外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析论文外文翻译中英文论文对照翻译.docx

外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析论文外文翻译中英文论文对照翻译.docx

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外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析论文外文翻译中英文论文对照翻译

出处：

WorldDevelopment,2006,34（3）:

541-556

中文3087字

毕业论文（设计）外文翻译

一、外文原文

ForeigndirectinvestmentandTechnologySpillover:

A

Cross-industryAnalysisofThaiManufacturing

Foreigndirectinvestment（FDI）hasbeenwidelyrecognizedasagrowth-enhancingfactorininvestmentreceiving（host）countries.FDInotonlybringsincapitalbutalsointroducesadvancedtechnologythatcanenhancethetechnologicalcapabilityofthehostcountryfirms,therebygeneratinglong-termandsustainableeconomicgrowth.Moreimportantly,thetechnologicalbenefitisnotlimitedtolocallyaffiliatedfirmsbutcanalsospreadtonon-affiliatedones.Thelatterbenefitisusuallyreferredtoastechnologyspillover.

TheexpectationofgainingfromtechnologyspilloverpersuadesmanydevelopingcountriestooffervariousincentivesinordertoattractFDI.Howevertheresultsofempiricalresearchtotestthevalidityoftechnologyspilloverarefarfromconclusive.PositivetechnologyspilloverfromFDIhasonlybeenfoundinsomecountries.1Overall,thefindingsseemtosuggesttechnologyspilloverisnotautomatic,butdependsonbothcountryspecificfactorsandpolicyenvironment.

ForeignPresenceinThaiManufacturing

Thirdly,foreignplantsarelikelytobelocatedinahighlyprotectedindustry.TheaverageERP2ofindustrieswhoseoutputsharesofforeignplantsaregreaterthan50%is15.3%.Theexceptionintheseindustrieswouldbeelectricalmachinerywhichispresumablydominatedbylabor-intensiveassembledelectronicsandelectricalappliances.Ontheotherhand,regardingtheindustrieswheretheshareofforeignplantsislessthan50%,averageERPtendstobelowerataround10.8%.Inaddition,theoutputshareofforeignplantsislikelytobeassociatedwiththedegreeofmarketconcentration.

Involvementofforeignplantsinthemanufacturingsectorwaspredominatelyinimportsubstitutingindustriessuchastextiles,automobiles,andchemicalsuptoaboutthelate1970s（Akira,1989）.Fromthenon,itwasdirectedtomoreexport-orientedactivities.Tobeginwith,export-orientedforeignfirmsenteredlightmanufacturingindustriessuchasclothing,footwear,andtoys.Morerecently,labor-intensiveassemblyactivitiesinelectronicsandelectricalgoodsindustrieshavebeenthemainattractionforforeigninvestors（Kohpaiboon,2005）.

Suchinvolvementhascloselymirroredtheshiftinthetradepolicyregime.Thailandbeganitsfirstnationaleconomicdevelopmentplanin1961withanimportsubstitution（IS）regimetopromoteindustrialization.Tariffswerethemajorinstrumentusedtoinfluencethecountry’sdevelopmentpath.Theroleoftariffstopromotethedomesticindustryeffectivelybeganin1974withtheimpositionofanescalatingtariffstructure,wherethetariffrateascendedfromrawmaterialstofinishedproducts.Thesechangesincreasinglyfavoredtheproductionoffinishedproducts,particularlyconsumerproducts.In1975,therangeoftheeffectiverateofprotection（ERP）intheThaimanufacturingsectorwasbetween–36to350%（Akrasanee&Ajanant,1986）.In1982,thevariationwidenedfrom–25.2to1,693.4%（Chunanantathumetal.1984）.Severalindustries,suchastextiles,tyres,furniture,automobiles,andleatherproducts,hadanextremelyhighERP.TherewasalsoahighdegreeofvariationinERPacrossindustries.Thistariffstructureremainedvirtuallyunchangeduntilthelate1980s,eventhoughin1974thegovernmentannouncedachangeindevelopmentstrategytoanexportpromotion（EP）regime.

Significanttariffreductionscommencedin1988,startingwithelectricalandelectronicgoodsaswellaswiththeinputsintotheseproducts.Comprehensivepackagesoftariffreformwereimplementedin1995and1997.Itinvolvedtariffreductionandrationalization.Maximumtariffswerereducedfrom100%intheearly1990sto30%.Bytheendofthe1990s,thetariffbandswerereducedfrom39to6tariffrates（0,1,5,10,20and30%）.Thetwolowrates（0and1%）wereforrawmaterialsandthetwotoprates（20and30%）forfinishedproductswiththetwomiddleratesforintermediategoods.Inaddition,tariffrestructuringhasreceivedrenewedemphasisasanessentialpartoftheoveralleconomicreformsaimedatstrengtheningefficiencyandcompetitivenessoverthepasttwoyears.TheThaigovernmentintroducedanotherefforttolowertariffrates,commencinginJune2003（implementedinOctober2003）,followedbyafouryearperiodoftariffreductionfrom2004to2008.Therearearound900itemsinvolvedinthesecondroundoftariffreductions,coveringawiderangeofmanufacturingproducts.Thetariffreductioninthisroundismainlyonintermediateproducts,therebymaintainingtheescalatingtariffstructure.Themagnitudeoftariffreductionismoderate,withintherangeof0to

8.9%（Athukoralaetal.2004）.

Asaresult,averagetariffsdeclinedmarkedlyfrom30.2%in1990to21.3%in1995andfurtherto11%in2005.ThedispersionofERPalsonarrowedovertheperiodsacrossindustries.In2003,theERPrangereducedto-27.1to142%（Athukoralaetal.2004）.4ThechangesinthetariffstructurewouldhavesignificantlyimprovedtheincentivetoattractFDItoindustrieswhereThailandhasacomparativeadvantageininternationalproduction.

AnalyticalFramework

TechnologyspilloverfromFDIissaidtotakeplacewhenthepresenceofaforeignfirmgeneratesproductivityorefficiencybenefitsforthehostcountry’slocalnon-affiliatedfirms（Blomström&Kokko,1998）.Asmentioned,technologyspilloverfromFDIisnotautomaticbutratherconditionedonthenatureofthetradepolicyregimeacrossindustries.AtheoreticalframeworkforexaminingtheeffectofthetradepolicyregimeonthegainsfromFDIinagivenhostcountrywasfirstpresentedbyBhagwati（1973）asanextensiontohistheoryofimmiserizinggrowth.ItwasfurtherdevelopedbyBhagwati（1985,1994）;Brecher&Diaz-Alejandro（1977）;andBrecher&Findlay（1983）.Akeyhypothesisarisingfromthisliteratureisthattechnologyspillovertendstobesmaller,orpossiblyevennegative,underarestrictive,importsubstitution（IS）regimecomparedwithaliberalizing,exportpromotion（EP）regime.

ToillustratehowtechnologyspillovertakesplaceaswellashowthetradepolicyregimeacrossindustriescanalterthemagnitudeofthesespilloversassuggestedbyBhagwati（1973）,weusethetheoreticalmodeldevelopedbyWang&Blomström（1992）.Inthemodel,therearetwofirms,namelyanaffiliateofamultinationalenterprise（MNE）andalocalnon-affiliatedfirm（henceforthreferredtoasthe‘foreign’and‘local’firms,respectively）,producingdifferentiatedbutsubstitutableproductsforthehostcountrymarket.Technologyspilloverisanoutcomeofinteractionofthesetwofirms.Ontheonehand,theentryofaforeignfirmisalwaysassociatedwithsomeamountofproprietarytechnologyfromtheparentcompanysoastooffsetthepotentialdisadvantageagainstthelocalfirmpossessingsuperiorknowledgeoftheavailabilityoffactorinputs,businesspracticesand/orconsumerpreferencesinthehostcountry.Inaddition,advancedtechnologywouldhelptheforeignfirmtogainmarketshareinthehostcountry.HowevertransferringtechnologyfromMNE’sheadquartertoitsaffiliatesarecostly.Themoretheadvanceleveloftechnologytransferred,thelargerthedollarcostsassociatedwiththetransfer.Becauseofthepresenceofcostandbenefit,theforeignfirmhastodecidetheeffortofundertakingtechnologytransferredfromitsheadquartertomaximizeitsnetbenefit.Sucheffortwoulddependonthelocalfirm’sresponsetothepresenceoftheforeignfirm.Inasituationwherethelocalfirmactivelyputsintheefforttolearntheadvancedtechnologyassociatedwiththeforeignfirm,thetechnologysuperiorityofthelatterwillnotlastlong.Astheresult,itwillneedtokeepundertakingtechnologytransferactivitiesinthefollowingperiodinordertomaintaintheadvantageoreventojustsurviveinthehostcountryenvironment.Incontrast,asituationwherethelocalfirmislessresponsiveinattemptingtolearntheassociatedtechnologyprovidesrelativelylessincentivefortheforeignfirmtocontinuetoactivelyundertaketechnologytransfersfromitsparentcompany.

Ontheotherhand,thelocalfirmcanobserve,learn,andadaptsuperiortechnologyassociatedwiththeforeignfirmtoenhanceitsowntechnologicalcapability.Thisisbecausethetechnologyaccompaniedwiththeforeignfirmhascertainpublicgoodqualities,whichcannotbefullyinternalized,thusthelocalizationoftheforeignfirmcouldpotentiallygeneratepositiveexternalityintermsoftechnologicalbenefittothelocalfirm.Sincethemarketsuccessofeachfirmdependsontheleveloftechnologyitemploys,thisencouragesthelocalfirmtolearntheassociatedsuperiortechnology.Nevertheless,theeffortoflearningandadaptingtheassociatedtechnologyisassociatedwiththedollaramountofcostsothatthelocalfirmhastodecideitsefforttolearnassociatedadvancedtechnology.Similartotheforeignfirm,thelearningeffortofthelocalfirmalsodependsontheforeignfirmbehavior.

Toincorporatethe‘Bhagwatihypothesis’,themodeldiscussedaboveismodifiedbyhypothesizingthatthetradepolicyregimeinfluencesthecosteffectivenessinthelearningactivitiesofthelocalfirm.Thatis,everyefforttoenhancethetechnologicalcapabilityofthelocalfirmismorecostlyinanyindustrywherethetraderegimeismorerestrictive.ThisisbecausemuchoftheFDIflowingtoanindustrywithhightraderestrictionsoftenentersrelativelycapital-andskill-intensiveproductswhereoutputismainlysuppliedforahighlyprotected