自动控制毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献.docx

1、自动控制毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献 毕业论文外文译文 学 院 自动化与电气工程学院 专 业 自动控制 Cmponent-based Saty Cmputer of Railwaal Inrlcig System1 ntrocoSignal Iterlocing System isthe critical eqimnt which can guartetfic safety and hance oeratinalefficiencyinailwa apttio. or a longime, te core conrl computeradopts initrlckng system isth

2、e spal ustoized high-gra saety mpter, or exaple， te SMSo Siemens, he EI3 f Npn Sgnal, ads n. longwith th rapidvelpmet of electroic tchology, thecustomied fey coptr iacing seve hallenges， forinac， te high development cs, por usabilty， wea expiblity andsow tehnlgypdate. Tovercom the flawsote hgh-grade

3、speial customizdcompter, the .S. Departent of Dens as u rwar he cncept:e shoul dopt commrcialsaard to elcemlitary nom and standrdsforeetng cosumers deman . n he antime, ter e sevea xplorations and pactcs abut doptin oe system achiecure i viocs Te UnitedStd nEurope hae o muc esearch about utilizing c

4、st-effeve fault-tolant omutr o repacete deicd opter inarospace nd otherfety-riticl fels. Irecntears, it s grdully becomin a new trend thate tilzaton ofsadrdzd comones i aeospc, indusr, transprtatioandotherfeycritil ieds2Railwysigl iterlokng ysem.Functoof nal iterlockingsstemhebasc funcio o signal it

5、erlocking symis t protect tin sey b conrollingigal qupes, suhasstc pit,snls antracunit in ttio,ad t andlesrouesv crainterlokingreationSinc irh f he raiwayrasorton, signainteloing sytem s gnethrugh nalsiga, chaiclsigal, rely-bse interlokng, ante oernompter-basedIterlocking Syste.2 chtecte f signl ite

6、rlokin sstm Geerally，th Inerlokin yste hasa hiearchcal tructure. According thefcin f equipent,h system can be divded tote fntion of equimets;te ytem cane id no thre laes s showninfgur1.Figure1 Ahitete f inal nteoking ystem3 Componetbased sfety copuer deign3.1eg trateyedeignconcept ofcoonn-asedafey i

7、t cmuter is iffeetfrom ha f specil ustmized compute.Our deig straegyofSIC ison a bae f fulttolernce and systemintration.We separat t SC n hreayers, the standardizd cmpoent unit layer, sfetsoftwar r and th sytem ae Diferent aey functis are allocated o a layer,ad the final integration ofth thre lars n

8、us the predefined safetyitegr lev of he whleIC. Thetre ayes b escibed as folows:（）oponnt unit layrincude fournenent standadizeCPU modules. harare“SAETAND” lgcis iplemnted i this ear.(2）afy swa layeray utilizs ail-safe trateg ad faulttolerantmnagen T ielcin afey comuting of the he sytemdots two outpu

9、ts fro diffrent CPU,tca mostly enrehdivrsity o oware to holdwihesign rrors of sinal veso ndremove den iss.(3)Systm ar ims o mpve reiablity, avabilit ad matainblity b means o edunancy.3.2 Deigof hardwrefault-toleat strucureA sn i fr2,t IC offour ipndent componnt nits (C11, C，C2, C). Th fault-rant arc

10、hiectu adoptsdua 2 vote 2 (v22) stture， andkind of higperormnce stdardzed modul has een selecte s coputig unit hich dpts Ine X Scal ere, 53 MHZ The oeraion fSC is baed on adualtwo-layer da ses. Te high bsaoptsth aadEthenet anTCIP cmmunicionprotoo, an t lo busis Crller e twrk (AN). C1、C2 and C21、22 r

11、spetivlmakeup of twsafy compuin ompnents IC1an C2, hich aeof 2v2 strucure. nd eaomnent ha n externaldnamic rci watchdg ha isst for omputgspervisionand scig.Figue Hadwre tructr of SIC33Stndardized cent unitAftercomnentmoueismdecertain, accoding tohe safey-critica rqireents o ralasaitlockigsysem, e ha

12、v o do asecodar eveopment on e modleTe sgn includespowe supply,terfcs and tr mdd circs.Thefut-olerantprcesing, syncronizeputig, d alt iagnsof SIC ostlypedn the fe otar He the safety swr esin meto s diferin fom tht of the special cour o For deiecompuer， the ofware is ote speciallydesgnedbase onthebr

13、hrare. stictedby computig abily nd ppliction ojct, aspel chuing rogramis ommonly eine as sfet sofware r te mpter, and not aunivera opeating syste The fal-tleant prcessi ndfaltagnsisf he dedcated cmputer re tight hrwar-coe. Hweer, the safty sofwarfor SIC is exoeric ad osy hardwareupled, adi is aseon

14、a adard Linux OS. Th saety sftwar s ita lemetf secondary dvelomen. includeLiux OS adjusmt, fail-sae rces, falt-toerce anagemnt， ad afety inelockiglogic. Th hierarchyeatins between thear shown inre 4. igre 4Setyswar hrrhy of SC3. Falt-olent model ad afet omtao34. Futoerat modelThealttra putation of S

15、I s of a mltilevelodel:S102D（F20(Sc11,Sc2),F22（S21,Sc)Firstly, baic omtng uniti1 adots oe algorithm o mpt theSCi1,and Ci2 finishes the Ci ia different algrithm, sconl 2 uto (2o2） sfety computing poenoSICexecte 2 alclaon and ts FSICi from te callatinrsults of SCi1 SCi2, and hirly,acordg the saesof wa

16、tchdogan wih unitblok, thereslt of SCs otten va a1out of 2 with iaostic (1oo2D）calulto, whc is baed oFSIC1 and SC.Theflw of cacultions i s fllow:（1) Sci1=F ci (Dnet1,Dt,Dd，Dfss)(2)Sci=F c2（Dne1，Dnt2，Ddi，fs)(3)FSCi=o（Sci1,c2 ),(i=1,2)()SICOutPut=F1(FIC，FSI2)3.4.2 SaftomputatnAs trlockg system cnsists

17、 o a ixed st of tak, tecopuatonal moe of IC s tak-based. In gna, appicatnay m to a timetriggeed， event-triggred or mixe compuationl model re he tme-triggerd mod i selet, tasksareeected cyclaly The cosistecofcmpung states bewn he two unit is te oundaion f SI for suring safty adcrediiy. SIC wor ndra o

18、oseycupled mo, i is dferent fro at of eicated hadar-coupledcomputer o a speciized nchronizaton alorith is nsaryo SICSI can be conidere a amltiprocess distributd ysem,ad tcouttiona model is eseniallybaeon data comarng via high bscmuiation irt，a ayicalpprchis us to corm th worst-cae espnetme of eac ta

19、sk. T guante hdedlnof tassthatcmmuicate coss he etork， te acces mendelafcounictonmedium is se toafxedposl valu. Morover, tecmputational model must mets te al time requimnts of railway interlck syst, thin sysem oputig ycle, we setmay chk intsPi (=1,2,. n) , whicare sal eouhor synchroizatin, an cmputa

20、to resulvotn is xeuted ateach pin. The safeycomputai low of SI i shown i Fgue5.igur Sfet omptatoal model of SC4. Hardwareafty integrity lvel evaluaton41Sfety ntgriy s nauthritatve internonal tandrd fr safety-related syt, IE 6108 pesents defiitnof saey ntegry： problty of safety-lated ysem tisfacoriye

21、rfring e eqrd safey functions unrll the ated condiions withina staterio o ie InIEC 6150, there ar four levf saeyintegitarpescribe, SIL1SI4. Te IL iste lwet,andSIL4 higst.cdi to IEC608, theSCelon tsafety-rele ssems in hih demand r contnuos mde ofoperatio. The SIL of SIC can e evaluated vi t pobabilit

22、y of danerous er hou. The rvisionof SIL abouch system in IEC618,see able 1.Table-Safet Interity lvels: trgetailre meauresfor safety fucin perting hih demndo contiousmode ofoprationafyIntgrity leelHigh emanorconinuous o of Operation(Probabilityof a dangeousFi per hou)4 19 o 10-83 -8 t 10-72 0- to 0-6

23、1 -6o 1-42 Rliabilityboc dirm SICfte anlyzingthe trctre and workngprinciple o the SC, w get he ok iagra ofrlibiity,as ure 6.Figre 6 Block iaram ofSIC reibilt Cusion thi paper, w rosed a availae stadrdizecmnent-basd copute SIC Raily signal iterlocking i a ail-safe ystem wh aequiredprobablit of lessha

24、n 1-9 sfe crial faiuresp hour n ordeo meet te citical crat, falt-tlera ahituread safey tcticsare ue in SIC. Alhoh the compuaional moel an mpeenatio tchniqusre rather comx, thephiosopyf SI roides chef prspect to safey cital appliions,itrendes in simplrstyle of hrwae, furthrmore, i cn ten dvlomen ccleadredcecos.SIChas beenput intoprailapplcaon，nd hig peformaneof eliabilit ad sae a enpovn. om: 模块化安全铁路信号计算机联锁系统1概述信号联锁系统是保证交通安全、提高铁路运输效率的关键设备。长期以