迈克尔 波特在哈佛商业评论上发表的一篇关于战略的经典文章Word格式.docx

迈克尔 波特在哈佛商业评论上发表的一篇关于战略的经典文章Word格式.docx

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tocompetitiveandmarketchanges.Theymustbenchmark

continuouslytoachievebestpractice.Theymustoutsource

aggressivelytogainefficiencies.Andtheymustnuttureafewcore

competenciesintheracetostayaheadofrivals.

Positioning-oncetheheartofstrategy-isrejectedastoostaticfor

today’sdynamicmarketsandchangingtechnologies.Accordingto

thenewdogma,rivalscanquicklycopyanymarketposition,and

competitiveadvantageis,atbest,temporary.

Butthosebeliefsaredangeroushalf-truths,andtheyareleading

moreandmorecompaniesdownthepathofmutuallydestructive

competition.True,somebarrierstocompetitionarefallingas

regulationeasesandmarketsbecomeglobal.True,companies

haveproperlyinvestedenergyinbecomingleanerandmore

nimble.Inmanyindustries,however,whatsomecall

hypercompetitionisaself-inflictedwound,nottheinevitable

outcomeofachangingparadigmofcompetition.

Therootoftheproblemisthefailuretodistinguishbetween

operationaleffectivenessandstrategy.Thequestforproductivity,

quality,andspeedhasspawnedaremarkablenumberof

managementtoolsandtechniques:

totalqualitymanagement,

`benchmarking,time-basedcompetition,outsourcing,partnering,

reengineering,changemanagement.Althoughtheresulting

operationalimprovementshaveoftenbeendramatic,many

companieshavebeenfrustratedbytheirinabilitytotranslatethoseChoose

gainsintosustainableprofitability.Andbitbybit,almostimperceptibly,managementtoolshavetakentheplaceofstrategy.Asmanagerspushtoimproveonallfronts,theymovefartherawayfromviablecompetitivepositions.Operationaleffectivenessandstrategyarebothessentialtosuperiorperformance,which,afterall,istheprimarygoalofanyenterprise.Buttheyworkinverydifferentways.

Acompanycanoutperformrivalsonlyifitcanestablishadifferencethatitcanpreserve.Itmustdelivergreatervaluetocustomersorcreatecomparablevalueatalowercost,ordoboth.Thearithmeticofsuperiorprofitabilitythenfollows:

deliveringgreater,valueallowsacompanytochargehigheraverageunitprices;

greaterefficiencyresultsinloweraverageunitcosts.

Ultimately,alldifferencesbetweencompaniesincostorpricederivefromthehundredsofactivitiesrequiredtocreate,produce,sell,anddelivertheirproductsorservices,suchascallingoncustomers,assemblingfinalproducts,andtrainingemployees.Costis

generatedbyperformingactivities,andcostadvantagearisesfromperformingparticularactivitiesmoreefficientlythancompetitors.Similarly,differentiationarisesfromboththechoiceofactivitiesandhowtheyareperformed.Activities,then,arethebasicunitsofcompetitiveadvantage.Overalladvantageordisadvantageresultsfromallacompany’sactivities,notonlyafew.’

OperationaleffectivenessfOE）meansperformingsimilaractivitiesbetterthanrivalsperformthem.Operationaleffectivenessincludesbutisnotlimitedtoefficiency.Itreferstoanynumberofpracticesthatallowacompanytobetterutilizeitsinputsby,forexample,reducingdefectsinproductsordevelopingbetterproductsfaster.Incontrast,strategicpositioningmeansperformingdifferentactivitiesfromrivals’orperformingsimilaractivitiesindifferentways.

GRAPH:

OperationalEffectivenessVersusStrategicPositioning

Differencesinoperationaleffectivenessamongcompaniesarepervasive.Some

companiesareabletogetmoreoutoftheirinputsthanothersbecausetheyeliminatewastedeffort,employmoreadvancedtechnology,motivateemployeesbetter,orhavegreaterinsightintomanagingparticularactivitiesorsetsofactivities.Suchdifferencesinoperationaleffectivenessareanimportantsourceofdifferencesinprofitabilityamongcompetitorsbecausetheydirectlyaffectrelativecostpositionsandlevelsof

differentiation.

DifferencesinoperationaleffectivenesswereattheheartoftheJapanesechallengetoWesterncompaniesinthe1980s.TheJapaneseweresofaraheadofrivalsinoperationaleffectivenessthattheycouldofferlowercostandsuperiorqualityatthesametime.Itisworthdwellingonthispoint,becausesomuchrecentthinkingaboutcompetitiondependsonit.Imagineforamomentaproductivityfrontierthatconstitutesthesumofallexistingbestpracticesatanygiventime.Thinkofitasthemaximumvaluethatacompanydeliveringaparticularproductorservicecancreateatagivencost,usingthebestavailabletechnologies,skills,managementtechniques,andpurchasedinputs.The

productivityfrontiercanapplytoindividualactivities,togroupsoflinkedactivitiessuchasorderprocessingandmanufacturing,andtoanentirecompany’sactivities.Whenacompanyimprovesitsoperationaleffectiveness,itmovestowardthefrontier.Doingsomayrequirecapitalinvestment,differentpersonnel,orsimplynewwaysofmanaging.Theproductivityfrontierisconstantlyshiftingoutwardasnewtechnologiesand

managementapproachesaredevelopedandasnewinputsbecomeavailable.Laptopcomputers,mobilecommunications,theInternet,andsoftwaresuchasLotusNotes,forexample,haveredefinedtheproductivityfrontierforsales-forceoperationsandcreatedrichpossibilitiesforlinkingsaleswithsuchactivitiesasorderprocessingandafter-sales

support.Similarly,leanproduction,whichinvolvesafamilyofactivities,hasallowedsubstantialimprovementsinmanufacturingproductivityandassetutilization.

Foratleastthepastdecade,managershavebeenpreoccupiedwithimproving

operationaleffectiveness.ThroughprogramssuchasTQM,time-basedcompetition,andbenchmarking,theyhavechangedhowtheyperformactivitiesinordertoeliminate

inefficiencies,improvecustomersatisfaction,andachieve,bestpractice.Hopingtokeepupwithshiftsintheproductivity‘frontier,managershaveembracedcontinuousimprovement,empowerment,changemanagement,andtheso-calledlearning

organization.Thepopularityofoutsourcingandthevirtualcorporationreflectthegrowingrecognitionthatitisdifficulttoperformallactivitiesasproductivelyasspecialists.Ascompaniesmovetothefrontier,theycanoftenimproveonmultipledimensionsofperformanceatthesametime.Forexample,manufacturersthatadoptedtheJapanesepracticeofrapidchangeoversinthe1980swereabletolowercostandimprove

differentiationsimultaneously.Whatwereoncebelievedtoberealtrade-offs-betweendefectsandcosts,forexample-turnedouttobeillusionscreatedbypooroperationaleffectiveness.Managershavelearnedtorejectsuchfalsetrade-offs.

Constantimprovementinoperationaleffectivenessisnecessarytoachievesuperiorprofitability.However,itisnotusuallysufficient.Fewcompanieshavecompetedsuccessfullyonthebasisofoperationaleffectivenessoveranextendedperiod,andstayingaheadofrivalsgetshardereveryday.Themostobviousreasonforthatistherapiddiffusionofbestpractices.Competitorscanquicklyimitatemanagementtechniques,newtechnologies,inputimprovements,andsuperiorwaysofmeetingcustomers’needs.Themostgenericsolutions-thosethatcanbeusedinmultiplesettings-diffusethefastest.WitnesstheproliferationofOEtechniquesacceleratedbysupportfromconsultants.

OEcompetitionshiftstheproductivityfrontieroutward,effectivelyraisingthebarfor

everyone.Butalthoughsuchcompetitionproducesabsoluteimprovementinoperationaleffectiveness,itleadstorelativeimprovementfornoone.Considerthe$5billion-plusU.S.commercial-printingindustry.Themajorplayers-R.R.Donnelley&

amp;

SonsCompany,Quebecor,WorldColorPress,andBigFlowerPress-arecompetingheadtohead,servingalltypesofcustomers,offeringthesamearrayofprintingtechnologies（gravureandweboffset）,investingheavilyinthesamenewequipment,runningtheirpressesfaster,andreducingcrewsizes.Buttheresultingmajorproductivitygainsarebeingcapturedbycustomersandequipmentsuppliers,notretainedinsuperiorprofitability.Even

industry-leaderDonnelley’sprofitmargin,consistentlyhigherthan7%inthe1980s,felltolessthan4.6%in1995.Thispatternisplayingitselfoutinindustryafterindustry.EventheJapanese,pioneersofthenewcompetition,sufferfrompersistentlylowprofits.（Seetheinsert&

quot;

JapaneseCompaniesRarelyHaveStrategies.&

）

Thesecondreasonthatimprovedoperationaleffectivenessisinsufficient-competitive

convergence-ismoresubtleandinsidious.Themorebenchmarkingcompaniesdo,themoretheylookalike.Themorethatrivalsoutsourceactivitiestoefficientthirdparties,oftenthesameones,themoregenericthoseactivitiesbecome.Asrivalsimitateoneanother’simprovementsinquality,cycletimes,orsupplierpartnerships,strategiesconvergeandcompetitionbecomesaseriesofracesdownidenticalpathsthatnoonecanwin.Competitionbasedonoperationaleffectivenessaloneismutuallydestructive,leadingtowarsofattritionthatcanbearrestedonlybylimitingcompetition.

TherecentwaveofindustryconsolidationthroughmergersmakessenseinthecontextofOEcompetition.Drivenbyperformancepressuresbutlackingstrategicvision,companyaftercompanyhashadnobetterideathantobuyupitsrivals.Thecompetitorsleftstandingareoftenthosethatoutlastedothers,notcompanieswithrealadvantage.Afteradecadeofimpressivegainsinoperationaleffectiveness,manycompaniesarefacingdiminishingreturns.Continuous