7 Substantive canons.docx

7 Substantive canons.docx

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7Substantivecanons

SubstantivecanonsofConstruction

∙Manyofthesesubstantivecanonstaketheformof"clearstatementrules"thatinstructcourtstoconstruestatutestopromoteafavoredvalueoravoidadisfavoredoneunlessthestatutesdemandsthecontrarywithgreaterclaritythanwouldordinarilyberequired.

∙Ruleoflenity:

Incriminallaw,statutesshouldbeinterpretedinfavorofDwhenthereisambiguity.

∙Whenweuseaclearstatementrule,itmustbethecasethatintheabsenceoftherulethecourtwouldhavereachedadifferentconclusion.

∙Avoidingseriousconstitutionalquestions

∙Thinkaboutwhetherorunderwhatconditions,itislegitimateforcourtstodevelopandapplysubstantivecanons.（howtojustify?

Congressionalintent?

）

∙Substantivecanonsmightalternativelybeunderstoodastechniquesthatcourtsemployinordertoadvanceparticularvaluesthatthecourtshavedeterminedareimportant,regardlessofthelikelypreferencesofCongress.

Avoidingseriousconstitutionalquestions

∙Marburyv.Madison（1803）

oThejudicialpowerincludesthepowertopassontheconstitutionalityoflegislation.

oAnactofthelegislature,repugnanttotheconstitution,isvoid.

∙PassingontheconstitutionalityofanActofCongressisthegravestandmostdelicatedutythattheCourtiscalledupontoperform.Thissenseperhapsreflectstheso-called"countermajoritariandifficulty"-thefeltrealitythatwhentheSupremeCourtdeclaresunconstitutionalalegislativeactortheactionofanelectedexecutive,itthwartsthewillofrepresentativesoftheactualpeopleofthehereandnow.Inlightofthisconcern,theSupremeCourthasexpressedastrongpresumptioninfavorofupholdingstatutesasconstitutional.

∙Ashwanderv.TennesseeValleyAuthority（1936）-JusticeBrandeis'sconcurrence

o4thrule[Whentointerpret]:

courtsshouldalwaystrytoresolveacaseonstatutory（orother）groundsbeforeaddressingconstitutionalobjections.

o7thrule[Howtoavoid]:

Ifthereisa"seriousdoubt"abouttheconstitutionalityofafederalstatute,thecourtshouldseewhether"aconstructionofthestatuteisfairlypossiblebywhichthequestionmaybeavoided."

∙Comparetheclassicconstitutionalavoidancecanonwiththemoderncanon:

oClassic:

Thecanoncanbeusedonlywhentheconstructionswouldbeactuallyunconstitutional. （doesnotallowthecourttoavoiddecidingtheconstitutionalissue）

oModern:

solongasthealternativeconstructionis"fairlypossible"unconstitutional. 

∙Howandwhenshouldthecanonbeapplied?

Andwhatisitsproperscope?

NationalLaborRelationsBoardv.CatholicBishopofChicago（1979）

Issue:

DoestheBoardhavejurisdictionovertheteachersinschoolsoperatedbyachurch?

Andifdoes,doesitsexerciseviolatetheguaranteesoftheReligionClausesoftheFirstAmendment?

Majority:

∙Rule:

anActofCongressoughtnotbeconstruedtoviolatetheConstitutionifanyotherpossibleconstructionremainsavailable.

∙Ifweinterpretthestatutetosaythattheboardhasjurisdictionovertheteachers,wewouldberequiredtodecidewhetherthatwasconstitutionallypermissibleundertheReligionClausesoftheFirstAmendment.

∙Wedon’tinterpretastatuteinawaythatCongressdidn'thaveclearlyexpressedaffirmativeintentwhenitraisesaconstitutionalquestion. 

∙TofindoutCongressionalintent,wecanlooktolegislativehistory:

o1935Act:

focusedonprivateindustryandindustrialrecovery;indicatinggivingnoconsiderationtochurch-operatedschools;

o1947Act:

excludednon-profitablehospitals

o1974Act:

removedtheexemptionin1947. 

∙IntheabsenceofaclearexpressionofCongress'sintenttobringteachersinchurch-operatedschoolswithinthejurisdictionoftheBoard,wedeclinetoconstruetheActinamannerthatmayraiseconstitutionalproblem.

Dissent:

∙Bystrictlyorlooselyapplyingmajority’saffirmativeintentionrule,theCourtcanvirtuallyremakecongressionalenactments.

∙Courtshouldfirstdecidewhetheroneconstructionofthestatuteis“fairlypossible”.Itconfinesthejudiciarytoitsproperroleinconstruingstatutes,whichistointerpretthemsoastogiveeffecttocongressionalintention.

∙Butdefining“employer”toexcludeteachersinreligiousschoolisnotfairlypossible:

oThewordsofthestatuteonlycreate8exceptions,buttheMajorityistryingtomaketheninth.（expressiounius）

oLegislativehistoryindicatesteachersshouldbeincludedin“employees”.（p276-277）

oUnderprecedents,aslongasanemployeriswithinthereachofCongress’powerundertheCommerceClause,theCourthasheldhimtobecoveredbytheActregardlessofthenatureofhisactivity.

∙Itisirresponsibletoavoidtheconstitutionalquestionbyanexerciseinstatutoryinterpretationwhichsucceedsonlyindefyingcongressionalintent.

Notes:

∙Whencanaconstitutionalproblembeavoided?

oBrennan:

【Ambiguity-resolvingversion】onlywhentheinterpretationis“reasonable”or“fairlypossible.”（Whenthestatuteisambiguous.）

oBurger:

【Clearstatementversion】whentheinterpretationwouldraiseaseriousconstitutionalquestion.

oQuestions:

∙AccordingtoBrennan,whenthereisambiguity,shouldtheAvoidancecanonbeappliedfirst,orshouldthesemanticinterpretationgofirsttosolvetheambiguity?

∙Whatifthelanguageisambiguousbutthelegislativehistorymakesitclear?

∙JustificationsforAvoidanceCanon:

oCongressionalintent:

Itispresumedthatthelegislatorsdon’twanttoentertheconstitution“dangerzone”. Counterargument:

thisempiricalclaimisridiculousandisnottrue.

oThereisalegalfictiontoshowjudicialrespectforCongress.CourtshouldproceedasifCongressbehavedinthatpresumedway.Whydon’tpresumethatCongresshasalreadycarefullyconsideredtheconstitutionalquestion?

oAprudentialtoolofjudicialrestraint:

∙Constitutionaldecisionsarehardtoalter;andaregenerallymorelikelytoaffectotherareasoflaw.Therefore,Courtshouldberestrainttodecideonthesequestions. 

∙Itisnotrestraint,butratherempowerment,because:

（1）Thecanonwillincludejudge’spreconstitutionalviewsaboutthestatuteswhichareunanticipatedbyCongress.

（2）Thecanonenlargestheabilityofjudgestorelyonconstitutionalconsiderationstokickoutcongressionalenactments.（3）Thejudgedecidesaconstitutionaldoubtnotactualconstitutionalviolation.Itreallygivesthejudgemorediscretiontoreachtheresulttheywant.

∙Clarifyingdifficultquestionsofconstitutionallawisthefunctionoffederalcourts.Courtsshouldnotavoidreachinganddecidingquestionsofconstitutionallaw.

oProtectingconstitutionalvalues:

∙ItactuallyenablesCourtstolimitthescopeorapplicationofcongressionalstatutes.

∙

（1）ThiscanongivesCourtsthemeanstoavoidgivingeffecttostatuteswithoutrequisitedegreeofcarefuldeliberationofCongress.Thecanonthusimproveslegislativeprocess.

∙

（1）IfJudgesaresupposedtobefaithfulagentsofCongress,itisproblematicforacourttorefusetoenforceastatuteaswrittenbecauseitconcludesCongressshouldhavebeenmorecareful.

∙

（2）TheConstitutionistoprotectcertainpublicvalues.CourtscanenforceandpromotethosevaluesbyreadingstatutesnarrowlytoavoidinterferingwithconstitutionalvaluesunlessCongresshasclearlyforcedtheissue.

∙

（2）IfthecourthasnotidentifiedanyactualviolationoftheConstitution,ifshouldnotadoptawiredmeaninginthenameofprotectingConstitutionalvalues.Itisawayforcourtstoescapefromdecidingtherealissue.

Classnotes:

Judgesdisagreeonwhenandhowtoapplythecanon

Statutoryobjectionfirstandthenconstitutionalobjection.Why?

Acourtcanholdastatuteunconstitutional.Butitisanextraordinarypower.Whenacourtholdastatuteunconstitutional,itmeansthecourtoverrulesastatutepassedbythemajorityofpeople.Itisreallyabigandseriousissue.Soifthecourtcanresolvetheissueonthestatutoryinterpretationlevel,thecourtdoesnotneedtoreachtheconstitutionalissue,anditdoesnotwanttogotothatleveleventhoughithasthatspecialpower.

Counter:

ButitisjusttheAmericansystem.Ifthecourthasthatpower,itshouldusethepowerwhennecessary.

NationalLaborRelationsBoardv.CatholicBishopofChicago（1979）

Dissent:

Ordinarymeaningof"employer"obviouslyincludesCatholicBishopinourcase.

Alsoinsection2,thedefinitionofemployer,thestatuteclearlylistseightexceptions.Butreligiousschoolisnotincluded.

Whenthestatutorytermisambiguous,weusetheavoidancecanon.Butthereisnoambiguity.

Majority:

Noclearexpressionofanaffirmativeintention

Whenweencounterabroadtermofthestatute,ifthebroadmeaningwouldpossiblyviolateconstitutionlaw,andthestatutedoesnotspecificallymentiontheissue,weshouldpresumethemeaningotherwise.

Why?

WeshouldassumeCongresstendstopassalawwithoutconstitutionalproblem.Soiftheynoticeaconstitutionalissue,theywouldusespecificlanguagetosayitclearly.Butiftheydonotspotit,weshouldpresumetheydonotnoticeitandtheywouldnotliketoraiseconstitutionalissue.

Dissent:

Whynot?

Youcannotfigureouttheclearlegislativeintent.Likeinthiscase,youthinkthelegislativeintentistoexcludereligiousschoolbasedontheavoidancecanon,butwethinkthelegislativeintentistoincludereligiousbasedonthetextofthestatute.Itishardtosaywhichisstronger.

ProtectingStateSovereigntyandAutonomy

1.Questionsabouttheappropriatebalancebetweenstateandfederalpower-andtheappropriateroleforthefederalcourtsinmaintainingthatbalance