About On the financial crisis after the US investment bank management optimization and Inspiration.docx
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AboutOnthefinancialcrisisaftertheUSinvestmentbankmanagementoptimizationandInspiration
AboutOnthefinancialcrisisaftertheU.S.investmentbankmanagementoptimizationandInspiration
Abstract:
ThefinancialcrisisexposedtheU.S.investmentbank,seriousflawsinthegovernancestructure,whichtheU.S.governmentcarriedoutmajorreformsandadjustments,includingattentiontotheinterestsofinvestors,thebankholdingdispersedownershipsteeringsystem,reformthefinancialregulatoryframework,limitedpayandexecutivecompensationreform.totheUnitedStatesasawarningtoimproveourcorporategovernancemechanism,itshouldbescientificdecision-makingenterprise,prudentmanagement,andcontrolrisk,theconceptofstrictsupervisionintothecorporategovernancemechanism,ontheotherhandthegovernmentforbusinessprovideagoodenvironmentandconditionsandonlytheinternalandexternalcorporategovernance,corporategovernanceperformancetofullplay.
Keywords:
investmentbanking,managementstructure,financialregulation.
Triggeredaglobalfinancialcrisis,theU.S.subprimemortgagecrisisisthefundamentalreasonforU.S.investmentbank’scorporategovernancemechanism.AnalysisofU.S.investmentbankgovernanceafterthecrisisofdefectsandmajorU.S.corporategovernancereforms,toimprovecorporategovernanceinChina’sinvestmentbankingmechanismhasimportantimplications.
First,theU.S.investmentbankcorporategovernancedeficiencies
Alackofsocialresponsibility.Thefinancialcrisisislargelyduetoalackofcorporatesocialresponsibilitylead,especiallybank-dominatedfinancialsectorintheUnitedStatesforupto10yearsofeconomicboom,investmentbanksgraduallylosttheiroriginalsound,conservativeandcustomer-orientedbusinessphilosophy,inpursuitofshort-termprofitsattheexpenseoftheinterestsofinvestorsandconsumersInvestmentBanklaunchedthepursuitofhighprofitsandsubprimeloans,whileloansforsaletoavoidtheriskoftheinvestmentBankloanswillbepackagedforsaletomoreinvestors,suchasopaquedesignofcomplexderivativeproducts,nottoexposeinvestorstounnecessaryrisk,buttoselltheproductasthehighestgoal,sothatthemajorityofinvestorscrisissufferedhugelossesininvestmentbanksblindfinancialinnovation,harmtheinterestsofinvestors,ignoringthesocialresponsibility,didnotfindthelackoffinancialinnovation,toexploresustainabledevelopmentmodel,forgetcorporatesocialresponsibilityandfinancialriskmanagementtechniquesandsystemsofequalimportance,thenegativeeffectsoftheaccumulationledtothecrisisoftheirownoperations,andultimatelytriggeredaglobalfinancialcrisis.Thiscorporatecultureandmoderncorporategovernancetoprotecttheinterestsofinvestorsfarawayfromtheultimategoal.
2highlydispersedownershipstructureledtoaninternalcontroloftheU.S.investmentbank,animportantfeatureofcorporategovernanceare:
ownershipstructureiswidelydispersed,highlyliquidshares,ownershipconcentrationlowerU.S.investmentbankequityistoofragmentedtoforma‘strongmanagement,weakshareholders.‘showninTable1,thetopfiveinvestmentbanksintheUnitedStates,thelargestshareholderwithmorethan5%theproportionofonlyone,thetopteninvestmentbanksinthelargestshareholderwithmorethan5%theproportionofonly3,inwhichthelargestshareholderofGoldmanSachsaccountsforonly1.72%inthishighlydecentralizedownershipstructure,thelimitedroleofindividualshareholders,theshareholdersof‘rationalapathy’and‘freeriding’theresultofmanagersmustbethelackofsupervision,sothatmanagershavetheopportunitytoinvestinhigh-riskshort-termsecuritieswhenthetreatmentcostsoutweighthebenefitscase,theshareholdersaremoreinclinedinthemarket,‘votewiththeirfeet’toindirectlyparticipateincorporategovernance,soinvestmentbank’sshareshavehigherliquidity.shareholdingspreadoveradirectresultoftheshareholdersofthecompany’scontrolanddecision-makingpowerdown,andholdingwithinthecompanyincreasedtheweakeningofthetraditionalprincipal-agentarisingfromthechecksandbalances,leadingtointernalimpairmentoftheinterestsofothershareholdersmoralhazardtoLehmanBrothers,forexample,withinthecompanyholdsabout1/3ofthestock,thepursuitofshort-termgains,managementandstafffranticallyspeculativearbitrageactivities,andevenlessconsiderationattheexpenseofothershareholders.
ChairmanandCEOofSystem3,resultingin‘internalcontrol.’Corporatedecision-makingishighlycentralizedgovernancemodeloftheU.S.investmentbanknotablefeatures.ThemajorityofU.S.investmentbank’sinternalimplementationoftheunifiedleadershipoftheboardofdirectors,withchecksandbalanceswithinthecompanyandanyofitsinternalorganization,companydecision-makingpowerishighlyconcentratedintheBoardofDirectorsTheBoardisthesupervisoryauthorityisdecision-makingbody,sothecompany’sinternalorganizationalstructureoftheinternaloversightandrestraintmechanismsexistinnameonlybecauseoftheUnitedStatesthereisnolegalrestrictiononpart-timechairmanandgeneralmanager,U.S.investmentbankshavechosenpart-timechairmanandgeneralmanagerofthesystem.authorityoversetsofindividuals,inacceleratingthecompany’sdecision-makingefficiency,negativeeffectscannotbeignored,thatiseasytoproducemanagers(CEO)oftheabuseofpower,especiallythedirectorsorexecutiveordertopursuetheirownshort-termmaximizethebenefits,whichmayseriouslydeviatefromitsduetothecompany’sdutyofloyaltyanddiligenceobligations.
4regulatoryauthorities,lackofsupervisionofinvestmentbanksinrecent30years,financialinnovationistheresultofthetradingchainbecomeslonger,morewidelydispersedrange,thetransactioniscompleted,thefinalinvestorsandborrowersamongthefirstseriousasymmetricinformation,forexample,thecrisiscausedbythehousingsub-primeproducts,fromtheinitialtothefinalmortgageCDOandotherderivativeproducts,inthemiddleaftercredit,packing,creditholdings,ratings,salesandothercomplexstage,thewholeprocessdozensofdifferentagenciesinvolvedinthedesignofasymmetricinformationproblemisveryprominent.investmentbankbonusincentivesalsogreatlycontributedtotheseniormanagementofmoralhazard-thepursuitofhighbonusesanddividends,ignoretheprudentialrequirements,blindinnovativebusinesswhileintheprocessoffinancialinnovation,financialregulationisseriouslylaggingbehind.regulatorysupervisionmodelsstillintheBaselIIcapitalandrisklevel,ignoringtheinformationasymmetryarisingfrommoralhazard,innovativeproductsofthesecomplexThehiddengreatriskthelackofstrongexternalconstraintsmeansanddepartments,andproductregulatorystandardsarenotuniform,evenafterthecrisis,regulatorsrealizedthattheirruleshavebeentotallyinappropriatetoarapidlychangingfinancialsystem.Inaddition,atoomanyagenciesintheU.S.regulatorysystem,powersoverlaptheotherhand,therearestillmanyblindspotmonitoring,forexample.asCDO(debt-backedsecurities),CDS(creditdefaultswaps)suchfinancialderivatives,intheendbytheFederalReserve,SavingsAuthority,ortheSECtomanageisnotclear,sonoonetomanage.
5improperpaysystem.IncentivepaysystemisthecoreofthesystemconstraintU.S.investmentbankgovernancemechanismsexecutivedirectorremunerationorincentiveshastwomaincharacteristics:
First,thereisnolegislativeconstraints,executivedirectoroftheCompanyLawgenerallydonotpayoronincentivestothemandatoryrules,thesecondistheextraordinarilyhighsalariesorincentivesconfigurationextremelyunreasonable,assessmentandshort-termperformance-relatedindicatorsonly,andhasnothingtodowithrisk.Thispaysystemtopromotethepursuitofquickandseeminglyeasycompany’sfinancialreturns,andeasytoover-optimisticonthemarket,thelackoflong-termthinking,nottoprotectthecompany’sprudentriskmanagement,butcannottakefullaccountoftheglobalmarket,otherstakeholders,long-terminterestsoftheUnitedStatestheformofstockoptions,incentive-basedapproachtoitsnegativeeffectscausetheCompanyshareholdersandcompanyexecutivessimplyignoredthelong-termdevelopment,andmorechasingshort-termbenefits,evenatthebreakmoralbottomline,foravarietyofshort-termprofitableinvestmentbehavior.
Second,amajorreadjustmentoftheU.S.corporategovernance
Thefinancialcrisisforinvestmentbanksexposedseriousflawsinthegovernancestructure,theU.S.governmentcarriedoutmajorreformsandadjustments.
AnemphasisontheinterestsofinvestorsintheUnitedStatestheoneofthemaincorporategovernancereformistore-emphasizeshareholdervalue,shareholdervaluethroughthereturnoftheinvestortorestoreconfidence.TheU.S.governmentproposedtwomeasures:
(1)improveaccesstoinformationdisclosurerequirements.Inprincipletoconsider,firstofalltotransparentinformationdisclosure,secondistoconductproperdisclosureofaccountinginformation,andstrivetobefairandaccurateindicationofperformance,fromthecontentuptoconsiderthedisclosureofinformationcontentexpansiontrendinthetimeofdisclosure,advocatesacombinationofregularandirregularway,bytheperiodicdisclosuresystemintoaninformationdisclosuresystem
(2)tostrengthenthesupervisionofintermediaries,strengthenaccountingoversight,andstrengtheninformationdisclosure,improvecorporategovernance,