耶鲁大学公开课 博弈论 原文讲稿仔细整理注释 第3讲.docx
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耶鲁大学公开课博弈论原文讲稿仔细整理注释第3讲
ECON-159:
GAMETHEORY
Lecture3-IterativeDeletionandtheMedian-VoterTheorem[September12,2007]
Chapter1.IterativeDeletionofDominatedStrategies:
TheMedianVoterTheorem[00:
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ProfessorBenPolak:
Lasttimewetalkedalotabouttheidea--Ididn'tmentionthenamebuthere'ssomejargonforyou--wetalkedabouttheideaofdeletingdominatedstrategies:
lookingatagame;figuringoutwhichstrategiesaredominated;deletingthem;lookingatthegameagain;lookingatwhichstrategiesarenowdominated;deletingthose;andsoonandsoforth.Thisprocessiscalledthe"iterativedeletionofdominatedstrategies."ThisisnotagreattitleforBarry'sbook.Youneedtodobetterthanthattogetthetwohundredandfiftydollars.Thisisaboringtitle,butnevermind.
IterativeDeletionofDominatedStrategies.Theideais--Itembodiestheideaofputtingyourselfinsomeoneelse'sshoesandtryingtofigureoutwhatthey'regoingtodo,andthenthinkaboutthemputtingthemselvesinyourshoes,figuringoutwhatyou'regoingtodo,andsoonandsoforth.Lasttime,wesawalready,thatthisisaverypowerfulidea,inthatgamelasttime.Butwealsosawit'sadangerousideatotaketooliterally:
thatsometimesthiscangetyoutoover-thinktheproblemandactually,asinthatnumbersgamelasttime,thebestchoice,thewinningchoice,mightnotinvolvesomanyrounds.
Wealsosawinthatnumbersgamelasttimethatinsomegames,butbynomeansallgames,insomegamesthisprocessactuallyconvergestoasinglechoice.Inthatnumbersgameitconvergedto1.Soonceagainwhatthisideais--thisideais--youyourselfshouldnotplayadominatedstrategy.Deletethose.Deletethoseforeveryoneelse,becauseeveryoneelseisnotgoingtoplayadominatedstrategy.Deletethose.Lookatthegamewithallthosedominatedstrategiesdeleted.Seeifthereareanystrategiesthatarenowdominated.Deletethose.Lookagain,etc.,etc.Icouldwritethatallup.Wesawitinpracticelasttime.It'sprobablyjusteasiertohavetheideathere.
Onetipaboutthis,trytoidentifyallthedominatedstrategiesofallplayersbeforeyoudelete,thendelete.Thenlookagain.Trytoidentifyallthedominatedstrategiesofallplayersagain,andthendelete.Thatprocesswillpreventyoufromgettingintotrouble.Sotoday,Iwanttobealittlebitlessabstract,ifyoulike,andIwanttolookatanapplication.Iwanttolookatafamousapplicationfrompolitics.
Sowe'regoingtolookatamodelofpolitics.Theideaisgoingtobethis.We'regoingtoimaginethattherearetwocandidates,andwhatthesecandidatesaredoingisthey'rechoosingtheirpoliticalpositionsforanelection.
Sothesearetheplayers,andthestrategiesaregoingtobe-they'regoingtochoosepositionsonaspectrum,onapoliticalspectrum.Tomakelifeeasy,we'regoingtoassumethatthispoliticalspectrumhastenpositions.Soherearethepositions.We'llcallthem1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,and10.Verydifficult.What'stheideahere?
Wehaven'tfinisheddescribingthegame.What'stheidea?
Theideaisthatthesepositionsareleftwingpositionsandthesepositionsarerightwingpositions.(Canpeoplenotseepastthepodium?
Let'sgetitoutoftheway.)
Soyoucouldthinkoftheseextremeleftwingpositions.Thesearepeoplewho,Iguess,theydon'teatanythingexceptforfruitandtheythinkthattreesshouldhavethevote.Theseguysouthere,thesearetheextremerightwingpositions.Sotheythinkthepoorshouldn'thavethevoteandtheyeatimmigrants.I'manimmigrant:
betterbecareful.Thecandidatesherearegoingtotryandchoosepositions.We'regoingtoassume--thisisnotrealistic--we'regoingtoassumefornowthatthereare10%ofthevotersateachofthesepositions.Sothere's10%ofthevotersateachposition.Sotheyareuniformlydistributed.
We'regoingtoassumethatvoterswilleventuallyvotefortheclosestcandidate.Sovotersvotefortheclosestcandidate:
thecandidatewhosepositionisclosesttotheirown.Andwe'llneedatiebreakingassumptionandwe'lldotheobvioustiebreak.Ifthere'satiethenthevoterssplit.Thevotersofthatpositionsplitevenly.Ifthere'satie,halfthevotersatthatpositiongoforoneofthecandidatesandhalfofthemgofortheother.Sohere'sagame,I'vegottheplayers,that'sthecandidates.I'vegotthestrategies,that'sthepoliticalpositions.WhatamImissing?
I'mmissingpayoffs,right?
I'mmissingpayoffs.Itmattersinthisgamealothowwespecifythepayoffsbutwe'regoingtoassumethatthepayoffsarethatthecandidatesaimtomaximizetheirshareofthevote.
Butthat'snottheonlythingwecouldhaveassumed.Wecouldhaveassumedthatalltheyreallycareaboutiswinningandthatwinninggavethemahighpayoffandthatlosinggavethemnothing.I'mgoingtoassumealittlebitmoreandI'mgoingtoassumethat--Ihaven'tspelledmaximizedright,maxwilldo--theywanttomaxtheirshareofthevote.Thereasonthisisn'taterribleassumptionisyoucouldthinkthatgettingahighershareofthevotegivesyouamandate.Or,ifthisisaprimaryelection,alargershareofthevotegivesyouabiggerpushforthenextprimaryorwhatever.Sowe'llassumethatthey'retryingtomaximizetheirshareofthevote.
Sowewanttoknowwhat'sgoingtohappeninthisgame.Itseemslikeaprettynatural,prettyimportantgame.Okay,sogivenwhatwe'velearnedsofarintheclass,anaturalfirstquestiontoaskis:
areanyofthestrategieshere?
Therearetenstrategies1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,areanyofthestrategiesdominated?
Areanystrategiesdominated?
Let'sgetsome--Letmegetmymicrophonesupandreadyalittlebit.Soanystrategiesdominated?
Howaboutthisgentlemaninblue?
Sostandupandshout,yeah.
Student:
Okay,1and10arebothdominated.
ProfessorBenPolak:
Sothisgentlemanwhosenameis?
Student:
Steven.
ProfessorBenPolak:
Stevensays1and10.We'llcomebackto10.You'reright.We'llcomebackto10.Sohesaysthatposition1,strategy1,choosingthemostextremeleftwingpositionisadominatedstrategy.Whatdominatesitbytheway?
Steven,youwanttoshoutitout?
Student:
2.
ProfessorBenPolak:
2.Soforexample--Soourconjecturehereisthat2dominates1.That'stheclaim.Let'sjustbecarefulhere,whatdoesitmeantosaythat2dominates1?
Itmeansthatchoosingposition2alwaysgivesmeahighershareofthevotethanchoosingposition1,nomatterwheretheothercandidatepositionsherself.Itdoesnotmean2beats1.
Solet'stakeSteven'sconjectureandseeifit'strue.So,inparticular,let'sstartworkingoutwhatshareofthevotesyou'dgetifyouchoseposition1orposition2,againstdifferentpositionstheotherguycanchoose.So,forexample,whatwe'regoingtodoiswe'regoingtotestdoes2dominate1?
Whilewe'redoingthiswe'llfigureouthowthesepayoffsworkaswell.Well,howaboutversus1.Sosupposetheothercandidatehaschosenposition1.Sotheothercandidatehaschosenposition1.Thenwe'regoingtocomparemypayofffromchoosing1againsttheothercandidate'spayofffromchoosing1.We'regoingtocomparethiswithmypayofffromchoosing2againsttheothercandidatechoosing1.
Let'sfigureoutwhatthatis.Sowhat'smy--somebodycanshoutthisout--what'smyshareofthevoteifIchoose1andtheothercandidatechooses1?
50%.Thatwasprettyeasy,right?
Itmustbeatieforeverybody,soI'llget50%ofthevote.What'smyshareofthevoteifIchoose2andtheothercandidatechooses1?
90%.Hewillgetorshewillgetallthevotersat1.I'llgeteveryoneelse.SoIget90%.Sointhiscasechoosing2isbetterthanchoosing1.Butofcoursewe'renotdoneyet.Wehavetoconsiderotherpossiblepositionsofmyopponent.
Sosupposemyopponentchooses2.Sonowwe'recomparingmychoosing1,whenmyopponentchooses2,andthepayoffIwouldgetifIchoose2whenmyopponentchooses2.Sowhat'smypayoffifIchoose1andmyopponentchooses2?
Igetallthevotersrightontopofmeatposition1andshegetseveryoneelse,isthatright?
SoIget10%.Andwhataboutifwebothchoose2?
50%,everybodyhappywiththat?
So50%inthiscase,andonceagain,2didbetterthan1.Everyonehappywiththat?
Soweshowedthischoicewasbetterandthischoicewasbetter,andwe'regoingtokeepongoing.
Against3:
sonowwe'recomparingmychoosing1versus3andmychoosing2versus3.IfIchoose1against3,whatshareofthevotedoIget?
I'mgoingtogetallthepeopleatposition1andhalfthepeopleatposition2foratotalof15.AndifIchose2against3,whatdoIget?
Iget20,Igetallthepeopleat1andIgetallthepeople2,soIget20%,sowe'reokayagain.Let'sdoonemorejusttoseeapatternhere.SoifIchoose1against4,andcomparingmychoosing2against4.IntheformercaseifIchoose1against4,howmanyvotesdoIget?
Igetallthepeopleat1,andallthepeopleat2,soIget20%ofthevotes,shegetseveryoneelse.AndhereifIchoose2against4,Igetallthepeopleat1,allthepeopleat2,andwhat?
Halfthepeopleat3,sothatcomesoutas25%andonceagainandsoon.
Now,Icouldgoonrightthewaythroughhere,butI'mgoingtostopbecauseitgetstobeabitboringafterawhile.I'mguessingyoucanseeapatternemerginghere.What'sthepatternhere?
What'sthepatternhere?
Somebody?
Where'sthat?
Somebodyraisetheirhandsowecangetamikeoutthere.Canwegetamikeonthisguyinwhite?
Standup,standup,yep,standupandshout.
Student:
2isalwaysbetterthan1.
ProfessorBenPolak:
2isalwaysbetterthan1,butwecanseemorethanthatinthepattern.That'sright