关联交易及利润操纵的英文文献就(带中文译文).doc

关联交易及利润操纵的英文文献就(带中文译文).doc

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浙江工业大学法学院 上市公司关联交易中利润操纵的法律问题研究

THEPROFITANDITSMANIPULATION

MascaEma

Universitatea“PetruMaior”,Tg.Mures,bld.1Decembrie1918,nr.13/10,0265266237,E-mail:

masca_ema@

Inthelightofrecentcorporatescandals,accountingtodayasanobjectivewayofpresentingeconomicrealityissufferingfromarealcrisisofconfidence.CentraltotheAnglo-Saxonsystemofcorporategovernance,ithasbeenpushedintothepublicspotlight,whereitsimpartialityandobjectivityisbeingquestioned.

Keywords:

profit,manipulation,management

ThePositiveAccountingTheoryandprofitmanipulation

EventhoughmostofthescandalshavetakenplaceintheUnitedStates,thecrisisofconfidencehashadanimpactfarbeyondU.S.borders,astheAnglo-SaxonsystemofgovernanceisspreadingthroughoutcontinentalEuropeandparticularlyinFrance.

Inordertocontainthecrisis,theUnitedStatesandFrancearecommittedtoinstitutionalandlegalreform.Moreover,thoseidentifiedashavingperpetratedsuchmanipulation,essentiallyauditorsandfinancialdirectors,havebeenlegallysanctioned.Weshouldnonethelessquestionwhethertheselegalandlegislativemeasureswillbesufficienttorestorelong-termconfidenceinthesystem.BernardCollaseisaskinghimselfifshouldn’tthesocialdimensionoftheissuebetakenintoaccount?

Isn’titnecessaryfirsttounderstandthereasonsbehindprofitmanipulationandhowitfunctionsbeforechanginglegislation?

TenantsofPositiveAccountingTheoryhaverepresentedthemainstreamofaccountingresearchsincetheearly80s.Theyseeprofitmanipulation,whichtheyeuphemisticallycall“earningsmanagement”,fromanexclusivelyeconomicstandpoint.

Howandwhydomanagementcontrollerstakepartinprofitmanipulation?

Thatshareholderpressureleadsmanagementcontrollerstomanipulatetheirfirm’sprofits.Goingbeyondindividualresponsibility,theorganizationimposedonacompanybyitsshareholderswiththeaimofrespectingcriteriaofAnglo-Saxoncorporategovernanceisitselfthecauseofaccountingmanipulationatalllevels.

First,wewilldefinethenotionof“earningsmanagement”,presentarangeofpractices,andassesstheroleofmanagementcontrollersinthisphenomenon.Wewillobservethatmanagementcontrollersimplementdifferentmethodsformanipulatingprofit.

Skillinprofitmanipulationenablesmanagementcontrollerstogainlegitimacyintheeyesofmanagersworkinginaculturalcontextthatistraditionallydifficultforthem.Theysoonbecomeindispensablestrategicalliesplayingtheroleofarbiterbetweenthemarkets’short-sightednessandtheimperativesofoperationalmanagement.

Schipperproposesarepresentativeacademicdefinitionofprofitmanipulationthatshereferstoas“earningsmanagement”,similarlytothevastmajorityofliteratureonthissubject.Shedefinesprofitmanipulationas:

“apurposefulinterventionintheexternalfinancialreportingprocess,withtheintentofobtainingsomeprivategain”.HealyandWalhenidentifytwomainincentivesforprofitmanipulation:

contractswrittenintermsofaccountingnumbers;andcapitalmarketexpectationsandvaluation.

ThefirstperspectiveissupportedbythetenantsofPositiveAccountingTheory.Theysuggestthatcontractsbetweenthefirmanditsstakeholderscreateincentivesforearningsmanagement.Precisely,theyproposethreehypotheses:

thebonusplanhypothesis（directorswhobenefitfrombonusestiedtoprofitsaremorepronetousingaccountingtechniquesthattransferfutureprofitsintothepresent）;thedebt/equityhypothesis（themoreacompanyisindebt,themoreitisinitsinteresttofocusonpresentearningsbecausedebtcovenants,commonintheUnitedStates,requirecertainlevelsofprofitability）;andthepoliticalcosthypothesis（thelargeracompany,themoreitisinitsinteresttopostponeitsprofitsuntilafutureaccountingperiodtofaceanyriskofburdensomelegislationbeingimplemented）.

Thesecondperspectivesuggeststhatthegoalofearningsmanipulationistobeinlinewiththeexpectationsofthefinancialmarkets.DechowandSkinnerunderlinethatacademicshavemainlyfocusedoncontractualincentives,muchmorethanontheinfluenceofcapitalmarketsonearningsmanagementandthat“thisfocushasbeensustainedbytheassumptionthatmarketsareefficient”.

Profitmanipulationcantaketwoforms:

earningsmanagementandfalsification.Earningsmanagementinvolvespostponingtheperiodaffectedbyanoperationbychangingthemeasurementmethods,speedingupasaleordelayingapurchase.

Here,wecanmakeoutinthebackgroundearningsmanagementaslimitedtomanipulatingaccountingfigures,ratherthantoprofitmanipulationthatinvolvesactingonrealbusinesssituations.Falsificationinvolvesdisclosingwrongfuldata.Inthiscase,suchactionsmaybeconsideredcriminal.However,thefinelinebetweenthesetwotypesofmanipulationremainsblurred.

Severalprofitmanipulationstrategiescanbeapplied:

smoothingreducesthevarianceofearningsandthereforetoreduceperceivedrisk;bigbathaccountingwipestheslatecleanforanewappointeddirector;orquitesimplyopportunisticmanagement,thephenomenonsupportedbytenantsofPositiveAccountingTheory.

Someofthesetechniquesaretheprivilegeof“headquarters”level,i.e.boardroomsdecidingtomanipulatecorporateresultssothatconsolidatedaccountsprovidethe“expected”figures.Otherpracticespresentedbelowarealsousedatotherlevelsintheorganizations.

PositiveAccountingTheoryresearchersalmostexclusivelyfocusontop-managementlevelprofitmanipulation.

Wedenythehypothesisaccordingtowhichthedirectorisaloneinmakingaccountingdecisions.Internalcontracting,mostoftencoveredinPositiveAccountingTheory,dealswiththecompensationhypothesis.Inthisarea,resultsfromdifferentstudiesarecontradictory.FewstudiesinthecontextofPositiveAccountingTheorylookatinternalearningsmanagement.Smoothingcouldbedestinedto

（1）externalusersoffinancialstatements,suchasinvestorsandcreditors,and

（2）managementitself.Morespecifically,asfarasmanagementisconcerned,itshouldbenotedthatthemotivationtosmoothincomeisnotconfinedtotopmanagement.Lowermanagementmayattempttosmoothtolookgoodtothetopmanagement.Theymaytrytomeetpredeterminedbudgets,whichinadditiontoservingasforecasts,alsoactasperformanceyardsticks.Thatmostbusinessunitmanagersmanipulatetheperformanceoftheirunits.

Therearefewempiricalstudiesoninternalprofitmanipulation.Pressuretoreachnetearningsorbudgetedexpensesencouragesmanagerstomoveearningsfromyeartoyearbymanipulatingtheaccounts.Thatprofitmanipulationdependsinlargepartontheforecastingprocess.Infact,ateachlevelintheorganizationexpectationsmaybeestablishedinoneofthreeways.Firstly,anindependentestimatecanbereachedindependentlyfromanyotherintheorganization.Secondly,anestimatecanbereachedbyaggregatingestimatesmadebylowerlevelsintheorganization.Thirdly,anestimatecanbereachedbydisaggregatingahigherlevelestimate.Thatoneresponsetofailureinreachingforecastsiscreativebook-keeping-therewasevidenceofacrossallocationofcostsinordertoprotectunitsfromexternalcriticismandtoprotectreputation.

Theorganizationofsuchprotectionwasanimaginativetaskfortheaccountingstaff.

Lastly,anotherfactorwhichexplainsprofitmanipulation:

theresultofthesecasestudiesindicatesthattheinterdependenceofforecastsatdifferentlevelswhenforecastshavebeenmadebydisaggregatingmayencouragemanagerstotakeaseriesofdefensivepositionsandmaketheinformationandreportingsystemsopaque.Howmuchprofitmanipulationtakesplacedoesnotonlydependonhowaccountingisusedtoevaluatetheperformanceofmanagersandtheirpaybutalsohowforecastsaremadethatwillbeusedasabaselineforsuchperformanceappraisal.Thus,theremunerationhypothesisputforwardinthePositiveAccountingTheorydoesnotsufficetoexplaininternalprofitmanipulation.

TheagencymodelinaFrenchcontext

Profitmanipulationperformedbymanagementcontrollersmustbeputinperspective.TheAnglo-Saxonmodelofcorporategovernanceisconsistentwithaspecificculturalcontext,andlendsfactualdata,andthereforeaccounts,aspecialstatus.Indeed,theAmericanapproachtocollectingandhandlingfactualdataisintimatelytiedtotheAmericanwayoflife.Judicialorquasi-judicialprocedures,whichareheldinhighesteem,givefundamentalvaluetomaterialproof.ThewaydataiscollectedandusedreflectstheAmericanpreferenceforaccountsthateveryoneshouldrenderpublic.Accountingstatementscorrespondperfectlytothiswayofthinking.

TheFrenchdistinguishtworolesfactualdataislikelytoplay:

enablingustounderstandbetterhowthingswork;andprovidingameansofassessingpeople.IntheFrenchsystem,confusingthesetworoles（whichisperfectlylegitimateintheUnitedStates）generatesresistance.Thecontroller’ssenseofresponsibilityalone（meaningwhathefeelsresponsiblefor,andnotwhatheneedstoaccountfor）makeshimpayattentiontoinformationhereceives.TheFrenchmodelhardlyencouragesustojudgeeachpersononthebasisofsuchdataandisopposedtosuperiorsdemandingaccountsthataretoostringent.Thatsubordinatesmayprotectthemselvesfromallhierarchical“interference”bysurroundingtheiractivityinashroudofopacityisnotconsideredanillegitimateact.

Asaconsequence,itisthelegitimacyofaccountsthatliesattheheartofthedebateinaFrenchcontext.Ingeneral,accountscan