巴菲特为何害怕通胀How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor.docx

1、巴菲特为何害怕通胀How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor巴菲特为何害怕通胀？巴菲特为何害怕通胀？ -张化桥通胀会打击债市，其中道理大家似乎都明白：因为未来每年的利息收入是固定的，但是利息收入会因为通胀而贬值。市场上的名义利率会上升，而债券的票息不会增加。但是关于通胀下的股市，大家都有一个错误的幻觉，总以为股票所代表的是“产能”，其真实的价值会随着通胀而水涨船高。1968年到1982年，美国股市经历了一个长达15年的大熊市，元凶是通胀。“滞涨”一词虽然是1965年出生的，但是等到七十年代末期，它才成为一个家喻户晓的词儿。那15年间，道琼斯指数名义上跌

2、了一半，但是考虑到通胀因素，股民的损失高达80以上。1977年5月，巴菲特在财富杂志发表了一篇超长的文章 ，精辟论述了通胀如何打击股市和债市。（它的标题是 “How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor”。)本人孤陋寡闻，不知道有人是否已经把它翻译成了中文，但是朗读再朗读，并且翻译和评论这篇文章却让我乐在其中。现容我把它归纳如下：巴菲特说，股票其实也是债券，只是它的期限是永远。在二战以后的30多年，尽管美国的经济变化很大，但所有公司的平均股本收益率相当地稳定：10到13之间，取个平均数大约就12。实际上，这就好比“股息”：当然一小部分股息用现金分掉了，大

3、部分留到了公司继续赚取那12。虽然股民的换手进行了利益再分配，但作为一个整体，他们的回报率超级稳定，并不因为通胀而改善。这意味着，股民作为一个整体，甚至连债券投资者还不如。债券到期时，投资者会购买新的，票息会有更高的收益，而“股息”却还停留在12，未分配的“股息”留在公司，也只能赚取每年12。在没有通胀或者通胀很温和的年代，比如美国的五十年代和六十年代早期，名义利率很低，所以，大部分“股息”能够留在公司继续赚取那可爱的12，太美了！大家都知道那是很美的，所以为了获得这种享受，大家纷纷投资股票，直到把股价抬高到账面净资产的2倍甚至3到4倍。那时的老股民得到了三个好处：一是那可爱的12超过了当时的

4、市场利率，二是把“股息”的大部分留在公司继续按12的回报率投资，三是股票市盈率的上升，一直抬到几倍的市账率。当然这不能照搬到中国，今天大量的中国公司在揭不开锅的时候也有3到5倍的市账率，这连巴菲特当时也没预料到。毕竟，中国特色就是不一样。巴菲特说，股票跟债券一样，不过是市场利率的倒数而已，或者说，它们的变动方向相反。股票就是一个“永续的债券”。它的“票息”为12。 不过，持票人每年只能获得其中的一小部分，而大部分的票息会被自动再投资于这种“永续债券”。在美国，五十年代和六十年代早期的低利率的“人间天堂”终于被通胀搅局。六十年代中期，当通胀上升时，企业长期债券发行时的票面利率涨到了6，8，和10

5、以上，可是照样跌破票面价格。而股票呢？那原本可爱的12的“股息”也不再显得可爱了。当市账率为1倍的时候，股民获得的回报率就是股本的回报率，比如12。当市账率涨到2倍甚至3倍时，股民的回报率就分别降到了6或者4。简单的算术，可能大家不愿意去想，而非大家不愿意去弄懂。虽然通胀时有些行业或企业可能是赢家，有些是输家，但总的来说，整个企业界不可能获得明显的好处。一个企业要增加股本回报率，无非有五个办法：增加资金周转、获得更便宜的负债、增加负债、降低税负、增加利润率。巴菲特说，获得更便宜的负债、增加负债、降低税负对于企业界而言根本没可能。而资金周转和利润率上升的空间也不大。固定资产重置成本会因为通胀而上

6、升；企业在短期內显得资金周转加快了，比如资产周转天数改善等等，但它们很快发现自己要因为重置成本上升而增加资本支出。增加负债也总有个极限。巴菲特认为“财富500强”的大企业的总资产负债率已经从1955年的37涨到了1975年的50，再怎么涨呢？当然中国企业不会出现这样的问题，我们中国的企业确实可以批评巴菲特没见过世面！什么数字都是有可能的。如果两个类似的公司的股本收益率均为12，但是一个低负债，另外一个高负债，前者就明显好多了。巴菲特说，其实，利润率高的公司并不需要太多的负债，而利润率差的公司永远缺钱。这句话马上让我想到麦肯锡2010年一本书中的一个观点：亚洲企业债务太高，利润增长率虽然很不错，

7、但并没有解决另外一个大问题：利润率太差，资本消耗太大，回报率太低。那本书名为，Value: The Four Cornerstones of Corporate Finance, 好象只有英文本。我为该书写过一篇书评：光有利润增长还不够。表面上看，高负债增加股东的回报，但是过了某一个度，就开始伤害股东。我们都见过大量高息借款的公司，天天在危险中度日。管理层整天在融资，无暇管理企业。负债太高，公司就丧失了回旋余地。高负债的公司的股票往往看起来便宜，实际上不便宜。买股票就跟收购企业一样，是承债收购。公司的负债也按你的股权比例成了你的负债。巴菲特专门强调，通胀使大量企业受暗伤，而股民不知道。比如，1

8、977年一个25岁的年轻员工的年薪为1万2千美元，如果按照每年7的通胀增加工资，等他65岁退休时，它的工资已经会涨到18万美元。这还不算：它的退休金和医疗费会飞涨。退休金是企业最隐蔽的炸弹。对于这个观点，我深有体会：近十年，美国几家大型汽车公司都是被这项负担压垮的。本人最近研究一家上海国企的股票，表面上看，便宜的了不得。但是，你想想那5000员工，工资只能涨，不能降，人员只能增，不能减，以及社会和谐的压力，我吓坏了。这公司和其它很多类似的中国公司一样，实际上早已经被掏空了，只是买单的时间还没有到罢了。把那些甩不掉的未来负债折现到今天，这些公司不仅自己已经是负资产，还可能毒害财政，迫使税收增加或

9、者印钞票来把负担分摊给别人。巴菲特幽默地说，美国的国会议员们都非常反对通胀，不过他们也都极力支持产生通胀的那些经济政策。有一件事他们从不含糊，他们把自己的退休金理所当然地按照通胀来进行调整。其实，何止美国如此。巴菲特说，和平时期的通胀完全是人为造成的。当政客们在下一轮选举与下一代人们的福利之间权衡时，他们的选择都是没有悬念的。“我看未来每年的平均通胀率更象大约7。 表面上企业界的股本回报率为12， 但扣除各种税收之后，实际上只有7左右。在扣除通胀以后，股本回报率大约是零。”回报率为零这就是真相。所以，别装糊涂了：通胀就是一种税。增加税收，股市当然好不了！巴菲特说，一个寡妇的存款账户年息5。如果

10、政府征收120的利息税，她会很生气。但是如果政府不收税，却把通胀搞到6。虽然对于那位寡妇来讲，两种情况的结果是一样的，但她不会对后种情况生气。如果股民或者基民们的投资年回报率是11，而通胀率大约7，那么他们的实际回报率只有大约4。这是大白话。但是，太多人被货币幻觉所蒙蔽。既然巴菲特对通胀以及通胀下的股市如此悲观，那么他为什么一直持有股票并且几乎满仓呢？他说，原因之一是多年养成的投资习惯，原因之二是因为长期持有股票就是拥有企业。而拥有企业即使在通胀下也比其它的可能性要好的多。呜呼哀哉！How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor2011-05-22 16:

11、57:43The central problem in the stock market is that the return on capital hasnt risen with inflation. It seems to be stuck at 12 percent.by Warren E. Buffett, FORTUNE May 1977It is no longer a secret that stocks, like bonds, do poorly in an inflationary environment. We have been in such an environm

12、ent for most of the past decade, and it has indeed been a time of troubles for stocks. But the reasons for the stock markets problems in this period are still imperfectly understood.There is no mystery at all about the problems of bondholders in an era of inflation. When the value of the dollar dete

13、riorates month after month, a security with income and principal payments denominated in those dollars isnt going to be a big winner. You hardly need a Ph.D. in economics to figure that one out.It was long assumed that stocks were something else. For many years, the conventional wisdom insisted that

14、 stocks were a hedge against inflation. The proposition was rooted in the fact that stocks are not claims against dollars, as bonds are, but represent ownership of companies with productive facilities. These, investors believed, would retain their Value in real terms, let the politicians print money

15、 as they might.And why didnt it turn but that way? The main reason, I believe, is that stocks, in economic substance, are really very similar to bonds.I know that this belief will seem eccentric to many investors. Thay will immediately observe that the return on a bond (the coupon) is fixed, while t

16、he return on an equity investment (the companys earnings) can vary substantially from one year to another. True enough. But anyone who examines the aggregate returns that have been earned by compa-nies during the postwar years will dis-cover something extraordinary: the returns on equity have in fac

17、t not varied much at all.The coupon is stickyIn the first ten years after the war - the decade ending in 1955 -the Dow Jones industrials had an average annual return on year-end equity of 12.8 percent. In the second decade, the figure was 10.1 percent. In the third decade it was 10.9 percent. Data f

18、or a larger universe, the FORTUNE 500 (whose history goes back only to the mid-1950s), indicate somewhat similar results: 11.2 percent in the decade ending in 1965, 11.8 percent in the decade through 1975. The figures for a few exceptional years have been substantially higher (the high for the 500 w

19、as 14.1 percent in 1974) or lower (9.5 percent in 1958 and 1970), but over the years, and in the aggregate, the return on book value tends to keep coming back to a level around 12 percent. It shows no signs of exceeding that level significantly in inflationary years (or in years of stable prices, fo

20、r that matter).For the moment, lets think of those companies, not as listed stocks, but as productive enterprises. Lets also assume that the owners of those enterprises had acquired them at book value. In that case, their own return would have been around 12 percent too. And because the return has b

21、een so consistent, it seems reasonable to think of it as an equity coupon.In the real world, of course, investors in stocks dont just buy and hold. Instead, many try to outwit their fellow investors in order to maximize their own proportions of corporate earnings. This thrashing about, obviously fru

22、itless in aggregate, has no impact on the equity, coupon but reduces the investors portion of it, because he incurs substantial frictional costs, such as advisory fees and brokerage charges. Throw in an active options market, which adds nothing to, the productivity of American enterprise but require

23、s a cast of thousands to man the casino, and frictional costs rise further.Stocks are perpetualIt is also true that in the real world investors in stocks dont usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, theyve had to pay more than book, and

24、 when that happens there is further pressure on that 12 percent. Ill talk more about these relationships later. Meanwhile, lets focus on the main point: as inflation has increased, the return on equity capital has not. Essentially, those who buy equities receive securities with an underlying fixed r

25、eturn - just like those who buy bonds.Of course, there are some important differences between the bond and stock forms. For openers, bonds eventually come due. It may require a long wait, but eventually the bond investor gets to renegotiate the terms of his contract. If current and prospective rates

26、 of inflation make his old coupon look inadequate, he can refuse to play further unless coupons currently being offered rekindle his interest. Something of this sort has been going on in recent years.Stocks, on the other hand, are perpetual. They have a maturity date of infinity. Investors in stocks

27、 are stuck with whatever return corporate America happens to earn. If corporate America is destined to earn 12 percent, then that is the level investors must learn to live with. As a group, stock investors can neither opt out nor renegotiate. In the aggregate, their commitment is actually increasing

28、. Individual companies can be sold or liquidated and corporations can repurchase their own shares; on balance, however, new equity flotations and retained earnings guarantee that the equity capital locked up in the corporate system will increase.So, score one for the bond form. Bond coupons eventual

29、ly will be renegotiated; equity coupons wont. It is true, of course, that for a long time a 12 percent coupon did not appear in need of a whole lot of correction.The bondholder gets it in cashThere is another major difference between the garden variety of bond and our new exotic 12 percent equity bo

30、nd that comes to the Wall Street costume ball dressed in a stock certificate.In the usual case, a bond investor receives his entire coupon in cash and is left to reinvest it as best he can. Our stock investors equity coupon, in contrast, is partially retained by the company and is reinvested at what

31、ever rates the company happens to be earning. In other words, going back to our corporate universe, part of the 12 percent earned annually is paid out in dividends and the balance is put right back into the universe to earn 12 percent also.The good old daysThis characteristic of stocks - the reinves

32、tment of part of the coupon - can be good or bad news, depending on the relative attractiveness of that 12 percent. The news was very good indeed in, the 1950s and early 1960s. With bonds yielding only 3 or 4 percent, the right to reinvest automatically a portion of the equity coupon at 12 percent via s of enormous value. Note that investors could not just invest their own money and get that 12 percent return. Stock prices in this period ranged far above book value, and investors were prevented by the premiu