16基辛格.docx

16基辛格.docx

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16基辛格

16.Kissinger

亨利·基辛格（HenryKissinger,1923-），美国著名国际政治学家、外交家和国务活动家。

生于德国，因纳粹迫害而移民美国，第二次世界大战结束后进入哈佛大学，1954年获哲学博士学位，后执教于哈佛大学，同时兼任美国半官方的对外关系委员会研究部主任和美国国务院、国防部、军备控制与裁军署、国家安全委员会顾问。

1969-1977年相继任总统国家安全事务助理和国务卿。

基辛格于1957年出版了两本立身之作《重建的世界：

梅特涅、卡斯尔雷与和平问题（1812-1822）》（AWorldRestored:

Metternich,CastlereaghandtheProblemsofPeace,1812-1822）和《核武器与对外政策》（NuclearWeaponandForeignPolicy）。

前者研究了19世纪初期欧洲政治家和外交家重建均势和国际体系的各种谋划与努力，基辛格在其中不仅考察了国际政治结构与外交政策的关系，而且分析了意识形态在国际关系中的作用；他提出，以秘密谈判和军事实力为基础的外交政策，其目标不仅仅是和平，而应当是一个更为宏大的和平结构，和平只能是稳定的国际秩序的副产品。

后者是对艾森豪威尔政府大规模报复战略进行反思的产物，它基本否定了以核大战为最终目标的大规模报复战略，提出了有限核战争的概念。

基辛格由此成为知名的军事战略家和外交政策权威。

基辛格入阁后，以均势思想和有限核战争理论为指导，在美苏中三大国中纵横捭阖，结束越南战争，推动中东和平进程，并于1973年获诺贝尔和平奖。

基辛格退出政坛后仍从事国际关系和外交政策研究，并于1994年出版了新作《大外交》（Diplomacy）。

该书以均势外交为主线，回顾了500年来的重大国际事件，深刻剖析了叱咤于国际舞台的外交家思想轨迹及其作为，这也是作者心路历程的写照。

本篇选自《大外交》，体现了基辛格一贯的外交思想，认为未来的世界秩序应建立在均势的基础之上。

TheNewWorldOrder

Almostasifaccordingtosomenaturallaw,ineverycenturythereseemstoemergeacountrywithpower,thewill,andtheintellectualandmoralimpetustoshapetheentireinternationalsysteminaccordancewithitsownvalues.Intheseventeenthcentury,FranceunderCardinalRichelieu1introducedthemodernapproachtointernationalrelations,basedonthenation-stateandmotivatedbynationalinterestasitsultimatepurpose.Intheeighteenthcentury,GreatBritainelaboratedtheconceptofthebalanceofpower,whichdominatedEuropeandiplomacyforthenext200years.Inthenineteenthcentury,Metternich’s2AustriareconstructedtheConcertofEuropeandBismarck’sGermanydismantledit,reshapingEuropeandiplomacyintoacold-bloodedgameofpowerpolitics.

Inthetwentiethcentury,nocountryhasinfluencedinternationalrelationsasdecisivelyandatthesametimeasambivalentlyastheUnitedStates.Nosocietyhasmorefirmlyinsistedontheinadmissibilityofinterventioninthedomesticaffairsofotherstates,ormorepassionatelyassertedthatitsownvalueswereuniversallyapplicable.Nonationhasbeenmorepragmaticintheday-to-dayconductofitsdiplomacy,ormoreideologicalinthepursuitofitshistoricmoralconvictions.Nocountryhasbeenmorereluctanttoengageitselfabroadevenwhileundertakingalliancesandcommitmentsofunprecedentedreachandscope.

ThesingularitiesthatAmericahasascribedtoitselfthroughoutitshistoryhaveproducedtwocontradictoryattitudestowardforeignpolicy.ThefirstisthatAmericaservesitsvaluesbestbyperfectingdemocracyathome,therebyactingasabeaconfortherestofthemankind;thesecond,thatAmerica’svaluesimposeonitanobligationtocrusadeforthemaroundtheworld.Tornbetweennostalgiaforapristinepastandyearningforaperfectfuture,Americanthoughthasoscillatedbetweenisolationismandcommitment,though,sincetheendoftheSecondWorldWar,therealitiesofinterdependencehavepredominated.

Bothschoolsofthought—ofAmericaasbeaconandofAmericaascrusader—envisionasnormalaglobalinternationalorderbasedondemocracy,freecommerce,andinternationallaw.Sincenosuchsystemhaseverexisted,itsevocationoftenappearstoothersocietiesasutopian,ifnotnaive.Still,foreignskepticismneverdimmedtheidealismofWoodrowWilson,FranklinRoosevelt3,orRonaldReagan4,orindeedofallothertwentieth-centuryAmericanpresidents.Ifanything,ithasspurredAmerica’sfaiththathistorycanbeovercomeandthatiftheworldtrulywantspeace,itneedstoapplyAmerica’smoralprescriptions.

BothschoolsofthoughtwereproductsoftheAmericanexperience.Thoughotherrepublicshaveexisted,nonehadbeenconsciouslycreatedtovindicatetheideaofliberty.Noothercountry’spopulationhadchosentoheadforanewcontinentandtameitswildernessinthenameoffreedomandprosperityforall.Thusthetwoapproaches,theisolationistandthemissionary,socontradictoryonthesurface,reflectedacommonunderlyingfaith:

thattheUnitedStatespossessedtheworld’sbestsystemofgovernment,andthattherestofmankindcouldattainpeaceandprosperitybyabandoningtraditionaldiplomacyandadoptingAmerica’sreverenceforinternationallawanddemocracy.

America’sjourneythroughinternationalpoliticshasbeenatriumphoffaithoverexperience.SincethetimeAmericaenteredthearenaofworldpoliticsin1917,ithasbeensopreponderantinstrengthandsoconvincedoftherightnessofitsidealsthatthiscentury’smajorinternationalagreementshavebeenembodimentsofAmericanvalues—fromtheLeagueofNationsandtheKellogg-BriandPacttotheUnitedNationsCharterandtheHelsinkiFinalAct5.ThecollapseofSovietcommunismmarkedtheintellectualvindicationofAmericanidealsand,ironically,broughtAmericafacetofacewiththekindofworldithadbeenseekingtoescapethroughoutitshistory.Intheemerginginternationalorder,nationalismhasgainedanewleaseonlife.Nationshavepursuedself-interestmorefrequentlythanhigh-mindedprinciple,andhavecompetedmorethantheyhavecooperated.Thereislittleevidencetosuggestthatthisage-oldmodeofbehaviorhaschanged,orthatitislikelytochangeinthedecadesahead.

Whatisnewabouttheemergingworldorderisthat,forthefirsttime,theUnitedStatescanneitherwithdrawfromtheworldnordominateit.Americacannotchangethewayithasperceiveditsrolethroughoutitshistory,norshoulditwantto.WhenAmericaenteredtheinternationalarena,itwasyoungandrobustandhadthepowertomaketheworldconformtoitsvisionofinternationalrelations.BytheendoftheSecondWorldWarin1945,theUnitedStateswassopowerfulthatitseemedasifitwasdestinedtoshapetheworldaccordingtoitspreferences.

JohnF.Kennedy6declaredconfidentlyin1961thatAmericawasstrongenoughto“payanyprice,bearanyburden”toensurethesuccessofliberty.Threedecadeslater,theUnitedStatesisinlessofapositiontoinsistontheimmediaterealizationofallitsdesires.OthercountrieshavegrownintoGreatPowerstatus.TheUnitedStatesnowfacesthechallengeofreachingitsgoalsinstages,eachofwhichisanamalgamofAmericanvaluesandgeopoliticalnecessities.Oneofthenewnecessitiesisthataworldcomprisingseveralstatesofcomparablestrengthmustbaseitsorderonsomeconceptofequilibrium—anideawithwhichtheUnitedStateshasneverfeltcomfortable.

WhenAmericanthinkingonforeignpolicyandEuropeandiplomatictraditionsencounteredeachotherattheParisPeaceConferenceof1919,thedifferencesinhistoricalexperiencebecamedramaticallyevident.TheEuropeanleaderssoughttorefurbishtheexistingsystemaccordingtofamiliarmethods;theAmericanpeacemakersbelievedthattheGreatWar7hadresultednotfromintractablegeopoliticalconflictsbutfromflawedEuropeanpractices.InhisfamousFourteenPoints,WoodrowWilsontoldtheEuropeansthat,henceforth,theinternationalsystemshouldbebasednotonthebalanceofpowerbutonethnicself-determination,thattheirsecurityshoulddependnotonmilitaryalliancesbutoncollectivesecurity,andthattheirdiplomacyshouldnolongerbeconductedsecretlybyexpertsbutonthebasisof“openagreements,openlyarrivedat”.Clearly,Wilsonhadcomenotsomuchtodiscussthetermsforendingawarorforresortingtheexistinginternationalorder,ashehadtorecastawholesystemofinternationalrelationsasithadbeenpracticedfornearlythreecenturies.

ForaslongasAmericanshavebeenreflectingonforeignpolicy,theyhaveascribedEurope’stravailstothebalance-of-powersystem.AndsincethetimeEuropefirsthadtoconcernitselfwithAmericanforeignpolicy,itsleadershavelookedaskanceatAmerica’sself-appointedmissionofglobalreform.Eachsidehasbehavedasiftheotherhadfreelychosenitsmodeofdiplomaticbehaviorandcouldhave,wereitwiserorlessbellicose,selectedsomeother,moreagreeable,method.

Infact,bothAmericanandtheEuropeanapproachestoforeignpolicyweretheproductsoftheirownuniquecircumstances.Americansinhabitedanearlyemptycontinentshieldedfrompredatorypowersbytwovastoceansandwithweakcountriesasneighbors.SinceAmericaconfrontednopowerinneedofbeingbalanced,itcouldhardlyhaveoccupieditselfwiththechallengesofequilibriumevenifitsleadershadbeenseizedbythebizarrenotionofreplicatingEuropeanconditionsamidstapeoplewhohadturnedtheirbacksonEurope.

TheanguishingdilemmasofsecuritythattormentedEuropeannationsdidnottouchAmericafornearly150years.Whentheydid,AmericatwiceparticipatedintheworldwarswhichhadbeenstartedbythenationsofEurope.Ineachinstance,bythetimeAmericagotinvolved,thebalanceofpowerhadalreadyfailedtooperate,producingthisparadox:

thatthebalanceofpower,whichmostAmericansdisdained,infactassuredAmericansecurityaslongasitfunctionedasitwasdesigned;andthatitwasitsbreakdownthatdrewAmericaintointernationalpolitics.

ThenationsofEuropedidnotchoosethebalanceofpowerasthemeansforregulatingtheirrelationsoutofinnatequarrelsomenessoranOldWorld8loveofintrigue.IftheemphasisondemocracyandinternationallawwastheproductofAmerica’suniquesenseofsecurity,Europeandiplomacyhadbeenforgedintheschoolofhardknocks.

Europewasthrownintobalance-of-powerpoliticswhenitsfirstchoice,themedievaldreamofuniversalempire,collapsedandahostofstatesofmoreorlessequalstrengtharosefromtheashesofthatancientaspiration.Whenagroupofstatessoconstitutedareobligedtodealwithoneanother,thereareonlytwopossibleoutcomes:

eitheronestatebecomessostrongthatitdominatesalltheothersandcreatesanempire,ornostateiseverquitepowerfulenoughtoachievetha