多恩布什宏观经济学第十版答案Word文档格式.docx

多恩布什宏观经济学第十版答案Word文档格式.docx

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usuallyfairlyshort.on-the-jobtrainingoreducationprogramsthatprovideskillstoobtainor

maintainjobsareoftenthebeststrategyforhelpingtheseworkers.however,suchprogramsareoften

costlyanddifficulttoimplement.

1.c.unemploymentindepressedgeographicalareastendstobeoflongdurationandlowfrequencyandis

oftenconcentratedinspecificindustries（verysimilartothesituationin1.a.）.policiestorelocate

workerstodifferentgeographicalareasmaynotbesuccessfulsinceworkersareoftenreluctantto

move.thuspolicymakersgenerallypreferprogramsdesignedtoattractnewindustriestoanarea

overprogramstorelocateworkers.

1.d.teenageunemploymentisoftenofhighfrequencyandshortduration.sinceteenagerstendtohave

fewskillsandlittleornoworkexperience,programstofacilitatethetransitionintotheadultwork

forceareneeded.programsthatofferon-the-jobtrainingwillprovidethehighestlong-termbenefits.

theseprogramstendtobefairlycostly,however,whichiswhysomepoliticiansadvocatelowering

theminimumwageforteenagersinstead.

2.thenaturalunemploymentrateisdeterminedbytwofactors:

thedurationandfrequencyof

unemployment.whilethedurationofunemploymentdependsprimarilyontheorganizationand

demographicmake-upofthelaborforce,theavailabilityofunemploymentbenefits,andthedesireof

theunemployedtolookforbetterjobs,thefrequencyofunemploymentdependslargelyontherateat

whichnewworkersentertheworkforceandonthevariabilityofthedemandforlaboracross

differentemployers.

2.a.itisunclearwhethertheeliminationofunionswouldservetoreducethenaturalrateof

unemployment.theinsider-outsidertheoryofthelabormarketsuggeststhatfirmsbargainwith

unions（theinsiders）andarenotmuchconcernedwiththeunemployed（theoutsiders）.ifunionswere

eliminated,firmswouldtendtohireunemployedworkersatalowerwagerate,thusreducingthe

naturalunemploymentrate.ontheotherhand,unionstendtopreservestablejobsfortheirmembers.

eliminatingthemmayleadnotonlytoareductioninbargainingpowerforlaborinwagenegotiations

butalsotoanincreaseinthenaturalrateofunemployment.theeliminationoflaborunionscould

alsoservetoeliminatethewagedifferentialsbetweenunionizedandnon-unionizedworkersand,in

theprocess,redistributesomeincome.

2.b.increasedlaborforceparticipationofteenagerswouldatleastinitiallyincreasethenaturalrateof

unemployment,sinceteenagershaveahigherfrequencyofunemploymentthanolder,more

experiencedworkers.however,asmoreandmoreteenagersenteredthelaborforceandmoregood

andstablejobsbecameavailabletothem,thenaturalrateofunemploymentwouldstarttodecline

again.butwithmorepeopleinthelaborforce,thesupplyoflaborwouldbehigherandwagerates

wouldbedrivendown,contributingtowagestagnation.

2.c.ifaggregatedemandfluctuatedmore,thenfirmswouldofferfewerstablejobsandthefrequencyof

unemploymentwouldincrease,increasingthenaturalrate.thiswouldnotonlyleadtoalossin

outputandanincreaseinpersonalhardship,butitwouldalsoputmorefinancialstrainonthe

unemploymentinsuranceprogram.

2.d.anincreaseinunemploymentbenefitswouldmakeitlessurgentfortheunemployedtofindnewjobs.

theywouldhavetheoptionoflookinglongerforjobsafterbeinglaidoffandwouldbelesslikelyto

acceptundesirablejoboffers.asthelengthoftheirunemploymentincreased,workersmightbeginto

looklessdesirabletopotentialemployerswhomightbelievethattheylackedeitherthemotivationor

qualificationstoworkhardforthem.thereforethenaturalrateofunemploymentwouldincrease.

2.e.employerswhoperceivetheminimumwageratetobeabovethevalueofthemarginalproductof

lowskilledworkerswillnothiresuchworkers.theeliminationoftheminimumwageratemight

inducesomefirmstohiremorelow-skilledworkers,thusdecreasingthenaturalrateof

unemployment.however,thewageratethattheselowskilledworkerswereofferedmightbewell

belowtheamountthatwouldensureanadequatestandardofliving.

2.f.iffluctuationinthecompositionofaggregatedemandincreased,workerswouldhavetobeshifted

fromindustrytoindustrymoreoftenandthiswouldincreasethenaturalrateofunemployment.

however,sinceskillsarenotalwaystransferable,resourceswouldhavetobedevotedtoretraining

programs.

3.manyunemployedteenagersarenewentrantsintothelaborforceandtheirfrequencyof

unemploymentishigherthanthatofadultworkers.teenagersfrequencyofentryintoandexitfrom

thelaborforceindicatesthatfewofthemworkatjobswiththepromiseofhighjobsecurity.they

havelittleornotrainingandfewjobskillsandthustendtoholdunattractivejobs.thisperpetuates

theproblemsincethejobstheycangetdonotprovidetheskillsneededtogainbetterjobsinthe

future.

whilethefrequencyofunemploymentislowerforadultsthanteenagers,thedurationisoften

higher.therearefewerentrantsandre-entrantsintotheworkforceamongadults,whoaremostoften

unemployedduetolayoffs.overall,theunemploymentrateforadultsismuchlowerthanthe

unemploymentrateforteenagers.

4.a.employerswouldbenefitfromalowerminimumwagerate,sincetheywouldbeabletoexpand

productionbyhiringlaboratalowercost.sincethenominalminimumwageratemightnolongerbe

abovethevalueofthemarginalproductoflowskilledorinexperiencedworkers,thelaborofthese

workerswouldbemoredesirabletoemployers.thereforeteenagersandlowskilledjobseekers

wouldalsobenefit.theywouldgetjobsmoreeasilyandgainvaluableworkexperiencethatthey

otherwisemightnothavegotten.sincemorepeoplewouldbehiredandmoreoutputwouldbe

producedatalowerprice,thewholeeconomywouldbenefitfromalowerinflationrateandalower

unemploymentrate.

4.b.thoseworkerswhowouldhavebeenworkingatjobspayingtheexistingminimumwageratemight

losefromadecreaseintheminimumwage.withalowerminimumwagerateimplementedonly

duringthesummermonths,employersmightlayoffcurrentworkersandreplacethemwithnew

entrantsatalowercost.thusthenumberofdisplacedworkersmightincrease.

4.c.obviously,thosewhowouldgainfromsuchapolicymeasurewouldsupportit--teenagers,low

skilledworkers,andsomefirms.

5.itispossibletodesignarestrictivefiscalandmonetarypolicymixtobringtheeconomytoa

long-runequilibriumsituationatthenaturalrateofunemploymentandatazerorateofinflation.

however,thiscannotbeachievedwithoutanincreaseintherateofunemploymentintheshortrun.

thereforeachoicehastobemadeamongadjustmentpathsthatdifferintheir

inflation-unemploymentmix.

inconsideringadjustmentpaths,thebenefitsofpermanentlylowerinflationhavetobecompared

withthecostsofincreasedshort-termunemployment.thecostsofunemploymentarelossofoutput

ifinflationcanbeanticipatedonlyimperfectly,thenaredistributionofincome

andwealthwilltakeplace.someoutputmaybelostasresourcesaredevotedtominimizinga

potentiallossinpurchasingpowerratherthantoactualproduction.however,thecostofperfectly

anticipatedinflationisminimal.thusitprobablymakeslittledifferencewhetherwehaveazero

inflationrateoraninflationrateof3%,aslongasaspecificlong-rungoalisestablished.apositive

rateofinflationmayactuallyhelpinwageandpriceadjustments,sinceitallowsrealwagestoadjust

moreeasilytosupplyshocks.

mostpolicymakerstendtoperceivethecostofinflationaslowerthanthecostofanincreasein

unemploymentresultingfromtoughanti-inflationpolicies.however,theu.s.experienceoftheearly

1980sindicatesthattoughmeasurestobringtheeconomyquicklytorecoverymaybeacceptableif

inflationreachesthedouble-digitrange.onewaytoestablishaclearinflationgoalisforthefedto

followamonetarygrowthrule.however,sucharulemaynotperformwellinallsituations（for

example,inasupplyshock）.anotheroptionistomaintaindiscretionarymonetarypolicyalongwith

anindependentcentralbankthathasaclearmandatetofunctionasaninflationfighter.

6.thesacrificeratioisthepercentageofoutputlostforeachone-percentreductionintheinflation

rate.itisnon-zerointheshortandmediumruns,whenoutputisdifferentfromthefull-employment

level.however,inthelongrun,unemploymentalwaysreturnstoitsnaturallevelandthereforethe

sacrificeratioiszero.

7.okunslawstatesthatareductionintheunemploymentrateof1percentwillincreasethelevelof

outputby2percent.thisrelationshipallowsustomeasurethecosttosociety（intermsoflost

production）ofagivenrateofunemployment.

8.wheninflationisperfectlyanticipated,then