土建学院毕业设计外文翻译中英文版Word文档格式.docx

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土建学院毕业设计外文翻译中英文版Word文档格式.docx

TheyearleadinguptoSeptember2008sawthecreationofrealestatefinancestructuresofbreathtakingcomplexity.sincethantimeintherealestatefinanceindustryhavebeeninvolvedmainlyintryingtounderstandwhatwentwrong,andtodeterminewhetherthecollapse,wasinanymaterialwaytheresultofflawsinthesecomplexrealestatefinancestructures.orwasitjustafunctionofexternaleconomicpressuresandthecyclicalnatureofrealestate.whilethejuryisstillout.Theanswerseemstobethatthestructuresdidnotcausetherealestaterecession,butthroughtheiropaquenaturetheymayhavemadetherecessionworse,bothbydelayingtherecognitionoftheunderlingfragilityofthemarketandbymakingtheproblems,oncerecognized,evenmoredifficulttoresolve.Onethingissure:

manypeople,whetherlegislators,regulators,lawyers,accountants,bankersorthosewhoraiseandconsumerealestatecapitalarenowworkingveryhardtoaddress

(1)howtoresolvedistressedrealestatecapitalstructures,and

(2)howtoimprovethestructuresandformofdeliveryofrealestatecapitaltothemarketinthefuture.Changebeingconsiderednowwillaffecttherealestatemarketsthroughthenextgeneration.Followingareafewexamples.RESTORINGAMERICANFINANCIALSTABILITYACTAslwritethis,theUSisbeginningitsfinaldebateoftheRESTORINGAMERICANFINANCIALSTABILITYACT<

RAFS>

andappearstobebuildingmomentumforadoptioninsomeform,whichwouldthenrequirereconciliationwiththeequivalentHouseversion.Ifadoptedinanythinglikeitscurrentformitwillcutabroadswathofchangeacrosscurrentbusiness.Practicesbyprovidersofrealestatecapitalofallshapesandsizes.itwillgivetheFederalReserveBanknewpowersoverfinancialinstitutionsbutinturnimposemorecongressionaloversightoftheFed.Lawyersrecognizethatoftenthemostcompellinglitigationcasesleadtotheworstprecedent:

judicialover-reachinginthefaceofegregiousfacts.WillthatbethecasewiththeRAFSandtheresultingregulations?

Willwespendthenext20yearsbackingawayfromthereformsadoptedinthisatmosphereofcrisis?

Thiswillallplayoutoverthecomingmonthsandyears,wewillkeepaneyeontheprocessinthiscolumn,andaswithallsubjectscoveredinthiscolumn,wewouldwelcomehearingyourperspectiveonthis.

CALPERSANDPLACEMENTAGENTSMuchoftherealestateinvestmentmomentumovertheyear2005through2007wasfueledbyincreasedassetallocationwithinpublicemployeepensionfounds,attractedbyseeminglyhighreturns.Oneexampleofthiswasa$14billionnetincreaseincommercialrealestateinvestment9bytheCaliforniaPublicEmployeesRetirementSystem(CalPERS)asthemarketboomedin2005and2006.Notonlywasthenetexposureincreased,but,asdetailedina"

RealEstateProgramReview"

datedApril19,2010,bytheRealEstateUnitOftheCalPERSInvestmentOffice,"

newinvestmentdisproportionallymadetohighriskinvestments"

.inaMemorandumaccompanyingtheProgramReviewTheRealEstateConsultanttotheCalPERS,Boardalsonotedawidevarietyoffactorsthatapparentlycontributedtothe48.2percentdeclineinNetAssetsatFairMarketValuefromJune30,2008throughJune30,2009,intheCalPERSrealestateportfolio,asfollows:

(1)Higheramountsofleverage,whichloweredincomereturnsandincreasedexposuretochangesintheassetvalue;

(2)Recoursedebt,whichexposedCalPERStorisksbeyondthespecificassets;

(3)Looserprogramguidelinesgaveinvestmentstrategies;

(4Shiftingcommitmentsfromstabilizedcoreinvestmenttonon-stabilizedopportunisticinvestments,whichnowcomprisemorethan40percentofthecurrentholdingsintheportfolio;

(5)Adramaticincreaseinthenumberofmanagerrelationshipsandcommingledinvestmentvehiclesprovidedlesscontrol,poorergovernanceandhinderedstaff'

sabilitytoresolveproblemsandliquidateasset;

(6)vintageyearconcentrationwithover$27billionofequitycommitmentsmadein2005and2006,inpartdrivenbysuccessfulmarkettimingdispositionsrealizedbycorepartner.InterestinglyneithertheRealEstateProgramReviewnorthePCAMemorandumcitetheundueinfluenceof"

placementagents"

generallythirdpartyconsultantswithdifferingdegreesofprofessionalandcompetence,politicalorboardconnections,andcompensationarrangementswhoundoubtedlycontributedtothe"

increaseinthenumberofmanagerrelationships"

"

looserprogramguidelines,"

and"

largeconcentratedinvestments."

However,theCalifornialegislaturedidtakenoteofthepotentialfoeabuse.OnOctober11,2009,Governor,SchwarzeneggersignedintolawAssemblyBillNo.1584regulatingtheroleofplacementagentsandrequiringdisclosureofcontributionsorgiftstostateandlocalretirementboardmembers.ThisnowhasbeenfollowedbyAssemblyBillNo.1743,notyetenactedintolaw,whichwoulddefineplacementagentsaslobbyistsintoaccordancewithCalifornia'

spoliticalreformact.Thiswouldimposestrictcontrols<

asopposedtosimplydisclosure>

overgiftsandcontributions,andwouldprohibitcompensationcontingentonanyinvestmentdecision.ThelatterprovisionproducedinitialstrongoppositionfromtheBlackstoneGroup,fromwhichitsubsequentlybackedoff.Thebillstillfacesignificantoppositionfromtradeassociation,which,notsurprisingly,prefertheregulatoryapproachofcompletedisclosureasopposedtooutrightprohibition.Allofthisisastorythatwillcontinuetounfold,withNewYorkbeinganotherstatelookingcloselyattheissue,butwhiletheissueoftheaccessisimportant,theissueofallocationandinvestmentstrategyareevenmorecritical.AsPCAconcludesinitsMemorandum:

CalPERS'

experienceduringthepast28yearssuggeststhatarealestatestrategyfocusedprimarilyondirectinvestmentincore-risktypepropertieshasprovidedamoreattractiveriskadjustedreturnthanthemoreaggressiveopportunisticstrategy.PCAfindssignificantmeritintheoverallcontextoftheCalPERSinvestmentprograminpursuingalessaggressivestrategy.Withmorecontrols,thanwasinplacebetween2002and2006.Willthismeanthatpublicpensionfundsincreasinglywillfocusonthesamecore,stableassetsthatarebeingpursuedbyglobalinvestmentfund?

Perhaps,butintherealestateprogramreviewthestaffnotesthatatcurrentvaluestheCalPERSactualrealestateinvestmentportfolioisat6.8percentoftotalassesversusthetargetallocationof10percentand"

thedislocationintherealestatemarketwillpresentinvestmentopportunities,whichisgoodnewsfortherealestatecapitalmarket.

FIARAANDPRIVATEPLACEMENTAsnotedabove,congressisconsideringaddingadditionalstructurestotheprivateplacementmarket.whileitisunclearhowmanyofthosestructureswillsurvivethelegislativeprocess,theFinancialIndustryRegulatoryAuthority(FINRA),actingasthewatchdogofthesecuritiesbroker-dealersandsecuritiesregisteredrepresentativeswhosellprivateplacementsof,amongotherassets,realestateandoilandgas,haspublishednewregulatoryguidanceastothe"

obligationofbroker-dealerstoconductReasonableInvestigationsinRegulationDOffering"

.Privateplacement,orso-calledRegulationDorRegulation506offeringssoldthroughthesecuritiesbroker-dealerschannel,havealongandconstructivehistoryofraisingcapitalforsmallandmid-sizedbusiness,includingrealestateandoilandgascompanies.inthe"

background"

sectionofRN10-22,FINRAcitesanestimateof$609billionofsuchsecuritiesonthemarketin2008.FINRAcitesanestimateof$609billionofsuchsecuritiesonthemarketin2008.However,FINRAremindsitsmemberbroker-dealermusthavemadea"

reasonableinvestigation"

beforedeterminingthatasecurityis"

suitable"

forinvestorgenerallyandtothespecificinvestorstowhomitisbeingsold.[RN10-22]obviouslythisisallverygeneral,leavingfertilegroundforinterpretation.perhapsmoretothepointonapracticallevel,FINRAremindsbroker-dealersthattheymayconducttheirownindependentinvestigationoftheissuerandtheoffering,andnotsimplyrelyoninformationprovidedbyanindependentcounselorduediligencefirmhiredbythebroker-dealers,orthe"

syndicatemanager"

the"

managing"

broker-dealer,thebroker-dealerindependentinvestigationhastoincludeareasonableinvestigation"

ataminimum"

intothefollowingissuers:

(1)Theissueranditsmanagement;

(2)Thebusinessprospectsoftheissuer;

(3)Theassetsheldbyortobeacquiredbytheissuer;

(4)Theclaimsbeingmade;

and(5)Theintendeduseofproceedsoftheoffering[RN10-22]FINRAalsoaddaddsacautionarynoteontwoparticularareasofconcern:

(1)whenthebroker-dealerisanaffiliateoftheissuerand

(2)whenthebroker-dealerandnowtheissuerpreparetheprivateplacementmemorandum.[RN10-22]Italsoremindsbroker-dealerstolookfor"

redflags"

financialstatementsthat,althoughpurportedlyauditedbyanaccountant,containnumerousindicationsthatthefinancialstatementsareinaccurate.Beyondthesegeneralprinciples,afterareminderofsupervisoryanddocumentationresponsibilities,FINRAclosedthenoticewithhelpfullistofspecificareasbroker-dealersshouldincludeintheirinvestigation,including:

1.Astothe"

issuersandmanagement"

:

a.Historicalfinancialstatements;

withparticularfocusonwhethertherearecredibleauditedfinancialstatements;

b.Inquiringabouttheactivitiesandcashneedsofaffiliates;

c.Contactingcustomersand

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