Analysis of financial and insurance industry executives salaries and operating performance of the em.docx
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Analysisoffinancialandinsuranceindustryexecutivessalariesandoperatingperformanceoftheem
Analysisoffinancialandinsuranceindustryexecutivessalariesandoperatingperformanceoftheempiricalanalysis
[Abstract]China’sfinanceandinsuranceissuesrelatedtoexecutivepayhasanimpactonitsmarketcompetitiveness,animportantfactorinthispaper,China’s28listedcompaniesinthefinancialperformanceoftheinsuranceindustryandthecorrelationbetweenexecutivepaytotheanalysisandexecutivesoflistedcompanieseffectiveincentivemechanismdesignanddevelopmentofanumberofrecommendations.
[Keywords]financeandinsurance,executivecompensation,related,companyperformance1IntroductionInrealitydifferentcompaniespayexecutiveslargedifferencesofthefinancialcrisismakestheemergenceoffinancialandinsurancecompaniespaytheirexecutiveshasbecomethefocusofattentioninthenationaleconomyfromtheglobaleconomiccrisisintheprocessofgradualrecovery,thefinancialindustrytookonimportantroleinthemanufacturingsectorisdifferent,witharegulatedfinancialindustry,highdebt,andconsequentlythefinancialcompany’sgoodorbadlargelydeterminedbythemanagersinfinancialcompanies,theremunerationofexecutiveswiththecompany’sperformanceexistsbetweentheinternalconsistency,whichcannotonlysolvethecompany’sprincipal-agentproblem,andcaneffectivelybalancethevolatilityofthefinancialjobmarket,theestablishmentoffinancialexecutives’paytocompanyperformancebetweenthesensitivebalanceddevelopmentofsexualrelationsisanimportantmeansoffinancialmarkets.
2LiteratureReview2.1foreignscholarsoftheoreticalandempiricalresearchFirstappearedonexecutivepayandbusinessperformanceofrelatedstudiesareBarrow,thestudiessuggestthatexecutivepayvarydependingonoperatingperformance,measuredbytheindexofstockreturnsandchangesincashproceeds,whichfullyreflectsthestockoptionsforexecutivestheincentiveeffect,Johnusedthedataobtainedfrom1992to2002theU.S.bankingindustryandtheperformancesensitivityofCEOpayislowerthanothersectorsoftheconclusions,thestudysuggeststhatHallandLieberman,CEOcompensationandcorporateperformanceassociatedwithasignificantlyincreasingrelationship,andthatthestockincentiveforoperatorstohaveagoodlong-termincentives,HuosiTanandJamespointedoutthatthebankhashistoricallybeenaregulatedindustry,thereisevenahigherproportionofthesalarystructureofincentivescomposition,norwillthebankexecutivestotakegreaterriskstothepursuitofhigherprofits,sothebankshavebeennotveryinclinedtoadoptincentivepaysystem,theirresearchshowsthattheaverageCEObankingandstockoptionsheldbystockoptionsinitsshareoftotalincomearelowerthanthemanufacturingsectorCEO.BebchukandFriedpreviousstudiesbasedonadecisionmademoresystematicmanagementofthepowermanagementcompensationcontracttheory,thattheBoardcannotcompletelycontrolthemanagementcompensationcontractdesign,managementhastheabilitytoinfluencetheirownmotivationandremuneration,andtheuseofrent-seeking,makingtheenterprisesdonotpayaccordingtoperformancepaytotheexecutives,theirstudyisthemessage:
managementincentivecompensationisnotnecessarilysolvetheagencyproblemThetoolitselfmayalsobecomepartoftheagencyproblem.
2.2DomestictheoreticalandempiricalresearchscholarsTheexistingliteratureinthecountry,onthefinancialindustryexecutivepaystudyoftherelationshipwithbusinessperformancepointofvieware:
ZhoujianSong,GuofuChunstudiessuggestthatChina’scommercialbanksintheincentivemechanism,themainshort-termincentive-based,short-termbehaviormoreobvious,impactandconstraintsoftheheterogeneityofcommercialbankstoplaythevalueofhumancapital,ChenXuebinetal(2003)ofcommercialbanksthroughsoftwaresimulationanalysisofincentiveandrestraintmechanismsthatimprovethebankexecutivesfixedremunerationisnotabletoincreasethebank’sincome,andimprovementandoperatingefficiencylinkedvariableincomeratioismoreconducivetofullymobilizetheoperatortooperatetheinitiative,GouopenredonChina’sjoint-stockcommercialbankspaythecompositionandlong-termincentivesfortheresearchonincentivecompensationandcommercialbankperformancerelatedtoasimplestatisticalanalysisthatthecommercialbankexecutives’paytothemainbusinessincome,netprofitwasnosignificantcorrelationwithtotalincomeandexecutivecompensationandprofitalsoshowedanegativecorrelationcoefficient;WeiHua,LiuYan,throughempiricalanalysis,inthehighmanagementpersonnelcompensationincentives,samplebankexecutivespaynoimpactonbankperformance,andthusthatthebankexecutivesincentivesdonotproducethenecessaryeffect.Inaddition,somescholarsbelievethatcommercialbanksdonotpayincentivestoitsbusinessperformancetherewasasignificantcorrelation,theneedforincentivecompensationforimprovementstopromotecommercialbankstoenhancetheperformanceofthispaperattemptstoanalysisusingSASsoftware,thecurrentfinanceandinsurancecompaniesexecutivepayandbusinessperformanceanalysisoftherelationship,furtherofROE,netprofitmarginandothercompanyperformancefactorsandtherelationshipbetweenexecutivepay.
3modelsandmultivariateanalysis3.1Sampleselectionanddataanalysis2010,China’sfinanceandinsurancehasbeenatotalof34listedcompanies,thispaperselectedoneofthe28listedcompanies,subjectto2009data,analyzethecompanyperformanceandexecutivepaylevelsofcorrelation,asshownbelow.Inordertomorerevealsagoodrelationshipbetweenthetwo,chooseawidelyrecognizednetassetsandnetprofitmarginasameasureoffinancialandinsurancecompaniesoperatingperformanceindicators,andaccordingtotheavailabilityofdataandrepresentative,respectively,uptothreeselecteddirectortotalcompensation,uptothreeseniorexecutivestotalremunerationofexecutivecompensationandthetotalannualsalaryofthreeindicatorsasmeasuredbythefirsttwoindicatorswereabletorepresentthecompanyownersandmanagerspaystatus,thethirdindicatoristheoveralllevelofcompanyexecutivesasameasureofcompensation.
3.2AnalysismodelandvariablesThisarticlewilltakealinearregressionanalysismethod,toestablishalinearequationmodeltoanalyzethefinancialandinsurancecompanyperformanceandexecutivecompensation-related,primarilythroughtheSASstatisticalanalysissoftwarefordataprocessinginallofthedata,selectthenetrateof(Y1)andROE(Y2)asthedependentvariable,threedirectorswereselectedmaximumtotalremuneration(x1),thehighesttotalreturnthreeseniormanagers(x2)andtotalannualexecutivecompensation(x3)modelasexplanatoryvariables.
Firstanalysisofnetprofitmargin(Y1)andthehighestthreedirectorsontotalcompensation(x1)therelationshipbetweentheprocessbySASdatacanbeobtainedthefollowingresults:
4ProblemsandSolutions4.1Problemsexecutivepay4.1.1ThefinanceandinsuranceexecutivepayandcompanyperformanceisnotrelevantBythisthirdpartofthedataanalysiswecanclearlysee,financeandinsuranceexecutivepayandcompanyperformancecorrelationisnotobvious,nearlytwoyearsofdatacanalsobefoundinthefinancialandinsuranceindustryexecutivepayconvergenceofitsprofitgrowthdifficult,correlationisverysmall,sohowperformanceindicatorsaccordingtothecompany’sexecutivestodevelopareasonablepayandchangehasbecomeabigproblem.
4.1.2Long-termincentiveisnotobviousFrom2009,thedisclosureoffinancialandinsurancepay,mostofthecompany’sseniormanagementhasnotdoneenoughonthelong-termincentivecompensation,payalittlemorecash,sharesoftheslightlysmallerproportionoftotalrevenue,reflectingChina’scurrentfinancialandinsuranceListedcompaniesarestillpartialshort-termincentivesratherthanlong-termincentive,whichthefinancialindustrywiththeinternationalpracticeandthereisnotasmalldeviationcharacteristics,othermajorinternationalfinancialinstitutionsandinvestmentfirmsaremostlybasedonincomeandotherlong-termequityincentivesasthemainincentivesThesemethodsandmeasuresofChina’sfinancialandinsurancecompaniesdeservefurtherstudy.
4.1.3partoftheexecutivelevelandpaylevelasymmetryAsChina’sfinancialandinsuranceindustryexecutivesmostlyingovernmentforacertainposition,whichdeterminestheselectionoftheseofficialsarenotoutofthebestonthemarketmanagersandmanagers,sotheirlevelofoperationswillbegreatlyreduced.Mostoftheseexecutiveswhorelyonstate-ownedfinancialandinsurancecompaniesarethemonopolyofhighprofitsandthusgetahigherpaylevel,whichforotherfinancialandinsuranceindustry,theremunerationofseniorofficialsisnotfair,somyjoburgentneedtoimprovemarketlevelmanager,toformareasonableandfairexecutivepaystructure.
4.2Solutionsandrecommendations4.2.1determineareasonablegoalofacomprehensiveperformanceevaluationComprehensiveperformanceevaluationtodetermineareasonablegoal,tomakefinancialchangesintheinsuranceindustryexecutivecompensationisconsistentwithchangesincompanyperformanceinperformance-payincentivecompensationasthemainmechanism,wemustdetermineareasonableassessmentoftheoverallperformanceindicators.Financialandinsuranceindustrybymanyfactors:
theexpansionofassetsize,capitalgainsincrease,risk