家族企业收购私募股权和战略变革文献翻译.docx

家族企业收购私募股权和战略变革文献翻译.docx

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家族企业收购私募股权和战略变革文献翻译

原文：

Family-FirmBuyouts,PrivateEquity,andStrategicChange

TheEuropeanprivateequityandbuyoutmarket'hasgrowninprominenceoverrecentyears.TheCentreforManagementBuyoutResearch（CMBOR，2008）hasshownthattheannualnumberofmanagementbuyoutsrosefroml212in1998to1,436bytheendof2007.Buyoutsoffamilyfirmsrepresentoneofthemostimportantfeaturesofthismarket,withthenumberofdealsincreasingfrom45in1998to559in2007andthecombinedvaluefrom11.2billionto18,3billionoverthesameperiod.In2007familyfirmscontributed38%ofthenumberand11%ofthevalueofthewholeEuropeanbuyoutmarket.

Managementbuyouts（MBO）andbuy-ins（MBI）thusrepresentanimportantsuccessionoptioninfamilyfirms.Theyalsoprovideanimportantdealsourceforprivateequityfirms.Yet,whilemuchattentionintheprivateequityandbuyoutmarkethasbeenonlargepublic-to-privatetransactions,thefamilybuyoutpartofthemarketisnotwellunderstood（Cumming,SiegelandWright，2007）.Thefocusinlargepublic-to-privatetransactionsanddivisionalbuyoutshasbeenontheresolutionofincentiveandcontrolproblemsthroughtheintroductionofnewownershipandgovernancestructuresintheformofmanagerialequityownership,commitmentandpressuretoservicedebt,andinmanycasesownershipandactiveinvolvementbyprivateequityfirms（WrightandBruining，2008）.Incontrast,thetypicalfamilyfirmhastraditionallybeenassumedtobeownedandmanagedbyaconcentratedgroupoffamilymemberswherethefirm'sobjectivesarecloselylinkedtofamilyobjectives.Familiestypicallydonotregardtheirfirmsasmereeconomicunitspursuingthegoalofprofitmaximization.Instead,familiesalsostrivefornoneconomicgoals.Asaresult,thetightnessofgripofafamilyoveritsfirmaddsanimportantdimensiontotheanalysisofthestrategiesoffamilyfirms.

Thechangesoccurringonthebuyoutofafamilyfirmmayleadtochangesingoalsandstrategiescomparedtothepreviousownershipregime,andthesestrategicchangesmayinfluencefirmsurvivalorfailure.Thechangeinstrategyismotivatedbyoneofthefollowingtwofactors;first,thefirmmayhavebeenunderperformingandnewstrategiesmustbeadoptedtocorrectthis（efficiencybuyout）.Second,thenewownerswillhavethefreedomtopursuetheirowninterestsintermsofbusinessdirectionand/ordiversification（growth/expansionbuyout）.Thepresenceoffounders,shareholdingnon-familymanagers,ornonfamilynon-executivedirectorsontheboardmayhavedifferenteffectsonthebuyoutprocessandonthebusinessstrategiesadoptedbeforeandafterthebuyout.Changesinstrategyarealsoduetotheownershipandgovernanceofthefirmbeforethebuyoutaswellasthenewfinancialstructureandtheneedtomeetresultantservicingcosts.

Inlightoftheseissues,thepurposeofthisarticleistwofold;

1.Weprovideanoverviewofdevelopmentsinthefamily-firmbuyoutmarket.Specifically,weexaminetrendsinthenumberandvalueofdeals,dealsizes,shareofthetotalbuyoutmarket,employment,andtheroleofprivateequity.WeuseCMBOR'suniquedatabasecomprisingthepopulationof30,000Europeanbuyoutsasthesourceforthisanalysis.

2.Weundertakeadetailedstudyofstrategicchangesinfamilyfirmsasaresultofabuyout.Specifically,weexaminewhetherchangesinthestrategyofformerprivatefamilyfirmsareaffectedbytheownershipandgovernanceofthefirmbeforethebuyout.Theseissuesareexaminedusinganovelhand-collectedrepresentativequestionnairesurveyof104privatefamilyfirmsacrossEuropewhichhadabuyoutfundedbyprivateequitybetween1994and2003.

Familyfirmsprovideaconstantandabundantsourceofpotentialtargetsforincumbentmanagersandprivateequity（PE）companies.Buyoutsoffamilyfirmsenabletheresolutionofsuccessionproblemsand.Bycatalyzingentrepreneurialactivity,canimprovetheoperatingefficiencyofthefirmandenablegrowth.Thissectionpresentsanoverviewoftrendsinthisimportantpartofthebuyoutmarket,focusingonnumberandvalueofdeals,dealsizes,shareofthetotalbuyoutmarket,employment,andtheroleofprivateequity.Alldatarefertobuyouttransactionsoffamilyfirmsunlessotherwisestated,andalldatarefertoEuropeunlessotherwisestated.

In2007,559family-firmbuyoutsandbuy-inswererecordedbyCMBORacrossEurope,amountingtoatotalvalueof18.3billion.Therehadbeenadipinbuyoutactivitybetween2000and2003,inlinewithasomewhatweakeroverallbuyoutmarketduringthatperiod.Sincethenbuyoutactivityinfamilyfirmshasrecovered,andthe2007figurewasanewrecordbynumberandvalue.

AcomparisonoftrendsbycountryrevealsthattheincreaseindealnumbershasbeenrelativelyuniformacrossmostofEurope.Overthepast10years,buyoutactivityintermsofnumberoftransactionshasincreasedinmostnationalmarkets.Thetotalvalueoffamily-firmbuyoutshasfluctuatedonanannualbasisinmanyoftheEuropeanmarkets,andnoclearpatternhasemerged.However,duetotheriseinnumberofthistypeofbuyout,thetotalvaluereachedanewrecordin2007.

Theaveragedealsizeofbuyoutsoffamilyfirmsismuchlowerthantheaveragedealsizeofalltransactions.Thetrendintheaveragedealsizeoffamilybuyoutsoverthepast10yearsshowsthatthesedealshaveremainedatarelativelyconstantlevelofabout26m,whileaveragedealsizeforallbuyoutshasincreasedsignificantly,from36min1998toalmost120millionin2007.Thisincreasinggapreflectsthemajorgrowthinlargepublic-to-privates,divestments,andsecondarybuyoutsacrossEuropeinrecentyears.

Familyfirmshavebeenaconstantandabundantsourceofbuyouts.Between1998and2007,about29%ofallbuyoutsinEuropewerefamily-firmtransactions.However,thesedealsrepresentedonly11%ofthetotalvalueofallbuyoutsoverthisperiod,furtherunderliningthefactthatbuyoutsinfamilyfirmsaregenerallymuchsmallerthanothertypesofbuyouts.

Overthelast10years,theproportionofthebuyoutmarketaccountedforbyfamily-firmdealsdecreaseduntil2002（23.2%）andstartedtoriseagainin2004,reaching38.3%ofdealnumbersbytheendof2007.Theproportionofthetotalmarketaccountedforbyfamily-firmbuyoutsbasedontotalvaluealsosawasharpdeclinefrom1998to2000.Sincethenthevalueoffamily-firmbuyoutshasfluctuatedbetween10%and15%oftotalmarketvalue.

Aninternationalcomparisonofthe10-yearaveragesoftheshareofthebuyoutmarketattributabletofamily-firmdealsshowssignificantvariationbetweencountries.InFrance,Italy,Spain,andtheUK,thisproportionisathirdormoreofalltransactionsintermsofdealnumbers.Apossiblereasonmightbethatthesecountriescontainaconsiderablestockoffamilyfirms,thusfuelingbuyouttransactions.

GermanyshowsasurprisinglylowmarketsharegivenitshugenumberoffamilyownedMittelstandcompanies.ThismaybelinkedtothegeneralpoorunderstandingandpossiblemistrustofprivateequityandalsothecloselinksGermancompanieshavehadhistoricallywiththeirlocalbanks.

Ananalysisofthe10-yearaveragenumberofemployeespercompanyshowsthatthesizeoftheformerfamilyfirmsvariesconsiderablyamongEuropeancountries.WhileGermanfamilyfirmshavebeenwellaboveaverage,UKfamilyfirmsaregenerallysmallerandbelowtheEuropeanaverage.

Buyoutscanbefinancedbyindividualsusingtheirownfinancialresourcesalongwithbankdebtorbyprivateequity（PE）firmsoracombination.Themajorityofbuyoutsoffamilyfirmsarebackedbyafinancialsponsorwiththe10-yearaverageshowingthat62%oflitbuyoutsoffamilyfirmswerePE-backed.

Non-PE-backedbuyoutsaresignificantlysmallerthanPE-backedtransactionsforfamilyfirms.Overthelast10years,theaveragedealsizeofnon-PE-backedfamilyfirmbuyoutswasabout7m,comparedwithanaveragedealsizeofabout41mforPE-backeddealsfromthissource.Family-firmbuyoutsthusrepresentanimportantsourceofdealsforprivateequityfirms.

Family-firmcharacteristicsbeforeaprivateequity-backedbuyoutmayinfluencethedegreeandfocusofstrategicchangesafterabuyout.Weexaminecharacteristicsrelatingtoownershipandfounders'involvementpre-buyout,ownershipstakeofnon-familymanagementpre-buyout,existenceofnon-family,nonexecutivedirectorspre-buyout,andmanagementandprivateequityfirmparticipationinsuccessionplanning.Ourevidenceisbasedonarepresentativesurveyof104privatefamilyfirmsacrossEuropewhichhadabuyoutfundedbyprivateequitybetween1994and2003.Abroaddefinitionwasadopted,withafamilyfirmdefinedashavingmorethan50%oftheordinaryvotingsharesownedorcontrolledbyasinglefamilygrouprelatedbybloodormarriage,andthefirmisperceivedtobeafamilybusiness.

Therespondentswereinseniorpositions:

CEOspresidents（83%）,directorsincludingdeputyCEO（15%）,andseniormanagement（2%）.Thestrategyofthefirmiscomparedbeforeandafterthebuyoutwheregrowth/expansion.Thesamplewasdividedintovarioussubgroupsrelatedtothecompanycharacteristicsconcerningownershipandmanagement.Universityanalysiswasthenusedtodeterminewhethertheobservedchangesinstrategyofthesesubgroupswassignificant.

Whenthefamilyfirmhadbeenfoundedbythepreviousowners,thechangesinstrategypost-buyoutaregenerallymorenumerousandmoresignificantthanwhenthefirmhadbeenpurchasedorinheritedbythepre-buyoutowners.Thisimpliesthatthefounder/ownerhasbeendominantintermsofdecidingcompanystrategyandthatonceshe/herelinquishesownership,thema