安全英语工程英语Word下载.docx

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SafetyManagementSystems

1.AccidentCausationModels

Themostimportantaimofsafetymanagementistomaintainandpromoteworkers'

healthandsafetyatwork.Understandingwhyandhowaccidentsandotherunwantedeventsdevelopisimportantwhenpreventiveactivitiesareplanned.Accidenttheoriesaimtoclarifytheaccidentphenomena,andtoexplainthemechanismsthatleadtoaccidents.Allmodemtheoriesarebasedonaccidentcausationmodelswhichtrytoexplainthesequenceofeventsthatfinallyproducetheloss.Inancienttimes,accidentswereseenasanactofGodandverylittlecouldbedonetopreventthem.Inthebeginningofthe20thcentury,itwasbelievedthatthepoorphysicalconditionsaretherootcausesofaccidents.Safetypractitionersconcentratedonimprovingmachineguarding,housekeepingandinspections.Inmostcasesanaccidentistheresultoftwothings:

Thehumanact,andtheconditionofthephysicalorsocialenvironment

Petersenextendedthecausationtheoryfromtheindividualactsandlocalconditionstothemanagementsystem.Heconcludedthatunsafeacts,unsafeconditions,andaccidentsareallsymptomsofsomethingwrongintheorganizationalmanagementsystem.Furthermore,hestatedthatitisthetopmanagementwhoisresponsibleforbuildingupsuchasystemthatcaneffectivelycontrolthehazardsassociatedtotheorganization’soperation.Theerrorsdonebyasinglepersoncanbeintentionalorunintentional.RasmussenandJensenhavepresentedathree-levelskill-rule-knowledgemodelfordescribingtheoriginsofthedifferenttypesofhumanerrors.Nowadays,thismodelisoneofthestandardmethodsintheexaminationofhumanerrorsatwork.

Accident-pronenessmodelssuggestthatsomepeoplearemorelikelytosufferanaccidentthanothers.Thefirstmodelwascreatedin1919,basedonstatisticalexaminationsinamumilionsfactory.Thismodeldominatedthesafetythinkingandresearchforalmost50years,anditisstillusedinsomeorganizations.Asaresultofthisthinking,accidentwasblamedsolelyonemployeesratherthantheworkprocessorpoormanagementpractices.Sinceinvestigationstodiscovertheunderlyingcausalfactorswerefeltunnecessaryand/ortoocostly,alittleattentionwaspaidtohowaccidentsactuallyhappened.Employees*attitudestowardsrisksandrisktakinghavebeenstudied,e.g.bySulzer-Azaroff.Accordingtoher,employeesoftenbehaveunsafely,evenwhentheyarefullyawareoftherisksinvolved.Manyresearchresultsalsoshowthatthetraditionalpromotionmethodslikecampaigns,postersandsafetysloganshaveseldomincreasedtheuseofsafeworkpractices.Whenbackedupbyotheractivitiessuchastraining,thesemeasureshavebeensomewhatmoreeffective.Experiencesonsomesuccessfulmethodstochangeemployeebehaviorandattitudeshavebeenreported.Onewell-knownmethodisasmall-groupprocessusedforimprovinghousekeepinginindustrialworkplaces.AcomprehensivemodelofaccidentcausationhasbeenpresentedbyReasonwhointroducedtheconceptoforganizationalerror.Hestatedthatcorporatecultureisthestarting-pointoftheaccidentsequence.Localconditionsandhumanbehaviorareonlycontributingfactorsinthebuild-upoftheundesiredevent.Thelatentorganizationalfailuresleadtoaccidentsandincidentswhenpenetratingsystem’sdefensesandbarriers.GmoeneweghasdevelopedReason’smodelbyclassifyingthetypicallatenterrortypes.HisTRIPODmode!

callsthedifferenterrorsasGeneralFailureTypes(CFTs).Theconceptoforganizationalerrorisinconjunctionwiththefactthatsomeorganizationsbehavemoresafelythanothers.Itisoftensaidthattheseorganizationshavegoodsafetyculture.AftertheChernobylaccident,thistermbecamewell-knownalsotothepublic.

Losspreventionisaconceptthatisoftenusedinthecontextofhazardcontrolinprocessindustry.Leeshaspointedoutthatlosspreventiondiffersfromtraditionalsafetyapproachinseveralways.Forexample,thereismoreemphasisonforeseeinghazardsandtakingactionsbeforeaccidentsoccur.Also,thereismoreemphasisonasystematicratherthanatrialanderrorapproach.Thisisalsonatural,sinceaccidentsinprocessindustrycanhavecatastrophicconsequences.Besidestheinjuriestopeople,Ihedamagetoplantandlossofprofitaremajorconcernsinlossprevention.Thefutureresearchontheultimatecausesofaccidentsseemstofocusonthefunctioningandmanagementoftheorganization.Thestrategicmanagement,leadership,motivation,andthepersonnel'

svisibleandhiddenvaluesaresomeissuesthatarenowunderintensivestudy.

2.SafetyManagementasanOrganizationalActivity

Safetymanagementisoneofthemanagementactivitiesofacompany.Differentcompanieshavedifferentmanagementpractices,andalsodifferentwaystocontrolhealthandsafetyhazards.Organizationalcultureisamajorcomponentaffectingorganizationalperformanceandbehavior.OnecomprehensivedefinitionforanorganizationalculturehasbeenpresentedbyScheinwhohassaidthatorganizationalcultureis“apatternofbasicassumptions—invented,discovered,ordevelopedbyagivengroupasitleanstocopewithitsproblemsofexternaladaptationandinternalintegration—thathasworkedwellenoughtobeconsideredvalidand,therefore,tobetaughttonewmembersasthecorrectwaytoperceive,think,andfeelinrelationtothoseproblems"

.Theconceptofsafetycultureistodayunderintensivestudyinindustrializedcountries.Booth&

Leehavestatedthatanorganization'

ssafetycultureisasubsetoftheoverallorganizationalculture.Thisargument,infact,suggeststhatacompany’sorganizationalculturealsodeterminesthemaximumlevelofsafetythecompanycanreach.Thesafetycultureofanorganizationistheproductofindividualandgroupvalues,attitudes,perceptions,competencies,andpatternsofbehaviorthatdeterminethecommitmentto,andthestyleandproficiencyof,anorganization’shealthandsafetymanagement.Furthermore,organizationswithapositivesafetyculturearecharacterizedbycommunicationsfoundedonmutualtrust,bysharedperceptionsoftheimportanceofsafety,andbyconfidenceintheefficacyofpreventivemeasures.Therehavebeenmanyattemptstodevelopmethodsformeasuringsafetyculture.Williamsonelal.havesummarizedsomeofthefactorsthatthevariousstudieshaveshowntoinfluenceorganization'

ssafetyculture.Theseinclude:

organizationalresponsibilityforsafety,managementattitudestowardssafety,managementactivityinrespondingtohealthandsafetyproblems,safetytrainingandpromotion,levelofriskattheworkplace,workers'

involvementinsafety,andstatusofthesafetyofficerandthesafetycommittee.

Organizationsbehavedifferentlyinthedifferentpartsoftheworld.Thiscausesvisibledifferencesalsoinsafetyactivities,bothinemployeelevelandinthemanagementlevel.Reasonsforthesedifferencesarediscussedinthefollowing.ThestudiesofWobberevealthatshop-floorworkersintheUSAare,ingeneral,lesstrainedandlessadaptablethanthoseinGermanyorJapan.Wobbeclaimsthatonereasonforthisisthat,intheUSA,companiesprovidingfurthertrainingfortheirstaffcanexpecttolosethesepeopletothecompetitors.ThisisnotsocommoninEuropeorinJapan.Furthermore,forunionizedcompaniesintheUSA,seniorityisvaluedveryhighly,whiletrainingorindividual’sskillsandqualificationsdonoteffectjobsecurity,employment,andwagelevelsverymuch.Oxenburghhasstudiedthetotalcostsofabsencefromwork,andfoundthatlocalcultureandlegislationhasastrongeffectonabsenteeismrates.Forexample,thenationalsystemsforpayingandreceivingcompensationexplainthedifferencestosomeextent.OxenburghmentionsSwedenasahighabsenteeismcountry,andAustraliaasalowabsenteeismcountry.InSwedeninjuriesandillnessesarepaidbythestatesocialsecuritysystem,whileinAustralia,theemployerpaysallthesecosts,includingillnessesnotrelatedtowork.Comparisonofaccidentstatisticsrevealsthattherearegreatnationaldifferencesinaccidentfrequenciesandintheaccidentrelatedabsenteeismfromwork.Someofthedifferencescanbeexplainedbythedifferentaccidentreportingsystems.Forexample,insomecountriesonlyabsenteeismlastingmorethanthreeworkingdaysisincludedinthestatistics.Thefrequencyofminoraccidentsvariesalotaccordingtothepossibilitytoarrangesubstitutiveworktotheinjuredworker.PlacingtheinjuredworkertoanotherjobortotrainingisacommonpracticeforexampleintheUSAandintheUK,whileintheScandinaviancountriesthisisararelyusedprocedure

Someorganizationsaremoreawareoftheimportanceofhealthandsafetyatworkthanothers.Cleardevelopmentstagescanbefoundintheprocessofimprovingthemanagementofsafety.Waringhasdividedorganizationstothreeclassesaccordingtotheirmaturityandabilitytocreateaneffectivesafetymanagementsystem.Waringcallsthethreeorganizationalmodelsasthemechanicalmodel,thesocio-technicalmodel,andthehumanactivitysystemapproach.Inthemechanicalmodel,thestructuresandprocessesofanorganizationarewell-definedandlogical,butpeopleasindividuals,groups,andthewholeorganizationsarenotconsidered.Thesocio-technicalmodelisanapproachtoworkdesignwhichrecognizestheinteractionoftechnology'

andpeople,andwhichproducesworksystemsthataretechnicallyeffectiveandhavecharactersthatleadtohighjobsatisfaction.Apositivedimensioninthismodelisthathumanfactorsareseenimportant,forexample,incommunication,trainingandemergencyresponses.Thelastmodel,thehumanactivitysyste

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