Kants View of the Mind and Consciousness of SelfWord文档格式.docx

1、o 2.1 Transcendental Aesthetico 2.2 Metaphysical Deductiono 2.3 Transcendental Deduction, 1stEditiono 2.4 Attack on the Paralogisms, 1sto 2.5 Two Discussions in the 2nd-edition TD and Other Discussions 3. Kants View of the mindo 3.1 Methodo 3.2 Synthesis and Faculties 3.2.1 Synthesis of Apprehension

2、 in Intuition 3.2.2 Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 3.2.3 Synthesis of Recognition in a Concepto 3.3 Synthesis: A 90 Turno 3.4 Unity of Consciousness 4. Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Selfo 4.1 Seven Theses About Consciousness of and Knowledge of Self 4.1.1 Thesis 1: Two Kinds of Co

3、nsciousness of Self 4.1.2 Thesis 2: Representational Base of Consciousness of Self 4.1.3 Thesis 3: Conscious Only of How One Appears to Oneself 4.1.4 Thesis 4: Referential Machinery of Consciousness of Self 4.1.5 Thesis 5: No Manifold in Consciousness of Self 4.1.6 Thesis 6: Consciousness of Self is

4、 not Knowledge of Self 4.1.7 Thesis 7: Conscious of Self as Single, Common Subject of Experience 5. Knowledge of the Mind 6. Where Kant Has and Has Not Influenced Contemporary Cognitive Research Bibliography Other Internet Resources Related Entries1. A Sketch of KantIn this article, we will focus on

5、 Immanuel Kants （1724-1804） work on the mind and consciousness of self and related issues.Some commentators believe that Kants views on the mind are dependent on his idealism （he called it transcendental idealism）. For the most part, that is not so. At worst, most of what he said about the mind and

6、consciousness can be detached from his idealism. Though often viewed as a quintessentially German philosopher, Kant is said to have been one-quarter Scottish. Some philosophers （often Scottish） hold that Kant is a Germanization of the Scottish name Candt, though many scholars now reject the idea. It

7、 is noteworthy, however, that his work on epistemology, which led him to his ideas about the mind, was a response toHumeas much as to any other philosopher.In general structure, Kants model of the mind was the dominant model in the empirical psychology that flowed from his work and then again, after

8、 a hiatus during which behaviourism reigned supreme （roughly 1910 to 1965）, toward the end of the 20thcentury, especially in cognitive science. Central elements of the models of the mind of thinkers otherwise as different as Sigmund Freud and Jerry Fodor are broadly Kantian, for example.Three ideas

9、define the basic shape （cognitive architecture） of Kants model and one its dominant method. They have all become part of the foundation of cognitive science.1. The mind is complex set of abilities （functions）. （As Meerbote 1989 and many others have observed, Kant held a functionalist view of the min

10、d almost 200 years before functionalism was officially articulated in the 1960s by Hilary Putnam and others.）2. The functions crucial for mental, knowledge-generating activity are spatio-temporal processing of, and application of concepts to, sensory inputs. Cognition requires concepts as well as pe

11、rcepts.3. These functions are forms of what Kant called synthesis. Synthesis （and the unity in consciousness required for synthesis） are central to cognition.These three ideas are fundamental to most thinking about cognition now. Kants most important method, the transcendental method, is also at the

12、 heart of contemporary cognitive science. To study the mind, infer the conditions necessary for experience. Arguments having this structure are called transcendental arguments.Translated into contemporary terms, the core of this method is inference to the best explanation, the method of postulating

13、unobservable mental mechanisms in order to explain observed behaviour.To be sure, Kant thought that he could get more out of his transcendental arguments than just best explanations. He thought that he could geta priori（experience independent） knowledge out of them. Kant had a tripartite doctrine of

14、 thea priori.He held that some features of the mind and its knowledge hadorigins, i.e., must be in the mind prior to experience （because using them is necessary to have experience）. That mind and knowledge have these features aretruths, i.e., necessary and universal （B3/4）1. And we can come to know

15、these truths, or that they areat any rate, only by usingmethods, i.e., we cannot learn these things from experience （B3） （Brook 1993）. Kant thought that transcendental arguments wereor yielded thein all three ways. Nonetheless, at the heart of this method is inference to the best explanation. When i

16、ntrospection fell out of favour about 100 years ago, the alternative approach adopted was exactly this approach. Its nonempirical roots in Kant notwithstanding, it is now the major method used by experimental cognitive scientists.Other things equally central to Kants approach to the mind have not be

17、en taken up by cognitive science, as we will see near the end, a key part of his doctrine of synthesis and most of what he had to say about consciousness of self in particular. Far from his model having been superseded by cognitive science, some important things have not even been assimilated by it.

18、2. KantThe major works so far as Kants views on the mind are concerned are the monumentalCritique of Pure Reason （CPR）and his little, lateAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, first published in 1798 only six years before his death. Since theAnthropologywas worked up from notes for popular le

19、ctures, it is often superficial compared toCPR.Kants view of the mind arose from hisgeneral philosophical projectinCPRthe following way. Kant aimed among other things to, Justify our conviction that physics, like mathematics, is a body of necessary and universal truth. Insulate religion, including b

20、elief in immortality, and free will from the corrosive effects of this very same science.Kant accepted without reservation that “God, freedom and immortality” （1781/7, Bxxx） exist but feared that, if science were relevant to their existence at all, it would provide reasons to doubt that they exist.

21、As he saw it and very fortunately, science cannot touch these questions. “I have found it necessary to denyknowledge, in order to make room forfaith.”（Bxxx, his italics）.Laying the foundation for pursuit of the first aim, which as he saw it was no less than the aim of showing why physics is a scienc

22、e, was what led Kant to his views about how the mind works. He approached the grounding of physics by asking: What are the necessary conditions of experience （A96）? Put simply, he held that for our experience, and therefore our minds, to be as they are, the way that our experience is tied together m

23、ust reflect the way that physics says that objects in the world must be tied together. Seeing this connection also tells us a lot about what our minds must be like.His pursuit of the second aim, and specifically hiscritique of some arguments of his predecessorsthat entailed that we can know more abo

24、ut the minds consciousness of itself than Kant could also, led him to some extraordinarily penetrating ideas about our consciousness of ourselves.InCPR,Kant discussed the mind only in connection with his main projects, never in its own right, so his treatment is remarkably scattered and sketchy. As

25、he put it, “Enquiry into the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests is of great importance for my chief purpose, but does not form an essential part of it” （Axvii）. Indeed, Kant offers no sustained, focussed discussion of the mind anywhere in his w

26、ork except the popularAnthropology,which, as we just said, is quite superficial.In addition, the two chapters ofin which most of Kants remarks on the mind occur, the chapter on the Transcendental Deduction （TD） and the chapter on what he called Paralogisms （faulty arguments about the mind mounted by

27、 his predecessors） were the two chapters that gave him the greatest difficulty. （They contain some of the most impenetrable prose ever written.） Kant completely rewrote the main body of both chapters for the second edition （though not the introductions, interestingly）.In the two editions ofthere are

28、 seven main discussions of the mind. The first is in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the second is in what is usually called the Metaphysical Deduction （for this term, see below）. Then there are two discussions of it in the first-edition TD, in parts 1 to 3 of Section 2 （A98 up to A110） and in the whole of Section 3 （A115-A127）2and two more in the second-edition TD, from B129 to B140 and from B153 to B159, the latter seemingly added as a kind of supplement. The seventh and last is found in the first edition version of Kants att