R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf

上传人:聆听****声音 文档编号:57498 上传时间:2023-04-28 格式:PDF 页数:238 大小:33.90MB
下载 相关 举报
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第1页
第1页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第2页
第2页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第3页
第3页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第4页
第4页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第5页
第5页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第6页
第6页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第7页
第7页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第8页
第8页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第9页
第9页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第10页
第10页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第11页
第11页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第12页
第12页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第13页
第13页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第14页
第14页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第15页
第15页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第16页
第16页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第17页
第17页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第18页
第18页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第19页
第19页 / 共238页
R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf_第20页
第20页 / 共238页
亲,该文档总共238页,到这儿已超出免费预览范围,如果喜欢就下载吧!
下载资源
资源描述

R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf

《R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf(238页珍藏版)》请在冰点文库上搜索。

R. H. Coase - The Firm, the Market, and the Law.pdf

THEFIRMR.H.CoaseTheFirmtheMarketandtheLawTheFirmtheMarketandtheLawR.H.Coasew)TheUniversityofChicagoPressChicagoandLondonThelfniversit)olChicagoPress.Chicago60637IIk-IniversitjofChicagoPress,Ltd.,London1988byTheUniversit)ofChicagoAllrightsreserved.Published1988Paperbackedition1990PrimedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica1312II10090807060504910II1213LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataCoase,R.H.(RonaldHarry)Thefirm,themarket,andthelaw/R.H.Coase.Includesindex.ISBN0-226-11101-6(paper)I.Industrialorganization(Economictheory)2.Externalities(Economics)3.Capitalism.I.Title.HD2326.C61988338.5142dcl987-24193ThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsoftheAmericanNationalStandardforInformationSciencesPermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials.ANSIZ39.48-1992.ContentsPrefaceviiONETheFirm,theMarket,andtheLaw1TWOTheNatureoftheFirm33THREEIndustrialOrganization:

AProposalforResearch57FOURTheMarginalCostControversy75FIVETheProblemofSocialCost95SIXNotesontheProblemofSocialCost157SEVENTheLighthouseinEconomics187Index215DigitizedbytheInternetArchivein2011http:

/www.archive.org/details/firmmarketlawOOcoasPrefaceThepurposeofthisbookistopersuademyfelloweconomiststochangethewaytheyanalyzeanumberofimportantques-tionsinmicro-economics.Mostofthebookconsistsofreprintsofpreviouslypublishedarticles,butIhaveattemptedinanintroductoryessayandinapaperentitledNotesontheProb-lemofSocialCosttomakeclearerthecharacterofthear-gumentinthesearticlesandtorespondtosomeofthemaincriticismswhichhavebeenmadeofthem.Nochangeshavebeenmadeinthearticlesreprintedexcepttocorrectmisprintsandtoremovesomeeccentricitiesinmyspellingandgrammar.IhavetothankGaryBecker,GerhardCasper,AaronDirector,andGeorgeStigler,allofwhomreadmyintroductoryessayandNotesontheProblemofSocialCostandmadesuggestionswhichhaveresultedinmanyimprovements,al-thoughnotasmanyastheywouldhavewished.ONETheFirm,theMarket,andtheLawI.TheAimoftheBookThecoreofthisbookconsistsofthreepapers,TheNatureoftheFirm(1937),TheMarginalCostControversy(1946),andTheProblemofSocialCost(1960).Otherpaperswhichextend,illustrate,orexplaintheargumentsinthesethreepa-persarealsoincluded.Aswillbecomeapparent,theseessaysallembodyessentiallythesamepointofview.Mypointofviewhasnotingeneralcommandedassent,norhasmyargument,forthemostpart,beenunderstood.Nodoubtinadequaciesinmyexpositionhavebeenpartlyrespon-sibleforthisandIamhopefulthatthisintroductoryessay,whichdealswithsomeofthemainpointsraisedbycommen-tatorsandrestatesmyargument,willhelptomakemypositionmoreunderstandable.ButIdonotbelievethatafailureofexpositionisthemainreasonwhyeconomistshavefoundmyargumentsodifficulttoassimilate.Astheargumentinthesepapersis,Ibelieve,simple,sosimpleindeedasalmosttomaketheirpropositionsfallintothecategoryoftruthswhichcanbedeemedself-evident,theirrejectionorapparentincomprehen-sibilitywouldseemtoimplythatmosteconomistshaveadif-ferentwayoflookingateconomicproblemsanddonotsharemyconceptionofthenatureofoursubject.ThisIbelievetobetrue.AtthepresenttimethedominantviewofthenatureofeconomicsisthatexpressedinRobbinsdefinition:

Econom-icsisthesciencewhichstudieshumanbehaviourasarela-tionshipbetweenendsandscarcemeanswhichhavealternativeTheFirm,theMarket,andtheLawuses.1Thismakeseconomicsthescienceofhumanchoice.Inpractice,mosteconomists,includingRobbins.restricttheirworktoamuchnarrowersetofchoicesthanthisdefinitionwouldsuggest.Recently,however,BeckerhasarguedthatRobbinswayoflookingateconomicsneednotbesocon-strainedandthattheeconomicapproach,ashetermsit,canandshouldbeappliedmoregenerallythroughoutthesocialsciences.Thattheeconomicapproachcanbeappliedsuc-cessfullyintheothersocialsciencesisdemonstratedbyBeck-ersownwork.2Itsverysuccess,however,posesthequestion.Whyhavetheeconomiststoolsoftradeprovedtobesoversatile?

Myparticularinteresthasbeeninthatpartofeconomictheorywhichdealswithfirms,industries,andmarkets,whichusedtobecalledValueandDistributionandisnowusuallytermedpricetheoryormicro-economics.Itisanintricatestruc-tureofhighintellectualqualityandhasproducedvaluablein-sights.Economistsstudyhowthechoiceofconsumers,inde-cidingwhichgoodsandservicestopurchase,isdeterminedbytheirincomesandthepricesatwhichgoodsandservicescanbebought.Theyalsostudyhowproducersdecidewhatfactorsofproductiontouseandwhatproductsandservicestomakeandsellandinwhatquantities,giventhepricesofthefactors,thedemandforthefinalproduct,andtherelationbetweenoutputandtheamountsoffactorsemployed.Theanalysisisheldtogetherbytheassumptionthatconsumersmaximizeutil-ity(anonexistententitywhichplaysapartsimilar.Isuspect,tothatofetherintheoldphysics)andbytheassumptionthatproducershaveastheiraimtomaximizeprofitornetincome(forwhichthereisagooddealmoreevidence).Thedecisionsofconsumersandproducersarebroughtintoharmonybythetheoryofexchange.Theelaborationoftheanalysisshouldnothidefromusitsessentialcharacter:

itisananalysisofchoice.Itisthiswhichgivesthetheoryitsversatility.Beckerpointsoutthatwhat1.LionelRobbins.AnEssayontheNatureandSignificanceofEconomicScience,2nded.(London:

Macmillun&Co.,1935),16.2.SeethevariousstudiesinGaryS.Becker,TheEconomicApproachtoHumanBehaviorChicago:

Universit)ofChicagoPress.1976)TheFirm,theMarket,andtheLawmostdistinguisheseconomicsasadisciplinefromotherdis-ciplinesinthesocialsciencesisnotitssubjectmatterbutitsapproach.3Ifthetheorieswhichhavebeendevelopedineco-nomics(oratanyrateinmicro-economics)constituteforthemostpartawayofanalyzingthedeterminantsofchoice(andIthinkthisistrue),itiseasytoseethattheyshouldbeap-plicabletootherhumanchoicessuchasthosethataremadeinlaworpolitics.Inthissenseeconomistshavenosubjectmatter.Whathasbeendevelopedisanapproachdivorced(orwhichcanbedivorced)fromsubjectmatter.Indeed,sincemanisnottheonlyanimalthatchooses,itistobeexpectedthatthesameapproachcanbeappliedtotherat,cat,andoctopus,allofwhomarenodoubtengagedinmaximizingtheirutilitiesinmuchthesamewayasdoesman.Itisthereforenoaccidentthatpricetheoryhasbeenshowntobeapplicabletoanimalbehaviour.4Thispreoccupationofeconomistswiththelogicofchoice,whileitmayultimatelyrejuvenatethestudyoflaw,politicalscience,andsociology,hasnonethelesshad,inmyview,se-riousadverseeffectsoneconomicsitself.Oneresultofthisdivorceofthetheoryfromitssubjectmatterhasbeenthattheentitieswhosedecisionseconomistsareengagedinanalyzinghavenotbeenmadethesubjectofstudyandinconsequencelackanysubstance.Theconsumerisnotahumanbeingbutaconsistentsetofpreferences.Thefirmtoaneconomist,asSlaterhassaid,kkiseffectivelydefinedasacostcurveandademandcurve,andthetheoryissimplythelogicofoptimalpricingandinputcombination.5Exchangetakesplacewithoutanyspecificationofitsinstitutionalsetting.Wehaveconsumerswithouthumanity,firmswithoutorganization,andevenex-changewithoutmarkets.TherationalutilitymaximizerofeconomictheorybearsnoresemblancetothemanontheClaphambusor,indeed,to3.Ibid.,5.4.See,forexample,JohnH.Kagel.RaymondC.Battalio.HowardRachlin.andLeonardGreen,DemandCurvesforAnimalConsumers/1Quar-terlyJournalofEconomics96,no.1(Februaryis,xi):

1-14.5MartinSlater,ForewordtoEdithT.Penrose./;TheoryojtheGrowthojtheFirm,2nded.(WhitePlains,N.Y.:

M.E.Sharpe,1980).ix.TheFirm,theMarket,andtheLawanyman(orwoman)onanybus.Thereisnoreasontosupposethatmosthumanbeingsareengagedinmaximizinganythingunlessitbeunhappiness,andeventhiswithincompletesuc-cess.Knighthasexpressedthethoughtverywell:

il.theargumentofeconomists.thatmenworkandthinktogetthemselvesoutoftroubleisatleasthalfaninversionofthefacts.Thethingsweworkforareannoyersasoftenassatis-fies/wespendasmuchingenuityingettingintotroubleasingettingout,andinanycaseenoughtokeepineffectively.Amanwhohasnothingtoworryaboutimmediatelybusieshimselfincreatingsomething,getsintosomeabsorbinggame,fallsinlove,preparestoconquersomeenemy,orhuntlionsortheNorthPoleorwhatnot.6Ibelievethathumanpreferencescametobewhattheyareinthosemillionsofyearsinwhichourancestors(whetherornottheycanbeclassifiedashuman)livedinhuntingbandsandwerethosepreferenceswhich,insuchconditions,werecon-ducivetosurvival.Itmaybe,therefore,thatultimatelytheworkofsociobiologists(andtheircritics)willenableustoconstructapictureofhumannatureinsuchdetailthatwecanderivethesetofpreferenceswithwhicheconomistsstart.Andifthisresultisachieved,itwillenableustorefineouranalysisofconsumerdemandandofotherkindsofbehaviourintheeconomicsphere.Inthemeantime,however,whatevermakesmenchooseastheydo,wemustbecontentwiththeknowledgethatforgroupsofhumanbeings,inalmostallcircumstances,ahigher(relative)priceforanythingwillleadtoareductionintheamountdemanded.Thisdoesnotonlyrefertoamoneypricebuttopriceinitswidestsense.Whethermenarerationalornotindecidingtowalkacrossadangerousthoroughfaretoreachacertainrestaurant,wecanbesurethatfewerwilldosothemoredangerousitbecomes.Andweneednotdoubtthattheavailabilityofalessdangerousalternative,say,ape-destrianbridge,willnormallyreducethenumberofthosecrossingthethoroughfare,northat,aswhatisgainedbycross-ingbecomesmoreattractive,thenumberofpeoplecrossing6.FrankH.Knight,TheEthicsofCompetition,2nded.(NewYork:

Harper&Bros.1936).32.TheFirm,theMarket,andtheLawwillincrease.Thegeneralizationofsuchknowledgeconstitutespricetheory.Itdoesnotseemtometorequireustoassumethatmenarerationalutilitymaximizers.Ontheotherhand,itdoesnottelluswhypeoplechooseastheydo.Whyamanwilltakeariskofbeingkilledinordertoobtainasandwichishiddenfromuseventhoughweknowthat,iftheriskisin-creasedsufficiently,hewillforegoseekingthatpleasure.Noneoftheessaysinthisbookdealswiththecharacterofhumanpreferences,nor,asIhavesaid,doIbelievethateconomistswillbeabletomakemuchheadwayuntilagreatdealmoreworkhasbeendonebysociobiologistsandothernoneconomists.Buttheacceptancebyeconomistsofaviewofhumannaturesolackingincontentisofapiecewiththeirtreatmentofinstitutionswhicharecentraltotheirwork.Theseinstitutionsarethefirmandthemarketwhichtogethermakeuptheinstitutionalstructureoftheeconomicsystem.Inmain-streameconomictheory,thefirmandthemarketare,forthemostpart,assumedtoexistandarenotthemselvesthesubjectofinvestigation.Oneresulthasbeenthatthecrucialroleofthelawindeterminingtheactivitiescarriedoutbythefirmandinthemarkethasbeenlargelyignored.Whatdifferentiatestheess

展开阅读全文
相关资源
猜你喜欢
相关搜索

当前位置:首页 > 求职职场 > 简历

copyright@ 2008-2023 冰点文库 网站版权所有

经营许可证编号:鄂ICP备19020893号-2