外文翻译公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响.doc

外文翻译公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响.doc

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毕业设计（论文）

外文翻译

题目公司治理对企业价值的影响

专业财务管理

班级10财管1班

学生姜波（21002137）

指导教师王向静

职称讲师

高科学院

2014年

Theinfluenceofcorporategovernanceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue

Capitalstructure:

relationwithcorporatevalueandmainresearchstreams

Whenlookingatthemostimportanttheoreticalcontributionsontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue,asillustratedinFigure1,itbecomesimmediatelyevidentthatthereisasubstantialdifferencebetweentheearlytheoriesandthemorerecentones.

ModiglianiandMiller（1958）,whohadoriginallyassertedthattherewasnorelationshipbetweencapitalstructureandvalue;in1963,instead,reachedtheparadoxicalandprovocativeconclusionthatamaximumlevelofdebtwouldmeanamaximumleveloffirmvalue,duetothefactthatinterestistaxdeductible.Manylatercontributionspointedoutthatthiseffectiscompensatedwhenconsideringpersonaltaxes（Miller,1977）,aneventuallackoftaxcapacity,duetothepresenceofeconomicloss,theeffectofothertypesoftaxshields（DeAngeloandMasulis,1980）,aswellastheintroductionofthecosts（directandindirect）offinancialdistress;allthesesituationsendupcreatingatrade-offbetweendebtcostsandbenefits.PointL’inFigure1cindicatesanoptimallevelofdebt,beyondwhichanyriseinleveragewouldcauseanincreaseinthebenefitsofdebtthatwouldbelessthanproportionalwithrespecttothecostsoffinancialdistress.Furthermore,thisnonmonotonicrelationwouldbemodifiedevenmorewhenconsideringagencycostsaswellasthecostsoffinancialdistress.Finally,onelaststreamofresearch（Myers,1984,Myers1984）pointsoutmanagerialpreferenceswhenchoosingfinancingresources.Inthiscasenooptimallevelofdebtbecomes‘‘objectively’’evident,butthisisduetothevarioussituationsthemanagerhadtodealwithovertime.Thefunctionofmanagerialpreferencehasparticularrelevanceduetoinformationasymmetries,thereforetheleveloffirmindebtednesswillbedeterminedbythetangentbetweenthefirmvaluefunctionandthecurveofmanagerindifference.

Furthermore,itcanbeobservedthatdebtincreasesincorrespondencewiththebetterthefirm’sreputationisonthemarket（Chevalier,1995）.Researchhasshownsimilaritiesbetweenfirmsthatbelongtothesamesector（TitmanandWessels,1988）;inotherwords,capitalstructuretendstobeindustry-specific.

Theempiricalcomparisonbetweenthetrade-offtheoryandthepeckingordertheoryseemstobecontroversial.Ononehand,empiricalevidenceshowsmoderatecoherencewiththetrade-offtheory,whenrevenueandagencyproblemsaretakenintoconsiderationcontextually;ontheotherhand,thenegativerelationbetweenleverageandfirmprofitdoesnotseemtosupportthetrade-offtheory,asitconfirmsahierarchicalorderinfinancialdecisionmaking.

Itis,thus,clearthatthetopicofcapitalstructureisanythingbutdefinedandthattherearestillmanyopenproblemsregardingit.

Asmanyauthorshavenoted（RajanandZingales,1995）capitalstructureisa‘‘hot’’topicinfinance.Byanalyzinginternationalliteraturethemainresearchprioritiesandnewanalyticalapproachesarerelatedto:

theimportantcomparisonbetween‘‘rational’’and‘‘behavioural’’finance（BarberisandThaler,2002）;alivelycomparisonmadebetweenthepeckingordertheoryandthetrade-offtheory（Shyam-SunderandMyers,1999）;theattempttoapplythesetheoriestosmallfirms（BergerandUdell,1998,Fluck,2001）;theroleofcorporategovernanceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue（Heinrich,2000,BhagatandJefferis,2002,Brailsfordetal.,2004,Mahrt-Smith,2005）.

Thebehaviouralapproach,thatconsidersthepeckingorderoffinancialresourcesintermsof‘‘irrational’’preferences,causedanimmediatereactionfromStewartMyersin2000and2001andjointlywithShyam-Sunderin1999（Myers,2000;2001;Shyam-SunderandMyers,1999）.StewartMyersisthefounderofthepeckingordertheory[7].Problemsofinformationasymmetry,togetherwithtransactioncosts,wouldbeabletoofferarationalexplanationtomanagerialbehaviourwhenfinancialchoicesaremadefollowingahierarchicalorder（FamaandFrench,2002）.Inotherwords,accordingtoMyersandFama,thereshouldbea‘‘rational’’explanationtothephenomenonobservedbyStein,Baker,Wrugler,BarberisandThaler.

Moreover,studiesoncapitalstructurehavealsobeendonelookingatsmallandmediumsizefirms（BergerandUdell,1998,Michaelasetal.,1999,Romanoetal.,2000,Fluck,2001）,duetotherelevanteconomicroleofthesefirms（inEuropetheyare95percentofthetotalfirmsoperating）.Zingales（2000）aswellhasemphasizedthefactthattoday‘‘...theattentionshowntowardslargefirmstendstopartiallyobscurefirmsthatdonothaveaccesstothefinancialmarkets...’’.Inoneofthemostinterestingstudiesdoneonthistopic,BergerandUdell（1998）assertedthatfirmfinancialbehaviourdependsonwhatphaseoftheirlifecycletheyarein.Infact,thereshouldbeanoptimalpro-temporecapitalstructure,relatedtothephaseofthelifecyclethatthefirmisin.

Finally,theobservationsofMichaelJensen（1986）,madethroughouthismanycontributionsoncorporategovernance,aswellasthoseofWilliamson（1988）,haveencouragedalineofresearchthat,revitalizedinthesecondpartofthenineties,seemstobequitepromisingasameanstoanalyzehowcorporategovernancedirectlyorindirectlyinfluencestherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue（Fluck,1998,Zhang,1998,Myers,2000,DeJong,2002,BergerandPatti,2003,Brailsfordetal.,2004,Mahrt-Smith,2005）.Insynthesis,itispossibletoaffirm,asitfollows,thatajoinedanalysisofcapitalstructureandcorporategovernanceisnecessarywhendescribingandinterpretingthefirm’sabilitytocreatevalue（Zingales,2000,Heinrich,2000,BhagatandJefferis,2002）.Thistypeofconsiderationcouldhelpovercomethecontroversyfoundwhenstudyingtherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue,onbothatheoreticalandempiricallevel.

Influenceofcorporategovernanceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue.

Capitalstructurecanbeanalyzedbylookingattherightsandattributesthatcharacterizethefirm’sassetsandthatinfluence,withdifferentlevelsofintensity,governanceactivities.Equityanddebt,therefore,mustbeconsideredasbothfinancialinstrumentsandcorporategovernanceinstruments（Williamson,1988）:

debtsubordinatesgovernanceactivitiestostrictermanagement,whileequityallowsforgreaterflexibilityanddecisionmakingpower.Itcanthusbeinferredthatwhencapitalstructurebecomesaninstrumentofcorporategovernance,notonlythemixbetweendebtandequityandtheirwellknownconsequencesasfarastaxesgomustbetakenintoconsideration.Thewayinwhichcashflowisallocated（cashflowright）and,evenmoreimportantly,howtherighttomakedecisionsandmanagethefirm（votingrights）isdealtwithmustalsobeexamined.Forexample,venturecapitalistsareparticularlysensitivetohowcapitalstructureandfinancingcontractsarelaidout,sothatanoptimalcorporategovernancecanbeguaranteedwhileincentivesandchecksformanagementbehaviorarewellestablished（Zingales,2000）[10].

Coase（1991）,inasortofcritiqueonhisownworkdonein1937,pointsoutthatitisimportanttopaymoreattentiontotheroleofcapitalstructureasaninstrumentthatcanmediateandmoderateeconomicaltransactionswithinthefirmand,consequently,betweenentrepreneursandotherstakeholders（corporategovernancerelations）.

AsexplicitlypointedoutbyBhagatandJefferis（2002）,whentheypayparticularattentiontotherelationsbetweencauseandeffectandtotheirinteractionsrecentlydescribedonatheoreticallevel（Fluck,1998,Zhang,1998,Heinrich,2000,Brailsfordetal.,2004,Mahrt-Smith,2005）,a‘‘researchproposal’’thatfutureempiricalstudiesshouldevaluateshouldbe,howcorporategovernancecanpotentiallyhavearelevantinfluenceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue,withaneffectofmediationand/ormoderation.

ThefiverelationsidentifiedinFigure2describe:

therelationbetweencapitalstructureandfirmvalue（relationA）througharoleofcorporategovernance‘‘mediation’’;therelationbetweencapitalstructureandfirmvalue（relationA）throughtheroleofcapitalgovernance‘‘moderation’’（relationD）;theroleofcorporategovernanceasadeterminingfactorinchoicesregardingcapitalstructure（relationE）.

AllfiverelationsshowninFigure2areparticularlyinterestingandshowtwothreadsofresearchthatfocusontherelationsbetween:

corporategovernanceandcapitalstructure,wherethedimensionsofthecorporategovernancedeterminefirmfinancingchoices,causingapossiblerelationofco-causationWhethermanagementvoluntarilychoosestousedebtasasourceoffinancingtoreduceproblemsofinformationasymmetryandtransaction,maximizingtheefficiencyofitsfirmgovernancedecisions,ortheincreaseinthedebtlevelisforcedbythestockholdersasaninstrumenttodisciplinebehaviorandassuregoodcorporategovernance,capitalstructureisinfluencedbycorporategovernance（relationE）andviceversa（relationB）.

Ononehand,achangeinhowdebtandequityaredealtwithinfluencesfirmgovernanceactivitiesbymodifyingthestructureofincentivesandmanagerialcontrol.If,throughthemixdebtandequity,differentcategoriesofinvestorsallconvergewithinthefirm,wheretheyhavedifferenttypesofinfluenceongovernancedec