WhatistheappropriatecorporategovernanceforthecontemporaryChinesecorporations?

2.2GoalandAimsoftheresearch

ThegoalforthisstudyistoanalyzethecorporategovernanceinChinaandinvestigatetheappropriatecorporategovernanceinoutstandingCompanies.

Theaimsoftheresearchwereto:

●Understandtheconceptofthecorporategovernance

●Examinebestcurrentcorporategovernanceintheworld

●CollectdataandanalyzingspecificcaseofChinesecorporations,findoutthecorporategovernancetheyuseandwhichapproachtheyusemost

●FindoutgovernanceissuesinChinaandaddressthedifficultytoadoptcurrentbestcorporategovernanceinChina

●FormulateasetofappropriatecorporategovernanceforaparticularChinesecorporation

●Analyzeanddiscussproblems

2.3Thewaytoachieveaimsandreachthegoal

Thereasonthatthecorporategovernancebecomestheresearchinghotisthatthedifferentcorporategovernancestructurewillinfluencetheoperationefficiencyandachievement.IntheprocessoftheChinesecorporatereformationpeoplerealizethatthecoreapproachofbuildingmoderncorporatesystemistobuildscientific,efficientandperfectcorporategovernancesystem.Manycompanies’scandalsareshowninrecentyear.ThismeansthattheChinesecorporategovernancehasmanyproblems.Thecorporategovernanceproblemshavesomefactualandtheoreticalmeaning.WhileChinesecompanies,especiallytheSOEs,acquireahugeamountofcapitalfromthepublicthrougheitherthebankingsystemorthecapitalmarket,theyremainextremelyinefficient.Forexample,recentofficialstatisticssuggestthataboutone-thirdofallSOEsareloss-makers,anotherthirdeitherbreakevenorareplaguedwithimplicitlosses,whiletheremainingone-thirdaremarginallyprofitable.IneffectivegovernancesystemhasbeenwidelybelievedastherootcauseofcorporateChina'slacklusterperformance.ImprovingcorporategovernanceisoneofthemostimportanttasksofChina’sfurtherreform.So,Chinesecompanyshouldbuildaperfectcorporategovernancesystem.

ItisalargeimpulsefortheChinesecorporatesystem’sdevelopmenttobuildperfectcorporategovernance.AtthemomentChinesecompaniesdonotbuildmodernandefficientcorporategovernancesystem.Intheexerciseofcorporategovernancetherearealotofproblems,suchastheunreasonableofshareholdersstructure,notenoughsupervision,andimperfectlawenvironmentetc.Weshouldattractandreferencetheforeignexperiencetobuildasetoffeasiblecorporategovernancesysteminordertomakecorporategovernancehavesomeorganizationandsystemguarantee.

Whydomanagerssuchconcernaboutcorporategovernance?

Theansweristhatcorporategovernancepracticehasapositiveeffectonitsmarketvalue,andtwoconditionsneedtobesatisfied.Thefirstisthatgoodgovernanceincreasesthereturnstoshareholdersofthefirmandthesecondisthatthestockmarketissufficientlyefficientsothatthesharepricesreflectthefundamentalvalues.Theseconditionsaremostlikelytobevalidinmaturemarkets,butitisbynomeanscleartheyarealsovalidinemergingmarkets.Infact,manypeoplebelievethatsharepricesonChina’sstockmarketsarepurelydrivenbyspeculativeactivitiesandbearnorelationshiptothefundamentalsofthefirms.SoweshouldcomparethepracticeintheChinesecountrywithothercountries.

Thisresearchtriestomakeuseofcomparisonandanalysisofcorporategovernancesystemtodiscoursethemeaningofmoderncorporategovernance,andtodiscussfactorswhichinfluencethecorporategovernancesystem.Itisusefultoknowandcontrolnewdevelopmenttrendofcorporategovernance,toimprovetheefficiencyofcorporategovernanceinordertotakesomeadvicestoperfectandextendtheChinesestandpoint.

Fromthehistoryandactualityofcorporategovernancesystemdevelopment,corporategovernancehasdifferentmodelindifferentagesandcountries.Theirrelationshipanddifferenceisusefultocontrolandcorporategovernancesystemandattractsomeexperience.

InordertofindouttheoptimumcorporategovernanceforChinesecompanies,weshouldanalyzecurrentcorporategovernancesystems.AtthesametimeweshouldexaminethepresentproblemsandfuturetrendsofcorporategovernanceandarrangetoreformandcreatethepresentsystemaccordingtoChina’sfact.So,Iwillhavealongandstablecorporategovernancesystem.

Thisarticlefocusesonmicrocosmicsystemofthecorporatelaw.Itneedstotakemanycomparisonandanalysis,includingthelevelcomparisonofcorporategovernancesystemduringdifferentcountriesandtheanalysisfromgeneraltheorytomaterialmethodsandactuality.Atlast,itisgoingtousetheoriesandactualmethodtogivesomepersonaladvicestoimproveandperfecttheChinesecorporategovernancesystem.

Firstissystemanalysismethod.Corporategovernanceisakindofsystemarrangement.Differentcorporategovernancesystemrepresentsdifferentsystemarrangement.Systemarrangementhascost.Peoplemakechoiceindifferentsystemarrangement.Infactpeoplecomparedifferentsystemarrangementtofindbestone.Itisimportantcontentofcorporategovernanceresearchtofindbestsystemarrangementinenvironmentchanging.Itistheapplicationofsystemarrangementmethodincorporategovernanceresearch.

Secondismulti-casesanalysismethod.ThisarticleanalyzedthemainproblemsofdifferentChinesecorporategovernances.Bycomparison,wegetanddiscoursethedifferenceandsamenesstomakeclearthecorporategovernances.

Thirdistheoreticalanalysismethod.ThispartanalyzesthepresentproblemsoftheChinesecorporategovernancebytheoryandpreviousstudies.Inthispart,thebarriersofChinesecompaniesadoptingbestcorporategovernancesystemwillbeaddressed.Atlast,wefindthebestmethodwhichisfittoChina’sfactandgetthegeneralsystem.

3.0LiteratureReviews

HistoryReview

Corporategovernancemechanismsareeconomicandlegalinstitutionsshapedbysocioeconomicfactorsaswellaspoliticalactivities.Theyincludefactorssuchasthestrategicdesignofexecutivecompensationandtenurecontracts,ownershipstructureandthecompositionoftheboardofdirectors,CEOduality,themarketforcorporatecontrol,anddisclosurerequirementsimposedbyregulatoryauthorities（Hittetal.,1996;ShleiferandVishny,1997;ChatterjeeandHarrison,2001）.Byconvention,thesedesignsoftenareclassifiedasinternalandexternalmechanisms（Hoptetal.,1998;Keaseyetal.,1999）.

ThepastdecadehasseenasurgeofinterestinformerlyplannedeconomiessuchasRussia,EasternEuropeancountriesandmoreimportantlyChina.Manyofthefirms