迈克尔 波特在哈佛商业评论上发表的一篇关于战略的经典文章.docx
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迈克尔波特在哈佛商业评论上发表的一篇关于战略的经典文章
WhatIsStrategy?
Contents
I.OperationalEffectivenessIsNotStrategyForalmosttwodecades,managershavebeenlearningtoplaybyanewsetofrules.Companiesmustbeflexibletorespondrapidly
tocompetitiveandmarketchanges.Theymustbenchmark
continuouslytoachievebestpractice.Theymustoutsource
aggressivelytogainefficiencies.Andtheymustnuttureafewcore
competenciesintheracetostayaheadofrivals.
Positioning-oncetheheartofstrategy-isrejectedastoostaticfor
today’sdynamicmarketsandchangingtechnologies.Accordingto
thenewdogma,rivalscanquicklycopyanymarketposition,and
competitiveadvantageis,atbest,temporary.
Butthosebeliefsaredangeroushalf-truths,andtheyareleading
moreandmorecompaniesdownthepathofmutuallydestructive
competition.True,somebarrierstocompetitionarefallingas
regulationeasesandmarketsbecomeglobal.True,companies
haveproperlyinvestedenergyinbecomingleanerandmore
nimble.Inmanyindustries,however,whatsomecall
hypercompetitionisaself-inflictedwound,nottheinevitable
outcomeofachangingparadigmofcompetition.
Therootoftheproblemisthefailuretodistinguishbetween
operationaleffectivenessandstrategy.Thequestforproductivity,
quality,andspeedhasspawnedaremarkablenumberof
managementtoolsandtechniques:
totalqualitymanagement,
`benchmarking,time-basedcompetition,outsourcing,partnering,
reengineering,changemanagement.Althoughtheresulting
operationalimprovementshaveoftenbeendramatic,many
companieshavebeenfrustratedbytheirinabilitytotranslatethoseChoose
gainsintosustainableprofitability.Andbitbybit,almostimperceptibly,managementtoolshavetakentheplaceofstrategy.Asmanagerspushtoimproveonallfronts,theymovefartherawayfromviablecompetitivepositions.Operationaleffectivenessandstrategyarebothessentialtosuperiorperformance,which,afterall,istheprimarygoalofanyenterprise.Buttheyworkinverydifferentways.
Acompanycanoutperformrivalsonlyifitcanestablishadifferencethatitcanpreserve.Itmustdelivergreatervaluetocustomersorcreatecomparablevalueatalowercost,ordoboth.Thearithmeticofsuperiorprofitabilitythenfollows:
deliveringgreater,valueallowsacompanytochargehigheraverageunitprices;greaterefficiencyresultsinloweraverageunitcosts.
Ultimately,alldifferencesbetweencompaniesincostorpricederivefromthehundredsofactivitiesrequiredtocreate,produce,sell,anddelivertheirproductsorservices,suchascallingoncustomers,assemblingfinalproducts,andtrainingemployees.Costis
generatedbyperformingactivities,andcostadvantagearisesfromperformingparticularactivitiesmoreefficientlythancompetitors.Similarly,differentiationarisesfromboththechoiceofactivitiesandhowtheyareperformed.Activities,then,arethebasicunitsofcompetitiveadvantage.Overalladvantageordisadvantageresultsfromallacompany’sactivities,notonlyafew.’
OperationaleffectivenessfOE)meansperformingsimilaractivitiesbetterthanrivalsperformthem.Operationaleffectivenessincludesbutisnotlimitedtoefficiency.Itreferstoanynumberofpracticesthatallowacompanytobetterutilizeitsinputsby,forexample,reducingdefectsinproductsordevelopingbetterproductsfaster.Incontrast,strategicpositioningmeansperformingdifferentactivitiesfromrivals’orperformingsimilaractivitiesindifferentways.
GRAPH:
OperationalEffectivenessVersusStrategicPositioning
Differencesinoperationaleffectivenessamongcompaniesarepervasive.Some
companiesareabletogetmoreoutoftheirinputsthanothersbecausetheyeliminatewastedeffort,employmoreadvancedtechnology,motivateemployeesbetter,orhavegreaterinsightintomanagingparticularactivitiesorsetsofactivities.Suchdifferencesinoperationaleffectivenessareanimportantsourceofdifferencesinprofitabilityamongcompetitorsbecausetheydirectlyaffectrelativecostpositionsandlevelsof
differentiation.
DifferencesinoperationaleffectivenesswereattheheartoftheJapanesechallengetoWesterncompaniesinthe1980s.TheJapaneseweresofaraheadofrivalsinoperationaleffectivenessthattheycouldofferlowercostandsuperiorqualityatthesametime.Itisworthdwellingonthispoint,becausesomuchrecentthinkingaboutcompetitiondependsonit.Imagineforamomentaproductivityfrontierthatconstitutesthesumofallexistingbestpracticesatanygiventime.Thinkofitasthemaximumvaluethatacompanydeliveringaparticularproductorservicecancreateatagivencost,usingthebestavailabletechnologies,skills,managementtechniques,andpurchasedinputs.The
productivityfrontiercanapplytoindividualactivities,togroupsoflinkedactivitiessuchasorderprocessingandmanufacturing,andtoanentirecompany’sactivities.Whenacompanyimprovesitsoperationaleffectiveness,itmovestowardthefrontier.Doingsomayrequirecapitalinvestment,differentpersonnel,orsimplynewwaysofmanaging.Theproductivityfrontierisconstantlyshiftingoutwardasnewtechnologiesand
managementapproachesaredevelopedandasnewinputsbecomeavailable.Laptopcomputers,mobilecommunications,theInternet,andsoftwaresuchasLotusNotes,forexample,haveredefinedtheproductivityfrontierforsales-forceoperationsandcreatedrichpossibilitiesforlinkingsaleswithsuchactivitiesasorderprocessingandafter-sales
support.Similarly,leanproduction,whichinvolvesafamilyofactivities,hasallowedsubstantialimprovementsinmanufacturingproductivityandassetutilization.
Foratleastthepastdecade,managershavebeenpreoccupiedwithimproving
operationaleffectiveness.ThroughprogramssuchasTQM,time-basedcompetition,andbenchmarking,theyhavechangedhowtheyperformactivitiesinordertoeliminate
inefficiencies,improvecustomersatisfaction,andachieve,bestpractice.Hopingtokeepupwithshiftsintheproductivity‘frontier,managershaveembracedcontinuousimprovement,empowerment,changemanagement,andtheso-calledlearning
organization.Thepopularityofoutsourcingandthevirtualcorporationreflectthegrowingrecognitionthatitisdifficulttoperformallactivitiesasproductivelyasspecialists.Ascompaniesmovetothefrontier,theycanoftenimproveonmultipledimensionsofperformanceatthesametime.Forexample,manufacturersthatadoptedtheJapanesepracticeofrapidchangeoversinthe1980swereabletolowercostandimprove
differentiationsimultaneously.Whatwereoncebelievedtoberealtrade-offs-betweendefectsandcosts,forexample-turnedouttobeillusionscreatedbypooroperationaleffectiveness.Managershavelearnedtorejectsuchfalsetrade-offs.
Constantimprovementinoperationaleffectivenessisnecessarytoachievesuperiorprofitability.However,itisnotusuallysufficient.Fewcompanieshavecompetedsuccessfullyonthebasisofoperationaleffectivenessoveranextendedperiod,andstayingaheadofrivalsgetshardereveryday.Themostobviousreasonforthatistherapiddiffusionofbestpractices.Competitorscanquicklyimitatemanagementtechniques,newtechnologies,inputimprovements,andsuperiorwaysofmeetingcustomers’needs.Themostgenericsolutions-thosethatcanbeusedinmultiplesettings-diffusethefastest.WitnesstheproliferationofOEtechniquesacceleratedbysupportfromconsultants.
OEcompetitionshiftstheproductivityfrontieroutward,effectivelyraisingthebarfor
everyone.Butalthoughsuchcompetitionproducesabsoluteimprovementinoperationaleffectiveness,itleadstorelativeimprovementfornoone.Considerthe$5billion-plusU.S.commercial-printingindustry.Themajorplayers-R.R.Donnelley&SonsCompany,Quebecor,WorldColorPress,andBigFlowerPress-arecompetingheadtohead,servingalltypesofcustomers,offeringthesamearrayofprintingtechnologies(gravureandweboffset),investingheavilyinthesamenewequipment,runningtheirpressesfaster,andreducingcrewsizes.Buttheresultingmajorproductivitygainsarebeingcapturedbycustomersandequipmentsuppliers,notretainedinsuperiorprofitability.Even
industry-leaderDonnelley’sprofitmargin,consistentlyhigherthan7%inthe1980s,felltolessthan4.6%in1995.Thispatternisplayingitselfoutinindustryafterindustry.EventheJapanese,pioneersofthenewcompetition,sufferfrompersistentlylowprofits.(Seetheinsert"JapaneseCompaniesRarelyHaveStrategies.")
Thesecondreasonthatimprovedoperationaleffectivenessisinsufficient-competitive
convergence-ismoresubtleandinsidious.Themorebenchmarkingcompaniesdo,themoretheylookalike.Themorethatrivalsoutsourceactivitiestoefficientthirdparties,oftenthesameones,themoregenericthoseactivitiesbecome.Asrivalsimitateoneanother’simprovementsinquality,cycletimes,orsupplierpartnerships,strategiesconvergeandcompetitionbecomesaseriesofracesdownidenticalpathsthatnoonecanwin.Competitionbasedonoperationaleffectivenessaloneismutuallydestructive,leadingtowarsofattritionthatcanbearrestedonlybylimitingcompetition.
TherecentwaveofindustryconsolidationthroughmergersmakessenseinthecontextofOEcompetition.Drivenbyperformancepressuresbutlackingstrategicvision,companyaftercompanyhashadnobetterideathantobuyupitsrivals.Thecompetitorsleftstandingareoftenthosethatoutlastedothers,notcompanieswithrealadvantage.Afteradecadeofimpressivegainsinoperationaleffectiveness,manycompaniesarefacingdiminishingreturns.Continuous