wellbeing英语资料Word下载.docx

wellbeing英语资料Word下载.docx

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o4.3ObjectiveListTheories

∙5.Well-beingandMorality

o5.1Welfarism

o5.2Well-beingandVirtue

∙Bibliography

∙OtherInternetResources

∙RelatedEntries

1.TheConcept

Popularuseoftheterm‘well-being’usuallyrelatestohealth.Adoctor'

ssurgerymayruna‘Women'

sWell-beingClinic’,forexample.Philosophicaluseisbroader,butrelated,andamountstothenotionofhowwellaperson'

slifeisgoingforthatperson.Aperson'

swell-beingiswhatis‘goodfor’them.Health,then,mightbesaidtobeaconstituentofmywell-being,butitisnotplausiblytakentobeallthatmattersformywell-being.Onecorrelatetermworthnotinghereis‘self-interest’:

myself-interestiswhatisintheinterestofmyself,andnotothers.

Thephilosophicaluseofthetermalsotendstoencompassthe‘negative’aspectsofhowaperson'

slifegoesforthem.Sowemayspeakofthewell-beingofsomeonewhois,andwillremainin,themostterribleagony:

theirwell-beingisnegative,andsuchthattheirlifeisworseforthemthannolifeatall.Thesameistrueofcloselyalliedterms,suchas‘welfare’,whichcovershowapersonisfaringasawhole,whetherwellorbadly,or‘happiness’,whichcanbeunderstood—asitwasbytheclassicalutilitariansfromJeremyBenthamonwards,forexample—tobethebalancebetweengoodandbadthingsinaperson'

slife.Butnotethatphilosophersalsousesuchtermsinthemorestandard‘positive’way,speakingof‘ill-being’,‘ill-faring’,or,ofcourse,‘unhappiness’tocapturethenegativeaspectsofindividuals'

lives.

‘Happiness’isoftenused,inordinarylife,torefertoashort-livedstateofaperson,frequentlyafeelingofcontentment:

‘Youlookhappytoday’;

‘I'

mveryhappyforyou’.Philosophically,itsscopeismoreoftenwider,encompassingawholelife.Andinphilosophyitispossibletospeakofthehappinessofaperson'

slife,oroftheirhappylife,evenifthatpersonwasinfactusuallyprettymiserable.Thepointisthatsomegoodthingsintheirlifemadeitahappyone,eventhoughtheylackedcontentment.Butthisusageisuncommon,andmaycauseconfusion.

Overthelastfewdecades,so-called'

positivepsychology'

hashugelyincreasedtheattentionpaidbypsychologistsandotherscientiststothenotionof'

happiness'

.Suchhappinessisusuallyunderstoodintermsofcontentmentor'

life-satisfaction'

andismeasuredbymeanssuchasself-reportsordailyquestionnaires.Ispositivepsychologyaboutwell-being?

Asyet,conceptualdistinctionsarenotsufficientlyclearwithinthediscipline.Butitisprobablyfairtosaythatmanyofthoseinvolved,asresearchersorassubjects,areassumingthatone'

slifegoeswelltotheextentthatoneiscontentedwithit—thatis,thatsomekindofhedonisticaccountofwell-beingiscorrect.

Whendiscussingthenotionofwhatmakeslifegoodfortheindividuallivingthatlife,itispreferabletousetheterm‘well-being’insteadof‘happiness’.Forwewantatleasttoallowconceptualspaceforthepossibilitythat,forexample,thelifeofaplantmaybe‘goodfor’thatplant.Andspeakingofthehappinessofaplantwouldbestretchinglanguagetoofar.（Analternativeheremightbe‘flourishing’,thoughthismightbetakentobiastheanalysisofhumanwell-beinginthedirectionofsomekindofnaturalteleology.）Inthatrespect,theGreekwordcommonlytranslated‘happiness’（eudaimonia）mightbethoughttobesuperior.But,infact,eudaimoniaseemstohavebeenrestrictednotonlytoconsciousbeings,buttohumanbeings:

non-humananimalscannotbeeudaimon.Thisisbecauseeudaimoniasuggeststhatthegods,orfortune,havefavouredone,andtheideathatthegodscouldcareaboutnon-humanswouldnothaveoccurredtomostGreeks.

Itisoccasionallyclaimedthatcertainancientethicaltheories,suchasAristotle'

s,resultinthecollapseoftheverynotionofwell-being.OnAristotle'

sview,ifyouaremyfriend,thenmywell-beingiscloselyboundupwithyours.Itmightbetempting,then,tosaythat‘your’well-beingis‘part’ofmine,inwhichcasethedistinctionbetweenwhatisgoodformeandwhatisgoodforothershasbrokendown.Butthistemptationshouldberesisted.Yourwell-beingconcernshowwellyourlifegoesforyou,andwecanallowthatmywell-beingdependsonyourswithoutintroducingtheconfusingnotionthatmywell-beingisconstitutedbyyours.TherearesignsinAristotelianthoughtofanexpansionofthesubjectorownerofwell-being.Afriendis‘anotherself’,sothatwhatbenefitsmyfriendbenefitsme.Butthisshouldbetakeneitherasametaphoricalexpressionofthedependenceclaim,orasanidentityclaimwhichdoesnotthreatenthenotionofwell-being:

ifyoureallyarethesamepersonasIam,thenofcoursewhatisgoodforyouwillbewhatisgoodforme,sincethereisnolongeranymetaphysicallysignificantdistinctionbetweenyouandme.

Well-beingisakindofvalue,sometimescalled‘prudentialvalue’,tobedistinguishedfrom,forexample,aestheticvalueormoralvalue.Whatmarksitoutisthenotionof‘goodfor’.TheserenityofaVermeerpainting,forexample,isakindofgoodness,butitisnot‘goodfor’thepainting.Itmaybegoodforustocontemplatesuchserenity,butcontemplatingserenityisnotthesameastheserenityitself.Likewise,mygivingmoneytoadevelopmentcharitymayhavemoralvalue,thatis,bemorallygood.Andtheeffectsofmydonationmaybegoodforothers.Butitremainsanopenquestionwhethermybeingmorallygoodisgoodforme;

and,ifitis,itsbeinggoodformeisstillconceptuallydistinctfromitsbeingmorallygood.

2.Moore'

sChallenge

Thereissomethingmysteriousaboutthenotionof‘goodfor’.Considerapossibleworldthatcontainsonlyasingleitem:

astunningVermeerpainting.Leaveasideanydoubtsyoumighthaveaboutwhetherpaintingscanbegoodinaworldwithoutviewers,andacceptforthesakeofargumentthatthispaintinghasaestheticvalueinthatworld.Nowitseemsintuitivelyplausibletoclaimthatthevalueofthisworldisconstitutedsolelybytheaestheticvalueofthepainting.Butnowconsideraworldwhichcontainsoneindividuallivingalifethatisgoodforthem.Howaretodescribetherelationshipbetweenthevalueofthisworld,andthevalueofthelifelivedinitfortheindividual?

Arewetosaythattheworldhasavalueatall?

Howcanit,iftheonlyvalueitcontainsis‘goodfor’asopposedtojust‘good’?

Andyetwesurelydowanttosaythatthisworldisbetter（‘moregood’）thansomeotheremptyworld.Well,shouldwesaythattheworldisgood,andissobecauseofthegooditcontains‘for’theindividual?

Thisfailstocapturetheideathatthereisinfactnothingofvalueinthisworldthanwhatisgoodfortheindividual.

ThoughtssuchastheseledG.E.Mooretoobjecttotheveryideaof‘goodfor’（Moore1903,pp.98-9）.Moorearguedthattheideaof‘myowngood’,whichhesawasequivalenttowhatis‘goodforme’,makesnosense.WhenIspeakof,say,pleasureaswhatisgoodforme,heclaimed,IcanmeanonlyeitherthatthepleasureIgetisgood,orthatmygettingitisgood.Nothingisaddedbysayingthatthepleasureconstitutesmygood,orisgoodforme.

ButthedistinctionsIdrewbetweendifferentcategoriesofvalueaboveshowthatMoore'

sanalysisofmyclaimthatmyowngoodconsistsinpleasure,istoonarrow.IndeedMoore'

sargumentrestsontheveryassumptionthatitseekstoprove:

thatonlythenotionof‘good’isnecessarytomakealltheevaluativejudgementswemightwishtomake.TheclaimthatitisgoodthatIgetpleasureis,logicallyspeaking,equivalenttotheclaimthattheworldcontainingthesingleVermeerisgood.Itis,sotospeak,‘impersonal’,andleavesoutofaccountthespecialfeatureofthevalueofwell-being:

thatitisgoodforindividuals.

Indeed,onewaytorespondbothtoMoore'

schallenge,andtothepuzzlesabove,istotry,whenappropriate,todowithoutthenotionof‘good’andmakedowith‘goodfor’,alongsidetheseparateandnon-evaluativenotionofreasonsforaction.Thus,theworldcontainingthesingleindividualwithalifeworthliving,mightbesaidtocontainnothinggoodperse,butalifethatisgoodforthatindividual.Andthisfactmaygiveusareasontobringaboutsuchaworld,giventheopportunity.

3.Scanlon'

Moore'

sbookwaspublishedinCambridge,England,atthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury.Attheendofthesamecentury,abookwaspublishedinCambridge,Mass.,whichalsoposedsomeseriouschallengestothenotionofwell-being:

WhatDoWeOwetoEachOther?

byT.M.Scanlon.

sultimateaimincriticizingtheideaof‘goodnessfor’wastoattackegoism.Likewise,Scanlonhasanulteriormotiveinobjectingtothenotionofwell-being—toattackso-called‘teleological’orend-basedtheoriesofethics,inparticular,utilitarianism,whichinitsstandardformrequiresustomaximizewell-being.Bu