土建学院毕业设计外文翻译中英文版.docx
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土建学院毕业设计外文翻译中英文版
Practitioner'sCorner:
AnInterestingTime
ForRealEstate
Hasthereeverbeenamoreinterestingtimeinrealestatefinance?
Happiertimes,yes,moreprofitabletimes,definitelyyes.Butmoreinteresting?
TheyearleadinguptoSeptember2008sawthecreationofrealestatefinancestructuresofbreathtakingcomplexity.sincethantimeintherealestatefinanceindustryhavebeeninvolvedmainlyintryingtounderstandwhatwentwrong,andtodeterminewhetherthecollapse,wasinanymaterialwaytheresultofflawsinthesecomplexrealestatefinancestructures.orwasitjustafunctionofexternaleconomicpressuresandthecyclicalnatureofrealestate.whilethejuryisstillout.Theanswerseemstobethatthestructuresdidnotcausetherealestaterecession,butthroughtheiropaquenaturetheymayhavemadetherecessionworse,bothbydelayingtherecognitionoftheunderlingfragilityofthemarketandbymakingtheproblems,oncerecognized,evenmoredifficulttoresolve.Onethingissure:
manypeople,whetherlegislators,regulators,lawyers,accountants,bankersorthosewhoraiseandconsumerealestatecapitalarenowworkingveryhardtoaddress
(1)howtoresolvedistressedrealestatecapitalstructures,and
(2)howtoimprovethestructuresandformofdeliveryofrealestatecapitaltothemarketinthefuture.Changebeingconsiderednowwillaffecttherealestatemarketsthroughthenextgeneration.Followingareafewexamples.RESTORINGAMERICANFINANCIALSTABILITYACTAslwritethis,theUSisbeginningitsfinaldebateoftheRESTORINGAMERICANFINANCIALSTABILITYACT,andappearstobebuildingmomentumforadoptioninsomeform,whichwouldthenrequirereconciliationwiththeequivalentHouseversion.Ifadoptedinanythinglikeitscurrentformitwillcutabroadswathofchangeacrosscurrentbusiness.Practicesbyprovidersofrealestatecapitalofallshapesandsizes.itwillgivetheFederalReserveBanknewpowersoverfinancialinstitutionsbutinturnimposemorecongressionaloversightoftheFed.Lawyersrecognizethatoftenthemostcompellinglitigationcasesleadtotheworstprecedent:
judicialover-reachinginthefaceofegregiousfacts.WillthatbethecasewiththeRAFSandtheresultingregulations?
Willwespendthenext20yearsbackingawayfromthereformsadoptedinthisatmosphereofcrisis?
Thiswillallplayoutoverthecomingmonthsandyears,wewillkeepaneyeontheprocessinthiscolumn,andaswithallsubjectscoveredinthiscolumn,wewouldwelcomehearingyourperspectiveonthis.
CALPERSANDPLACEMENTAGENTSMuchoftherealestateinvestmentmomentumovertheyear2005through2007wasfueledbyincreasedassetallocationwithinpublicemployeepensionfounds,attractedbyseeminglyhighreturns.Oneexampleofthiswasa$14billionnetincreaseincommercialrealestateinvestment9bytheCaliforniaPublicEmployeesRetirementSystem(CalPERS)asthemarketboomedin2005and2006.Notonlywasthenetexposureincreased,but,asdetailedina"RealEstateProgramReview",datedApril19,2010,bytheRealEstateUnitOftheCalPERSInvestmentOffice,"newinvestmentdisproportionallymadetohighriskinvestments".inaMemorandumaccompanyingtheProgramReviewTheRealEstateConsultanttotheCalPERS,Boardalsonotedawidevarietyoffactorsthatapparentlycontributedtothe48.2percentdeclineinNetAssetsatFairMarketValuefromJune30,2008throughJune30,2009,intheCalPERSrealestateportfolio,asfollows:
(1)Higheramountsofleverage,whichloweredincomereturnsandincreasedexposuretochangesintheassetvalue;
(2)Recoursedebt,whichexposedCalPERStorisksbeyondthespecificassets;(3)Looserprogramguidelinesgaveinvestmentstrategies;
(4Shiftingcommitmentsfromstabilizedcoreinvestmenttonon-stabilizedopportunisticinvestments,whichnowcomprisemorethan40percentofthecurrentholdingsintheportfolio;(5)Adramaticincreaseinthenumberofmanagerrelationshipsandcommingledinvestmentvehiclesprovidedlesscontrol,poorergovernanceandhinderedstaff'sabilitytoresolveproblemsandliquidateasset;(6)vintageyearconcentrationwithover$27billionofequitycommitmentsmadein2005and2006,inpartdrivenbysuccessfulmarkettimingdispositionsrealizedbycorepartner.InterestinglyneithertheRealEstateProgramReviewnorthePCAMemorandumcitetheundueinfluenceof"placementagents",generallythirdpartyconsultantswithdifferingdegreesofprofessionalandcompetence,politicalorboardconnections,andcompensationarrangementswhoundoubtedlycontributedtothe"increaseinthenumberofmanagerrelationships","looserprogramguidelines,"and"largeconcentratedinvestments."However,theCalifornialegislaturedidtakenoteofthepotentialfoeabuse.OnOctober11,2009,Governor,SchwarzeneggersignedintolawAssemblyBillNo.1584regulatingtheroleofplacementagentsandrequiringdisclosureofcontributionsorgiftstostateandlocalretirementboardmembers.ThisnowhasbeenfollowedbyAssemblyBillNo.1743,notyetenactedintolaw,whichwoulddefineplacementagentsaslobbyistsintoaccordancewithCalifornia'spoliticalreformact.Thiswouldimposestrictcontrolsovergiftsandcontributions,andwouldprohibitcompensationcontingentonanyinvestmentdecision.ThelatterprovisionproducedinitialstrongoppositionfromtheBlackstoneGroup,fromwhichitsubsequentlybackedoff.Thebillstillfacesignificantoppositionfromtradeassociation,which,notsurprisingly,prefertheregulatoryapproachofcompletedisclosureasopposedtooutrightprohibition.Allofthisisastorythatwillcontinuetounfold,withNewYorkbeinganotherstatelookingcloselyattheissue,butwhiletheissueoftheaccessisimportant,theissueofallocationandinvestmentstrategyareevenmorecritical.AsPCAconcludesinitsMemorandum:
CalPERS'experienceduringthepast28yearssuggeststhatarealestatestrategyfocusedprimarilyondirectinvestmentincore-risktypepropertieshasprovidedamoreattractiveriskadjustedreturnthanthemoreaggressiveopportunisticstrategy.PCAfindssignificantmeritintheoverallcontextoftheCalPERSinvestmentprograminpursuingalessaggressivestrategy.Withmorecontrols,thanwasinplacebetween2002and2006.Willthismeanthatpublicpensionfundsincreasinglywillfocusonthesamecore,stableassetsthatarebeingpursuedbyglobalinvestmentfund?
Perhaps,butintherealestateprogramreviewthestaffnotesthatatcurrentvaluestheCalPERSactualrealestateinvestmentportfolioisat6.8percentoftotalassesversusthetargetallocationof10percentand"thedislocationintherealestatemarketwillpresentinvestmentopportunities,whichisgoodnewsfortherealestatecapitalmarket.
FIARAANDPRIVATEPLACEMENTAsnotedabove,congressisconsideringaddingadditionalstructurestotheprivateplacementmarket.whileitisunclearhowmanyofthosestructureswillsurvivethelegislativeprocess,theFinancialIndustryRegulatoryAuthority(FINRA),actingasthewatchdogofthesecuritiesbroker-dealersandsecuritiesregisteredrepresentativeswhosellprivateplacementsof,amongotherassets,realestateandoilandgas,haspublishednewregulatoryguidanceastothe"obligationofbroker-dealerstoconductReasonableInvestigationsinRegulationDOffering".Privateplacement,orso-calledRegulationDorRegulation506offeringssoldthroughthesecuritiesbroker-dealerschannel,havealongandconstructivehistoryofraisingcapitalforsmallandmid-sizedbusiness,includingrealestateandoilandgascompanies.inthe"background"sectionofRN10-22,FINRAcitesanestimateof$609billionofsuchsecuritiesonthemarketin2008.FINRAcitesanestimateof$609billionofsuchsecuritiesonthemarketin2008.However,FINRAremindsitsmemberbroker-dealermusthavemadea"reasonableinvestigation"beforedeterminingthatasecurityis"suitable"forinvestorgenerallyandtothespecificinvestorstowhomitisbeingsold.[RN10-22]obviouslythisisallverygeneral,leavingfertilegroundforinterpretation.perhapsmoretothepointonapracticallevel,FINRAremindsbroker-dealersthattheymayconducttheirownindependentinvestigationoftheissuerandtheoffering,andnotsimplyrelyoninformationprovidedbyanindependentcounselorduediligencefirmhiredbythebroker-dealers,orthe"syndicatemanager",the"managing"broker-dealer,thebroker-dealerindependentinvestigationhastoincludeareasonableinvestigation"ataminimum"intothefollowingissuers:
(1)Theissueranditsmanagement;
(2)Thebusinessprospectsoftheissuer;
(3)Theassetsheldbyortobeacquiredbytheissuer;(4)Theclaimsbeingmade;and(5)Theintendeduseofproceedsoftheoffering[RN10-22]FINRAalsoaddaddsacautionarynoteontwoparticularareasofconcern:
(1)whenthebroker-dealerisanaffiliateoftheissuerand
(2)whenthebroker-dealerandnowtheissuerpreparetheprivateplacementmemorandum.[RN10-22]Italsoremindsbroker-dealerstolookfor"redflags",financialstatementsthat,althoughpurportedlyauditedbyanaccountant,containnumerousindicationsthatthefinancialstatementsareinaccurate.Beyondthesegeneralprinciples,afterareminderofsupervisoryanddocumentationresponsibilities,FINRAclosedthenoticewithhelpfullistofspecificareasbroker-dealersshouldincludeintheirinvestigation,including:
1.Astothe"issuersandmanagement":
a.Historicalfinancialstatements;withparticularfocusonwhethertherearecredibleauditedfinancialstatements;b.Inquiringabouttheactivitiesandcashneedsofaffiliates;c.Contactingcustomersand