美国的增值税 一种解决方案外文翻译.docx

美国的增值税 一种解决方案外文翻译.docx

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美国的增值税一种解决方案外文翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

外文出处BrookingsInstitutionandTaxPolicyCenter

外文作者WilliamG.Gale，BenjaminH.Harris

原文：

AValue-AddedTaxfortheUnitedStates:

PartoftheSolution

AdministrativeIssues

Abroad-basedVATwouldcostlesstoadministerthanthecurrentincometax.Forexample,intheUnitedKingdom,administrativecostsoftheVATwerelessthanhalfofthoseoftheincometax,measuredasashareofrevenue.Similarly,theNewZealandrevenuedepartmentwasrequiredtointerveneinjust3percentofVATreturns,comparedto25percentofincometaxreturns（GAO2008）.

TheVAThascomplianceadvantagesoveraretailsalestax,whichaimstocollectallrevenueatthepointofsalefromabusinesstoahousehold.SincerevenuecollectionfortheVATisspreadacrossstagesofproduction,withproducersreceivingacreditagainsttaxespaidasanincentiveforcompliance,theVATinpracticeislesslikelytobeevaded.

Theoryandevidencesuggestthatthecomplianceburdenwouldlikelyfallmoreheavily–asapercentageofsales–onsmallerbusinesses.MostcountriesaddresstheseconcernsbyexemptingsmallbusinessesfromcollectingtheVAT.In2007,24outofthe29OECDcountrieswithaVATexemptedbusinesseswithgrossreceiptsbeneathspecifiedthresholds,varyingfrom$2,159to$93,558（OECD2008）.

Finally,itisworthnotingthat,totheextentthatadministrativecostsarefixedwithrespecttotheVATstandardrate,thepresenceofsuchcostssuggestthattheVATshouldbesetatarelativelyhigherrateratherthanalowerone.

TheStates

SomeanalystsexpressconcernthatanationalVATwouldimpingeonstates’abilitytoadministertheirownsalestaxes.Inourview,anationalVATcouldhelpstatessignificantly.Stateretailsalestaxesarepoorlydesigned–theyexemptmanygoodsandmostservicesandcollectmorethan40percentoftheirrevenuefromtaxingbusinesspurchases,whichshouldbeexempt.

ConvertingtheirsalestaxestoVATsandpiggybackingonabroad-basedfederalVATwouldofferstatesseveraladvantages.First,thestatescouldraisesubstantialamountsofrevenueinalessdistortionarymannerthancurrentsalestaxes.Second,administrativecosts,whichcurrentlyexceed3percentofstatesalestaxrevenue（PriceWaterhouseCoopers2006）,woulddecline.Manystatescurrentlylinktheirincometaxtothefederalincometaxbase,withobviousadministrativeandcomplianceadvantages.SimilarsavingswouldaccruefromlinkingfederalandstateVATbases.Third,anationalVATwouldallowstatesandthefederalgovernmenttotaxpreviouslydifficult-to-taxtransactions,suchasinterstatemailorderandinternetsales.IftheU.S.experiencefollowedthatofCanada,thefederalgovernmentcouldcollectrevenueonbehalfofstatesandabsolvestatesofthecostofadministeringconsumptiontaxesaltogether（DuncanandSedon2010）.

In2009,stateandlocalsalestaxrevenueequaled2.0percentofGDP（authors’calculationsbasedonU.S.CensusBureau2010）.IfthefederalVAThadthebroadbaseanddemograntsdescribedinTable1,andthestatesandlocalitiespiggy-backedonthatstructure,anaveragesubnationalVATofabout6percentwouldraisethesamerevenueasexistingstateandlocalsalestaxes.Alternatively,statescouldmaintaintheirsalestaxesorcreatetheirownVATbases.FollowingtheimplementationofafederalVATinCanada,mostprovincesmaintainedtheirexistingtaxcodesforseveralyears.SomeprovinceshaveyettofullyharmonizewiththefederalVAT,whileQuebecadministersitsownVAT（DuncanandSedon2010）.

AnticipatedVATasStimulus

Whileamajortaxincreasewouldnotbeagoodideawhiletheeconomyisstillrecoveringslowlyfromrecession,itisworthnotingthatthereispotentialfortheannouncementofafutureVATtobestimulativeinthecurrentperiod.Byraisingthepriceofconsumptiongoodsinthefuture,orbydoingsograduallyovertimeviaaphased-inVAT,theannouncementwouldencouragepeopletospendmorenowandinthenearfuture,whentheeconomyneedsthestimulus.Thiseffectmaynotbeverybig–thereislittleevidence–butitgoesintherightdirection.

WilltheVATfuelexpandinggovernment?

TheVAThasbeencalleda"moneymachine"inhonorofitsabilitytoraisesubstantialamountsofrevenue.Thatisahelpfulfeatureiftherevenuesareusedtoclosedeficits,butposesaproblemiftheboostinrevenuesimplyfuelsfurtherunsustainablegrowthinfederalspending.

Someanalystsrejectanysourceofextrarevenue–includingaVAT–onthegroundsthatlessgovernmentrevenueleadstosmallergovernment.Ingeneral,this“starvethebeast”theorydoesnotapplytomosttaxes,nordoesitreflectrecentexperience.RomerandRomer（2009）,forexample,findthattaxcutsdesignedtospurlong-rungrowthdonotinfactleadtolowergovernmentspending;ifanything,theyfindthattaxcutsleadtohigherspending.ThisfindingisconsistentwithGaleandOrszag（2004b）,whoarguethattheexperienceofthelast30yearsismoreconsistentwitha"coordinatedfiscaldiscipline"view,inwhichtaxcutswerecoupledwithincreasedspending（asinthe1980sand2000s）andtaxincreaseswerecoupledwithcontemporaneousspendingreductions（asinthe1990s）.Giventhewidelyrecognizedneedforbothspendingcutsandrevenueincreasestobalancethebudget,itislikelythatanynewrevenuestreamwouldbeaccompaniedbyreductionsinspending.

SomeobserversarguethattheVATissuchanefficientandinvisibletaxthatithasbeenandwouldbeusedtofuelgovernmentspendingincreasesthroughagraduallyincreasingVATrate.Bartlett（2010a,2010b）addressesthisclaimbynotingthatincreasedVATratesinOECDcountrieswerecommonamongearlyadopters,whooperatedaVATinthehigh-inflationenvironmentsinthe1970s,butfarlesscommonamongcountriesthatadoptedaVATafter1975.Amongthe17countriesthatinstitutedaVATduringthepost-1975periodofrelativepricestability,fourhavenotchangedtheirVATrateandfourhavedecreasedtherate;theaveragerateincreaseacrossalllate-adoptersoftheVATislessthan1percentagepoint.TheaverageVATinOECDcountrieshasbeenroughlyconstantsince1984atorjustbelow18percent.

MakingtheVATtransparent

AvariantoftheconcernaboutspendinggrowthisthenotionthattheVATis"hidden"inoverallprices.Asaresult,theargumentgoes,taxpayerswon’tnoticetheVATthewaytheydoincome,sales,orpayrolltaxes,enablingCongresstoincreasetheVATratewithoutmuchtaxpayerresistance.

Thisissueiseasilyaddressed.TheVATdoesn’thavetobeinvisible:

forexample,CanadasimplyrequiresthatbusinessesprinttheamountofVATpaidonareceiptwitheveryconsumerpurchase.ThisisessentiallyidenticaltothestandardU.S.practiceofprintingsalestaxespaidoneachreceipt.

AnotherwaytomaketheVATtransparentistolinkVATratesandrevenueswithspendingonparticulargoods.Aaron（1991）andBurman（2009）proposeaVATrelatedtohealthspending.Undersuchasystem,theadditionalhealthinsurancecoveragewouldhelpoffsettheregressivityofaVATandmakethecostsofboththeVATandgovernmentspendingmoretransparent.

Inflation

Thecreationofanadd-onVATwillcreatepressureonprices.（If,instead,theVATwerereplacingasalestax,therewouldbenopressureorneedtoadjustthepricelevel.）Inourview,theFedshouldaccommodatetheone-timepriceriseinherentinthecreationofanadd-onVAT.Notdoingsowouldcreatesignificantandunnecessaryadjustmentcostsintermsoflostjobsandwages.

ButthereisnotheoreticalorempiricalreasontoexpectthattheVATwouldcausecontinuinginflation.Indeed,thepresenceofanadditionalrevenuesourcewouldreducethelikelihoodoftheFedhavingtomonetizethedebt.ResearchhasfoundonlyaweakrelationshipbetweentheVATandcontinuallyincreasingprices.Inasurveyof35countriesthatintroducedtheVAT,Tait（1991）findsthat63percentexhibitednoincreaseintheconsumerpriceindex（perhapsbecausetheywerereplacingexistingsalestaxes）and20percenthadaone-timepricerise.Intheremaining17percentofcases,theintroductionoftheVATcoincidedwithongoingaccelerationinconsumerprices,butitisnotlikely–inTait'sview–thattheVATcausedtheacceleration.

TheCanadianVAT

In1991,Canadaimplementeda7percentVATatthenationalleveltoreplaceataxonsalesbymanufacturers.ManyoftheconcernsassociatedwiththeVATintheUnitedStatescanbeassuagedbyobservingtheCanadianexperience.

Canadaaddresseddistributionalconcernsbyapplyingazeroratetocertainnecessitiesandaddingarefundabletaxcreditintheincometax.Asnotedabove,wepreferthelattermethod.TheCanadianVATiscompletelytransparent:

itislistedseparatelyonreceiptsjustlikesalestaxesintheU.S.Perhapsbecauseofthetransparency,theVAThasnotledtosignificantgrowthofgovernmentspending.FederalspendinginCanadahasinfactgraduallydeclinedfrom22.6percentofGDPin1991—whentheVATwasimplemented—to14.9percentin2009.ThestandardVATratehasdeclinedovertimeto6percentin2006and5percentin2008.FederaltaxrevenueinCanadahasfallenfrom17.6percentofGDPin1991to16.3percentofGDPin2007（andfellfurtherto14.6percentduringthe2009recession）.Intermsofbothrevenuesandexpenditures,thesizeoftheCanadianfederalgovernmenthasshrunksignificantlysincetheintroductionoftheVAT.Since1991,CanadianinflationandeconomicgrowthrateshavebeensimilartothoseintheUnitedStates.

CoordinatingprovincialsalestaxeswiththeVAThasproventobechallenging,butmanageable.AftertheVAT