The Unintended and Indirect Effects of Performance Measurement and Regulation on Productivity A Mult.docx

The Unintended and Indirect Effects of Performance Measurement and Regulation on Productivity A Mult.docx

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TheUnintendedandIndirectEffectsofPerformanceMeasurementandRegulationonProductivityAMult

TheUnintendedandIndirectEffectsofPerformanceMeasurementandRegulationonProductivity:

AMultidisciplinaryOverview

1.0.Introduction

TheenvironmentalimpactofproductsandpracticeshasbecomeanimportantissueofdebateandconcernoverthepastfewdecadesinUnitedKingdom（UK）.Throughacombinationofpublicpressureandgovernmentinterventionthroughlegislations,stakeholders（companies,institutions,consumersandothers）arebeingforcedtoconsidertheenvironmentalimpactoftheiractions.ThemainphilosophybehindenvironmentalpolicieshasbeenthepolluterpaysprinciplewhichwasinitiallyincorporatedbytheEUintheEECtreatyof1986andlateradoptedbyUK.Theconceptofproducerresponsibilityhasgrownoutofthisprinciple.Howevervastlydifferentinterpretationsofwhatconstitutesa‘producer’responsibilityhasledtothecurrentstatusof‘sharedresponsibility’whichdividesthecostamongvariousstakeholdersandsectorsoftheindustry.

Thepurposeofenvironmentlegislationsistopreventandreduceenvironmentalproblemscausedbyproduction,use,ordisposalofgoods.Someofthecommonfeaturesoftheselegislationsarephasingoutofcertainsubstances;producerresponsibilitiesinproduction,wastecollectionandrecoveryoftheproduct,anddutytoprovideinformationanddocumentationtothegovernmentandconsumer;governmentapprovalfortreatmentofcertainsubstances;andendoflifeclauseforcertainproducts.Thedirectimpactofthislegislativecontrolasidentifiedinliteratureincludeproductandprocessredesigntoincludeenvironmentallyfriendlymaterialsandprocesses;lifecyclemanagementforwastedisposal,recyclingandreuse;andgovernmentstructuresandmechanismstomonitorcompliance（LowandWilliams,1998;Kim,2002;Hug,2001andmanyothers）.Thesechangesinturnhavehadsomedirectconsequencesonvariousstakeholderslikeincreasedcostsandresponsibilities,andchangeinnatureandfocusofR&Dandinnovation（Kim,2002）.However,theselegislations,asincaseofotherlegislations,alsohavethepotentialtoproducesecondaryandtertiaryimpactsonvariousstakeholderswhichareeithernotclearlyvisibleortaketimetoshowtheirimpact.

SeveralstudieshighlightthesignificantimpactofregulationsonproductivityandthereportofESRC[2004]clearlypointsatenvironmentlegislationsasoneofthepossiblesourcesoftheUKproductivitygap.However,onlyfewstudieshaveattemptedtounderstandtherelationshipbetweenthesecondaryortertiaryimpactsoftheseregulations,andproductivityanditsrelatedareas.Ifonecastsanetwideenoughhoweverbydefining‘impactorconsequence’ratherbroadlyandsearchindirectaswellasdirectevidenceitispossibletoidentifysomestudiespotentiallycapableofsheddingsomelightonthiscauseandeffectrelationship.Thispaperisasystematicreviewofthesestudiesinordertoidentifysecondaryandtertiaryimpactsofenvironmentallegislationsonvariousstakeholderswithspecialsearchfor,End-of-life（EOL）legislation,withtheobjectiveofunderstandingpossiblereasonsfortheUKproductivitygap.

Alongwiththechallengeofidentifyingthenatureofthesetertiaryorsecondaryeffects,onvarioussocietalstakeholdersincludingthedecisionmakersthemselves,i.e.,thegovernment,definingtheseeffectshasbeenanotherchallenge.Thesecondaryandtertiaryeffectsareclassifiedasindirect,unintendedandunforeseenaccordingtothenatureofeffectitisseentohaveononeormorestakeholders.

2.0.Definingdirectandnotsodirect

Thereisagrowingunderstandingthatenvironmentfactorshaveanimpactonsociety（Rosenzweigetal.,2001;Griffinetal.,2001;Deudney,1999）.Therearedirectcauseandeffectrelationsbetweenenvironmentandsocietythatdonotrequiredebate.Howeveridentifyingindirectcausality,complexcausalchainsthatbringunpredictablesurprisesandthereflexnatureoftheenvironmentrequirescreativeanalysisandisamethodologicalaswellasscholarlychallenge（Hug,2001）.Asimplehumanmanagementdecisionmayleadtochangesintheenvironmentwhichinturncanimpacthumanpopulationinnewandoftenunforeseenways.Forexample,asimplegovernmentaldecisionofforestfireinIndonesiatoclearlandforagriculturecausedacloudofsmoketocovermuchofSouthAsia（Fraseretal.,2003）.Similarly,regulatoryfacilitationofintenseindustrialactivityofacertainkindinCanadaandAustralia,whichcreatedcloudsofaerosols,islinkedtodroughtsinAfricaduringthe1980s（Nowak,2002）.Theseexampleshighlightthevariouscomplexitiesintheinteractionbetweenenvironmentaldecisionsandsocietalstakeholdersasthenatureofresponsemaytakeyearstobefelt,thepopulationimpactedmaybedifferentfromthepopulationwhichisaffectedbytheenvironmentaldecisionsanddifferentstakeholderswillhavedifferentabilitytoadapttothedecision.Henceitisrequiredtomovebeyondsimplecause-and-consequencetounderstandthesenot-so-direct,secondaryortertiary,impactsofenvironmentrelateddecisions.

∙Defining‘indirect’consequence

Thedictionarydefinitionof‘indirect’refersto‘havinginterveningfactorsorpersonsorinfluences’,notleadingbyastraightlineorleadingthroughdifferentlinesbutdescendingfromacommoncause.Analyzingsocietyrelated（stakeholders）consequencesthroughthesedefinitionsonecandefineindirectconsequenceofenvironmentallegislationsasthosefactorsorinfluencesthatdirectlydescend/emergefromthedirectconsequences,andleadtochanges（movement）towardseffective/bettermanagementofenvironmentandsociety（socio-culturalaspects）.Exampleofsomeoftheindirectconsequencesofendoflifelegislationmayincludechangesinorganizationalaccountingpracticesorcreationofspecializedroleintheorganizationstructure.

∙Defining‘unintended’consequence

Thedictionarydefinitionof‘unintended’refersto“anyactivityorinfluencenotdoneormadeorperformedwithpurposeorintent”.Theconsequenceisnotpartofandhasnotbeenplannedintheactivityorinfluenceinquestion.Thenatureofthewordsuggests“unanticipatedeffectthatcouldbepositiveornegativeandwhichleadstomakingdiscoveries,byaccidentandsagacity,ofthingsnotinquestoforaneffectwhichcouldbesourceoffurtherproblems.Forexample,UnitedStateshadimposedquotasonimportsofsteelinordertoprotectsteelcompaniesandsteelworkersfromlower-pricedcompetition.Thequotasdidhelpsteelcompanies.ButtheyalsomadelessofthecheapsteelavailabletoU.S.automakers.Asaresulttheautomakershadtopaymoreforsteelthantheirforeigncompetitorsdo.Sopolicythatprotectedoneindustryfromforeigncompetitionmakesitharderforanotherindustrytocompetewithimports（Norton,2006）.Possiblecausesofunintendedconsequencesincludeworld’sinherentcomplexity（leadingtoeitherignoranceorincompleteanalysis）,contraryincentiveslikeintheexampleofUSsteelindustry,orcognitiveoremotionalbiases,i.e.,immediateinterestsofpressuregroupsorsocialvalues（Merton,1936）.

Thereforeforthereviewweidentifyunintendedconsequenceaschangethatmaynotdirectlydescendfromadirecteffect,andthatcreatessomehindranceforeffective/bettermanagementofenvironmentorsociety（socio-culturalaspects）.

∙Definitionof‘unforeseen’consequences

Unforeseenconsequenceisdefinedas“unanticipatedanddisconcertinglinesofdevelopment”（Glidden,2000）.FirsthintedatbyAdamSmith（1904）intheWealthofNations,whileheusedtheterm“invisiblehand”,itwasusedtodescribe‘unforeseen’onlyonce,inthefollowingquotation:

"..[B]ydirectingthatindustryinsuchamannerasitsproducemaybeofthegreatestvalue,heintendsonlyhisowngain,andheisinthis,asinmanyothercases,ledbyaninvisiblehandtopromoteanendwhichwasnopartofhisintention.Norisitalwaystheworse（orgood）forthesocietythatitwasnotpartofit."WithintheunderstandingfromGlidden（2000）andSmith（1904）,wecandefineitas“anysuddenorunexpecteddevelopmentthathasthepotentialofcreatingeco-socio-culturalimbalanceinthesociety”.Additionallythemagnitudeofchangewouldbelargerin‘unforeseen’than‘unintended’.

3.0.Theoreticalframeworks

3.1.Theeconomic-libertyperspectiveoreconomictheoryofregulation

Sometimesknownastheprivateinterestperspective,itbelievesthatmarketisthebestmechanismformaximisingsocialandeconomicwelfare.Ittreatspoliticalandbureaucraticmotiveswithsuspectandhighlightstheroleofinterestgroupsinregulationformation（Wilson,1980）.Itbelievesthatinademocraticsystemgovernmentswillestablishpoliciestonotonlycatertointerestsofthegeneralpublicbutalsotosatisfyinterestsofspecificpressuregroupsandeveryindustryoroccupationthathasenoughpowertoutilisethestatewilltrytogetafavourableregulationinplace（Stigler,1971）.Someofthesalientfeaturesofregulations,fromthisperspective,are:

∙Justlikeelectedofficials（forvotes）andappointedofficials（forwealth）,industryalsoworksasapressuregroupinordertoacquireregulationsfortheirbenefit.

∙Oftenregulationsgetformedkeepinginviewtheinterestgroup’sperspectiveratherthanoftheoneswhoaretoberegulated.

∙Evenifagrouphasastrongincentivetoorganiseasapressuregroupitmuststillacquireanduseinfluence.

Thevirtuesofthisperspectiveonregulationarethatitcutsawaythenaïveassumptionsthatgovernmentofficials（electedorappointed）areselfless,altruisticindi