Kants View of the Mind and Consciousness of SelfWord文档格式.docx
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o2.1TranscendentalAesthetic
o2.2MetaphysicalDeduction
o2.3TranscendentalDeduction,1st
Edition
o2.4AttackontheParalogisms,1st
o2.5TwoDiscussionsinthe2nd-editionTDandOtherDiscussions
∙3.Kant'
sViewofthemind
o3.1Method
o3.2SynthesisandFaculties
▪3.2.1SynthesisofApprehensioninIntuition
▪3.2.2SynthesisofReproductioninImagination
▪3.2.3SynthesisofRecognitioninaConcept
o3.3Synthesis:
A90°
Turn
o3.4UnityofConsciousness
∙4.ConsciousnessofSelfandKnowledgeofSelf
o4.1SevenThesesAboutConsciousnessofandKnowledgeofSelf
▪4.1.1Thesis1:
TwoKindsofConsciousnessofSelf
▪4.1.2Thesis2:
RepresentationalBaseofConsciousnessofSelf
▪4.1.3Thesis3:
ConsciousOnlyofHowOneAppearstoOneself
▪4.1.4Thesis4:
ReferentialMachineryofConsciousnessofSelf
▪4.1.5Thesis5:
NoManifoldinConsciousnessofSelf
▪4.1.6Thesis6:
ConsciousnessofSelfisnotKnowledgeofSelf
▪4.1.7Thesis7:
ConsciousofSelfasSingle,CommonSubjectofExperience
∙5.KnowledgeoftheMind
∙6.WhereKantHasandHasNotInfluencedContemporaryCognitiveResearch
∙Bibliography
∙OtherInternetResources
∙RelatedEntries
1.ASketchofKant'
Inthisarticle,wewillfocusonImmanuelKant'
s(1724-1804)workonthemindandconsciousnessofselfandrelatedissues.
SomecommentatorsbelievethatKant'
sviewsonthemindaredependentonhisidealism(hecalledittranscendentalidealism).Forthemostpart,thatisnotso.Atworst,mostofwhathesaidaboutthemindandconsciousnesscanbedetachedfromhisidealism.ThoughoftenviewedasaquintessentiallyGermanphilosopher,Kantissaidtohavebeenone-quarterScottish.Somephilosophers(oftenScottish)holdthat‘Kant’isaGermanizationoftheScottishname‘Candt’,thoughmanyscholarsnowrejecttheidea.Itisnoteworthy,however,thathisworkonepistemology,whichledhimtohisideasaboutthemind,wasaresponseto
Hume
asmuchastoanyotherphilosopher.
Ingeneralstructure,Kant'
smodelofthemindwasthedominantmodelintheempiricalpsychologythatflowedfromhisworkandthenagain,afterahiatusduringwhichbehaviourismreignedsupreme(roughly1910to1965),towardtheendofthe20th
century,especiallyincognitivescience.CentralelementsofthemodelsofthemindofthinkersotherwiseasdifferentasSigmundFreudandJerryFodorarebroadlyKantian,forexample.
Threeideasdefinethebasicshape(‘cognitivearchitecture’)ofKant'
smodelandoneitsdominantmethod.Theyhaveallbecomepartofthefoundationofcognitivescience.
1.Themindiscomplexsetofabilities(functions).(AsMeerbote1989andmanyothershaveobserved,Kantheldafunctionalistviewofthemindalmost200yearsbeforefunctionalismwasofficiallyarticulatedinthe1960sbyHilaryPutnamandothers.)
2.Thefunctionscrucialformental,knowledge-generatingactivityarespatio-temporalprocessingof,andapplicationofconceptsto,sensoryinputs.Cognitionrequiresconceptsaswellaspercepts.
3.ThesefunctionsareformsofwhatKantcalledsynthesis.Synthesis(andtheunityinconsciousnessrequiredforsynthesis)arecentraltocognition.
Thesethreeideasarefundamentaltomostthinkingaboutcognitionnow.Kant'
smostimportantmethod,thetranscendentalmethod,isalsoattheheartofcontemporarycognitivescience.
∙Tostudythemind,infertheconditionsnecessaryforexperience.Argumentshavingthisstructurearecalledtranscendentalarguments.
Translatedintocontemporaryterms,thecoreofthismethodisinferencetothebestexplanation,themethodofpostulatingunobservablementalmechanismsinordertoexplainobservedbehaviour.
Tobesure,Kantthoughtthathecouldgetmoreoutofhistranscendentalargumentsthanjust‘bestexplanations’.Hethoughtthathecouldget
apriori
(experienceindependent)knowledgeoutofthem.Kanthadatripartitedoctrineofthe
apriori.
Heheldthatsomefeaturesofthemindanditsknowledgehad
origins,i.e.,mustbeinthemindpriortoexperience(becauseusingthemisnecessarytohaveexperience).Thatmindandknowledgehavethesefeaturesare
truths,i.e.,necessaryanduniversal(B3/4)[1].Andwecancometoknowthesetruths,orthattheyare
atanyrate,onlybyusing
methods,i.e.,wecannotlearnthesethingsfromexperience(B3)(Brook1993).Kantthoughtthattranscendentalargumentswere
oryieldedthe
inallthreeways.Nonetheless,attheheartofthismethodisinferencetothebestexplanation.Whenintrospectionfelloutoffavourabout100yearsago,thealternativeapproachadoptedwasexactlythisapproach.ItsnonempiricalrootsinKantnotwithstanding,itisnowthemajormethodusedbyexperimentalcognitivescientists.
OtherthingsequallycentraltoKant'
sapproachtothemindhavenotbeentakenupbycognitivescience,aswewillseeneartheend,akeypartofhisdoctrineofsynthesisandmostofwhathehadtosayaboutconsciousnessofselfinparticular.Farfromhismodelhavingbeensupersededbycognitivescience,someimportantthingshavenotevenbeenassimilatedbyit.
2.Kant'
ThemajorworkssofarasKant'
sviewsonthemindareconcernedarethemonumental
CritiqueofPureReason(CPR)
andhislittle,lateAnthropologyfromaPragmaticPointofView,firstpublishedin1798onlysixyearsbeforehisdeath.Sincethe
Anthropology
wasworkedupfromnotesforpopularlectures,itisoftensuperficialcomparedto
CPR.
Kant'
sviewofthemindarosefromhis
generalphilosophicalproject
in
CPR
thefollowingway.Kantaimedamongotherthingsto,
∙Justifyourconvictionthatphysics,likemathematics,isabodyofnecessaryanduniversaltruth.
∙Insulatereligion,includingbeliefinimmortality,andfreewillfromthecorrosiveeffectsofthisverysamescience.
Kantacceptedwithoutreservationthat“God,freedomandimmortality”(1781/7,Bxxx)existbutfearedthat,ifsciencewererelevanttotheirexistenceatall,itwouldprovidereasonstodoubtthattheyexist.Ashesawitandveryfortunately,sciencecannottouchthesequestions.“Ihavefounditnecessarytodeny
knowledge,…inordertomakeroomfor
faith.”
(Bxxx,hisitalics).
Layingthefoundationforpursuitofthefirstaim,whichashesawitwasnolessthantheaimofshowingwhyphysicsisascience,waswhatledKanttohisviewsabouthowthemindworks.Heapproachedthegroundingofphysicsbyasking:
Whatarethenecessaryconditionsofexperience(A96)?
Putsimply,heheldthatforourexperience,andthereforeourminds,tobeastheyare,thewaythatourexperienceistiedtogethermustreflectthewaythatphysicssaysthatobjectsintheworldmustbetiedtogether.Seeingthisconnectionalsotellsusalotaboutwhatourmindsmustbelike.
Hispursuitofthesecondaim,andspecificallyhis
critiqueofsomeargumentsofhispredecessors
thatentailedthatwecanknowmoreaboutthemind'
sconsciousnessofitselfthanKantcouldalso,ledhimtosomeextraordinarilypenetratingideasaboutourconsciousnessofourselves.
In
CPR,
Kantdiscussedthemindonlyinconnectionwithhismainprojects,neverinitsownright,sohistreatmentisremarkablyscatteredandsketchy.Asheputit,“Enquiry…[into]thepureunderstandingitself,itspossibilityandthecognitivefacultiesuponwhichitrests…isofgreatimportanceformychiefpurpose,…[but]doesnotformanessentialpartofit”(Axvii).Indeed,Kantoffersnosustained,focusseddiscussionofthemindanywhereinhisworkexceptthepopular
Anthropology,
which,aswejustsaid,isquitesuperficial.
Inaddition,thetwochaptersof
inwhichmostofKant'
sremarksonthemindoccur,thechapterontheTranscendentalDeduction(TD)andthechapteronwhathecalledParalogisms(faultyargumentsaboutthemindmountedbyhispredecessors)werethetwochaptersthatgavehimthegreatestdifficulty.(Theycontainsomeofthemostimpenetrableproseeverwritten.)Kantcompletelyrewrotethemainbodyofbothchaptersforthesecondedition(thoughnottheintroductions,interestingly).
Inthetwoeditionsof
therearesevenmaindiscussionsofthemind.ThefirstisintheTranscendentalAesthetic,thesecondisinwhatisusuallycalledtheMetaphysicalDeduction(forthisterm,seebelow).Thentherearetwodiscussionsofitinthefirst-editionTD,inparts1to3ofSection2(A98uptoA110)andinthewholeofSection3(A115-A127)[2]
andtwomoreinthesecond-editionTD,fromB129toB140andfromB153toB159,thelatterseeminglyaddedasakindofsupplement.TheseventhandlastisfoundinthefirsteditionversionofKant'
satt